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ABSTRACT 

Shipping is a fragmented, global industry operating in a culturally diverse 
environment. As a result of rising maritime accident rates and pollution incidents in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the I nternational Maritime Organisation introduced two 
conventions that entered fully into force in 2002: the International Management 
Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and Pollution Prevention (ISM Code), and the 
1995 revision of the 1978 Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Code). 
Introduction of the conventions served to focus the attention of the international 
maritime community on the need to raise industry-wide safety standards, but 
questions were raised about whether it was possible to develop a safety culture in a 
fragmented, global industry and what effects the diversity of cultures might have 
upon implementation of the ISM Code. This study explores those questions. 
Subsequent to a review of the literature, a model of the working of the ISM Code 
is developed and used to identify the constraints and pressures, particularly those 
that might be influenced by cultural values and attitudes, that impact upon the 
development and implementation of a Safety Management System in individual 
shipping organisations, which is the essence of the ISM Code. 
A comparative case study methodology is adopted for the empirical research and 
a number of investigative techniques are used to test the ISM Code model and 
obtain both qualitative and quantitative data to determine whether the impact of 
culturally influenced constraints and pressures would be best addressed by 
stricter enforcement of existing regulatory provisions or greater emphasis on 
education and training. 
From analysis of the data collected, the study concluded that: 
• 	 Professional, vocational and safety training correctly utilised are effective 
in harmonising culturally influenced safety perspectives, thus improving 
safety performance; and 
• 	 Culturally influenced constraints and pressures can be dealt with by the 
application of standard management techniques which, in a multi-cultural 
environment requires good cross-cultural management skills. 
The most common method of determining how effective a company has been in 
dealing with the various constraints and pressures affecting safety performance is 
to evaluate the efficacy of the organisation's Safety Management System by 
analysis of accident records, lost time incidents and hazardous occurrences 
(ACNSI, 1993). These data, reported under the provisions of Clause 9 of the ISM 
Code, are therefore analysed and compared with an industry sector benchmark. 
The study however, goes beyond such a purely quantitative approach and 
establishes the relative safety climate of the case study companies by means of 
perceptual audit of salient, safety-related factors. This qualitative technique 
draws together all the main research elements of the study and a Safety Climate 
Comparator is developed that provides a useful indicator of the relative status of 
those culturally influenced factors that ultimately affect a company's safety 
performance. By extension, the technique may be used to provide a Relative 
Safety Culture Maturity Model to measure the safety climate of other shipping 
companies relative to a benchmark standard. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION, 

CONTEXT AND APPROACH 

TO THE STUDY 

CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 

This study sets out to determine what obstacles the global diversity of cultures 
presents to the development and implementation of safe practices throughout the 
shipping industry and by what means it may be possible to overcome those 
obstacles. 
The overriding statutory instrument governing operational safety within the 
shipping industry today is the International Management Code for the Safe 
Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention, otherwise known as the 
International Safety Management Code or simply the ISM Code. Using material 
drawn from a review of the relevant literature and the provisions of the ISM Code 
itself, a multi-stage model of the working of the ISM Code is developed, in part to 
assist with making predictions regarding the effectiveness with which safety 
management systems of individual companies meet the objectives of the Code 
and in the main to provide an organising framework to help identify: 
• 	 Where and in what manner cultural influences might reasonably be 
expected to impact upon the interpretation and implementation of the 
provisions of the ISM Code; and 
• 	 The industry levels at which empirical research could most beneficially be 
carried out to better identify the impact of those cultural influences on the 
implementation of the provisions of the ISM Code in shipping 
organisations. 
1 
From a review of the literature and subsequent empirical research, the study aims to 
determine whether stricter enforcement of existing regulations, possibly by Port 
State Control inspectorates (a practice that recognises heterogeneity), or greater 
emphasis on education and training such as that provided for in the 1995 revision of 
the 1978 Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers (STCW Code) (an attempt at homogeneity) is the better path to follow to 
counter the effects of those culturally influenced constraints and pressures upon the 
way shipping companies interpret and implement the ISM Code. 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO SAFETY LEGISLATION IN THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
Ninety-five percent of world trade by volume - raw materials, finished goods and 
energy supplies - is transported by sea (Slater, 2001) and a large amount of 
capital is invested in shipping. The world wide ship building order book at June 
2001 stood at US$ 54 billion, with a total of 1,824 new vessels due for delivery 
within two to three years (Papa/exis, 2001). By July 2005 the number of ships on 
order had increased to 4,324 vessels totalling 226.7 million dwt (SSMR, 2005). 
Shipping is inherently a global industry. A ship built in one country may be owned 
by a company incorporated in another country, flagged out to a third country, 
managed by a company in another country, crewed by nationals of yet another 
country and trade internationally. This has led to difficulties both in establishing 
and in policing common safety standards throughout the industry. However, if 
safety rules differ, or if they are interpreted differently from one country to another, 
then an unnecessary and unwanted element of uncertainty and possibly confusion 
would be introduced into international maritime voyages with the potential for 
serious resultant consequences. 
2 
Internationally recognised standards of safety within the shipping industry are 
therefore, of the utmost importance, not only to ensure human safety and 
protection of the marine environment, but also for purely economic reasons. 
In order to achieve an industry-wide safety-culture there must be rules and 
regulations specifying minimum standards for the building, operation and 
maintenance of ships, and there must also be a common understanding of those 
rules and regulations. Procedural and technical safety rules and regulations result 
from past experience, technical progress, scientific research, reflective deliberation 
and risk assessment. Where necessary, they are codified by State legislatures 
and the resultant statutes, such as the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 in 
England and Wales, are implemented by public and commercial organisations, 
monitored by executive bodies such as the United Kingdom Health and Safety 
Executive and, in the event of severe breaches, enforced by the judiciary. 
Many safety rules also exist that are not subject to legislative enforcement but do 
carry persuasive force. The standards developed by the Society of International 
Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) (McGuire and White, 1996) and 
the Rules For the Classification of Steel Ships developed by the Classification 
Societies such as Bureau Veritas (Bureau Veritas, 2004) are examples of safety 
rules that have persuasive rather than legislative force. 
Seafaring has traditionally been regarded as a hazardous occupation. HistOrically, 
the main hazards were associated with perils of the sea because sailing vessels 
were very much at the mercy of the elements, although not all hazards were the 
result of natural providence: poor workmanship, overloading of vessels and failure 
to maintain vessels in a seaworthy condition also played their part. 
3 
..... 
With the advent of the industrial revolution came the use of iron and steel to 
construct ships and development of steam and internal combustion engines to 
power them. Ships were no longer so susceptible to the vagaries of the elements. 
The invention of the telegraph in the mid-nineteenth century made rapid 
communications possible, and by the latter part of the nineteenth century a global 
communications network was in existence. Ever more rapid and ever cheaper 
means of communication, coupled with ships that were no longer dependant upon 
wind power for propulsion, resulted in more companies being able to trade in a 
much wider market place than ever before. 
With the industrial revolution at its height in Britain there was an increasing need 
for imports to supply raw materials for the fabrication of finished goods for export. 
International trade soared. As Amin (Amin, 1997) quoting Hirst and Thompson 
(1996) pointed out, at the height of the imperial age between 1878 and 1914 
international flows of investment, exports and people exceeded current levels. 
However, commensurate with technical progress and the increase in shipping in 
the nineteenth century, there was also an increase in the losses of ships and their 
crews. New hazards more readily associated with industrial accidents than with 
perils of the sea were introduced to seafaring. 
In 1836 in response to growing public concern about maritime safety, the British 
government appointed a committee to investigate the growing number of 
shipwrecks. Subsequently, in 1850 legislation was passed creating the Marine 
Department of the Board of Trade with a brief to enforce laws governing crewing, 
crew competency, and the operation of merchant vessels. 
4 
II Plld 
Regulations were introduced requiring Masters, Mates and Engineers of British 
ships to be in possession of Certificates of Competency, issued by the Board of 
Trade. British seafarers could sit examinations for the Certificates in centres world 
wide and the Marine Department of the Board of Trade was responsible for 
ensuring uniformity of standards at all examination centres. 
In response to public pressure to improve the safety of shipping, the British 
government also enacted the Merchant Shipping Act of 1875 providing inter alia for 
the marking of a load line on the hull of every ocean going cargo ship flying the 
British flag or leaving a British port. Subsequent adoption of similar regulations by 
other States for vessels flying their own national flags resulted in the introduction of 
the International Load Line. 
In 1914 the British government convened an international conference with the aim of 
establishing international maritime safety regulations. The outcome of the 
conference was the adoption of the first Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS). According to Ozgayir (Ozgayir, 2001) the title of the Convention was 
significant because it was the first time in shipping history that protection of human 
life rather than vessels and their cargoes became a priority. 
Due to the outbreak of the First World War the SOLAS Convention of 1914 was not 
implemented and it was not until 1929 when the United Kingdom hosted another 
conference that a second SOLAS Convention was adopted, the Convention entering 
into force in 1933. Subsequently, at a further conference in 1948 hosted by the 
United Kingdom the third SOLAS Convention was adopted and in the same year the 
newly established United Nations Organisation began to take an interest in the 
regulation of international shipping. 
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1.3 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION 

From the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century the United Kingdom 
dominated the international shipping industry. British shipping companies carried 
over 50% of world trade, owned a similar percentage of world tonnage and Britain 
was the world's leading shipbuilding nation (Talbot-Booth, circa 1940; Aldcroft, 
1968; Podolny & Scott-Morton, 1998). This enabled the United Kingdom 
government to exercise sufficiently strong administrative control to impose uniform, 
internationally recognised, maritime rules throughout the world shipping industry. 
Political and sociological changes during the twentieth century led to cultural and 
organisational fragmentation within the industry. Today, ship ownership is 
predominately in the hands of Greek and Chinese companies (Lloyd's Maritime 
Directory 2001; 2000), the leading ship building nations are Japan and Korea (Guide 
to Shipbuilding, Repair and Maintenance 200012001; 2000), and ships' crews are 
drawn mainly from the former eastern bloc countries, the Philippines and the Indian 
SUb-continent (Seafarers International Research Centre, 1999) with Filipino 
seafarers accounting for approximately 20% of the shipping industry's total labour 
force (International Transport Workers Federation, 1998). 
This administrative, organisational and cultural fragmentation within the shipping 
industry is the manifestation of a phenomenon recognised by Frobel et al (1980) as 
a new international division of labour. According to Frobel, global reproduction of 
Western economic institutions has resulted in the transplantation of many Western 
dominated industries to other regions around the world where cheaper labour forces 
are available, resulting in considerable restructuring of trans-national companies 
and industries, and subsequent problems associated with the restructuring. 
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Fragmentation in the shipping industry in the twentieth century led to increasing 
difficulties in establishing and policing uniform safety standards throughout the 
industry. In 1948 the United Nations Organisation (UN) convened a conference in 
Geneva to consider regulation of international shipping, which led to the introduction 
of a Convention establishing the International Maritime Consultative Organisation 
(IMCO) as an agency of the United Nations. The Convention was ratified in 1958 by 
a quorum of UN Member States and IMCO, renamed the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) in 1982, convened its first meeting in 1959. 
1.4 IMO AND SOlAS 
When a qualified majority of signatory States ratify an IMO Convention the 
provisions of that Convention enter into force. By this means IMO introduced a 
series of internationally applicable regulations, commencing with the 1960 revision 
of the 1948 SOLAS Convention, followed inter alia by the 1974 Convention on 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), (fMO 1991; 1986), the 1978 Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 
Convention) and a substantial revision of the 1978 STCW Convention in 1995. 
But according to an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
report (OECD, 1996), the legislative approach had not been effective in raising 
levels of safety in shipping operations and practice, possibly because the resources 
necessary to police the situation have not always been forthcoming and also there 
are economic advantages to be gained by ship owners who avoid following the 
rules. The report concluded that enforcement and implementation of SOLAS 
regulations varied from one country to another and from one owner to another, with 
unscrupulous owners disregarding even the most basic safety requirements. 
7 
Contrary to the view expressed by the OEeD, the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) (Health and Safety Executive, 1999) is of the opinion that 
short-term financial gains resulting from perceived competitive advantages from 
non-observance of rules and standards, agreed by convention to be safe, might well 
be outweighed by long term economic disadvantages, the appreciation of which 
might in itself be subject to differing cultural interpretation between companies 
based in developing countries and those based in developed countries. 
The impact of economic forces in today's shipping industry may also have been 
somewhat mitigated by the current profitability of the industry. Beale (Beale, 2004) 
estimated the 2003 earnings of ship owners at US$11 Obn and their profit at $80bn 
resulting from the 'best-ever trading conditions'. Beale noted also that despite the 
world fleet recently increasing in size and value, ship owners were paying 30% 
less in insurance premiums than a decade ago. The presumption therefore is that 
ship owners are getting much better returns on their investments than hitherto and 
economic forces are thus less pressing than previously. 
The significance of economic forces on the way a business is managed was also 
questioned by Drucker (Drucker, 1996) who argued that people, not forces create 
and manage a business and management's actions are not determined, but 
merely constrained, by economic forces. 
Constraints imposed by economic forces are however, recognised as being 
important influences on the development and implementation of safety 
management systems, safe working practices and personal safety awareness, 
(Weyman, 1998). 
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1.5 THE INTERNATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT CODE 

In 1994 in an endeavour to ensure uniform implementation of the provisions of 
international Conventions regarding maritime safety and environmental protection, 
IMO introduced as an amendment to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, the International 
Management Code for the safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention, 
otherwise known simply as the ISM Code, which applies not only to ships and their 
crews but also to ship owners, managers and operating companies. In the terms 
used by Lau et al (1996) drawing on McMahan and Woodman (1992), the 
introduction of the ISM Code was a standard system-wide intervention. 
Central to the ISM Code is a requirement for each ship operating company to 
establish and implement a Safety Management System (SMS). However, the ISM 
Code is prescriptive in outcome rather than prescriptive in process, and in 
recognition of the global nature of shipping and the wide differentials existing within 
the industry, the Code was drafted in broad terms based upon general principles 
and objectives (ISM Code, Preamble, para.4 and 5), allowing sufficient latitude to 
accommodate the specific needs and varied conditions facing individual ship owners 
and operators. 
The report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 1996), although written prior to implementation of the ISM Code, 
acknowledged that its impending introduction represented the latest attempt to 
improve minimum standards of safety and provided owners and operators with a 
useful industry-wide organisational framework to co-ordinate the improvement effort. 
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Implementation of the ISM Code was forecast to result in lower insurance claims 
and hence premiums (Barr, 1999) and a recent survey carried out by the Swedish 
Club, a ship owners' mutual protection and indemnity insurance association, 
indicated that members of the Club who had fully implemented the ISM Code 
provisions had seen reductions of more than 30% in hull insurance claims and a 
similar improvement in protection and indemnity insurance claims (Marine 
Engineers Review, October 2001). The findings support the HSE argument that any 
short-term economic advantages gained by non-observance of safety regulations 
are outweighed by long-term advantages gained by observance of the rules. 
However, there remains a great deal of debate within the shipping industry 
concerning the efficacy of the ISM Code (Mulrenan, 2003). Some writers believe 
that the Code is being ignored by ships' senior officers for fear that in the event of 
an accident and subsequent investigation data recorded under the provisions of an 
approved SMS may be used against them or their employers in a court of law 
(Anderson, 2002). Other writers report a general negative response from the 
industry as a whole with a growing number of key players writing off the industry's 
response to the ISM Code as a flop (De Bievre, 2001). 
1.6 ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISM CODE 
The fundamental principle embodied in Article 92(1) of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention (UNGLOS, 1982) is that jurisdiction over a vessel on the high seas 
may be exercised only by the Administration of the State whose flag the vessel is 
entitled to fly. There exists also a general presumption under customary 
international law that a flag State shall ensure vessels flying its flag implement the 
provisions of Conventions which the State has ratified and adopted. 
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But, not all flag States have been equally conscientious in ensuring that vessels 
flying their national flag comply with the provisions of the ISM Code. As a result, 
the principle of sole jurisdiction by flag States has been eroded in recent years 
with ad hoc powers of inspection and detention of vessels being exercised by port 
States, i.e. those States whose ports a vessel enters or through whose territorial 
water a vessel sails. This is explored more fully in Chapter IV, Section 4.2. 
But if individual nation States differ in the degree to which they ensure that ships 
flying their flags comply with internationally agreed rules and regulations, possibly 
because the States have markedly different cultural values and norms from each 
other, then the enforcement by a port State of the obligations and duties accepted 
by a flag State as a party to an internationally recognised Convention, can clearly 
lead to conflicts of opinion between the States in question regarding the 
seaworthiness of a vessel and the acceptability of its on-board safety procedures. 
Furthermore, since individual safety perspectives are influenced by various factors, 
some of which, such as education and training, may themselves be influenced by 
national culture, it is logical to suppose that national cultures might also impact upon 
how seagoing personnel conceptually perceive safety and how safety regulations 
are interpreted and implemented by people of different cultures in management 
positions ashore. 
The apparent non-observance of the provisions of the SOLAS Convention by some 
ship owners may therefore, owe more to cultural diversity than to perceptions of 
short term gain, fear of retribution, or mere negative attitude. It is this possibility 
that provides the chief focus of the research reported in this thesis. 
11 
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1.7 CULTURE AND SAFETY 
The contextual environment in which the shipping industry operates is inherently 
culturally diverse and cross-cultural management therefore plays an important role 
in the management and operations of shipping organisations, not only with regard to 
national and corporate cultures but also to safety cultures. 
Trompenaars (2000; 24) quoting Geertz (1973) defines national culture as the 
means by which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge 
about attitudes towards life. Culture is the fabric of meaning in terms of which 
human beings interpret their experience and guide their action. Trompenaars 
continues by offering a means of measuring culture, arguing that cultures can be 
distinguished from each other by the differences in shared meanings they expect 
and attribute to their environment. 
Schein (1992) on the other hand, implies that for organisational studies to advance 
culture needs to be observed more than measured. The views of Trompenaars and 
Schein may not be mutually exclusive however, since the former's approach may 
quantify the degree to which cultures differ and the latter's approach may indicate 
how those differences may impact on organisational functions such as management 
styles and risk assessment. 
A number of value frameworks for use in international business research have been 
compiled, the most common being the dimensions identified by Hofstede (1991) and 
Trompenaars (2000) along which national cultures differ from one another, each 
dimension having quite distinct characteristics. The cultural dimensions represented 
by the value frameworks provide the context within which trans-national companies 
12 
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operate and present a knowledge management task to be dealt with by the 
application of cross-cultural management techniques (Holden, 1992). 
Trompenaars (2000, p7) notes that culture manifests itself at different levels, such 
as national or regional cultures, corporate cultures and the culture of particular 
functions within organisations such as marketing, or research and development. 
Organisations also frequently refer to safety cultures and the Advisory Committee 
on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACNSI, 1993), commented in its third report 
that safety culture is a sub-set of, or at least profoundly influenced by, the overall 
culture of an organisation. 
Some authors (Cooper, 2000; Young, 1989) argue that far from reflecting shared 
values and beliefs, corporate culture is the result of conflict and alignment of many 
sub-cultures within an organisation. According to this concept, corporate culture is a 
heterogeneous not homogeneous phenomenon, and Cooper questions whether an 
industry-wide homogenous safety culture can ever arise, let alone a global one. 
Others propose that globalisation has blurred the differences between cultures, 
(Amin, 1997). They hypothesise that people are influenced by their environment 
and that influence takes place partly through institutionalised patterns of social 
interaction which are in a globalised society, global institutions (Spybey, 1996). 
It can also be argued that whilst the twin pillars of globalisation, increasingly rapid 
communications and increasingly rapid transportation, have brought about an ever­
increasing rate of exposure of cultures to each other (Czarniawska and Joerges, 
1996), the effects of such exposure are selective, (Hofstede, 1991), different 
cultures responding differently to the same external agency. 
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1.8 SAFETY, EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
In addition to concluding that the legislative approach has not made much of an 
impact on raising the levels of safety in shipping operations and practice, the 1996 
GECD report, also expressed concerns about the professional training of seafarers. 
Because the GECD report was published in 1996 the authors were not in a position 
to assess the effects of the 1995 revision of the 1978 Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers undertaken by IMG in an 
endeavour to provide a common minimum standard of education and training for 
seafarers throughout the shipping industry. 
The new Convention, which entered into force in February 2002, strongly 
emphasises the need for greater safety training. However, despite the notion that 
safety training will cure most ills in regard to accidents, evidence exists showing that 
it is not always effective, (Hale, 1984), which may be related to the variability of the 
quality of training given or, alternatively, to the cultural attitudes of the trainees. 
Furthermore, safety training should not be seen as a substitute for, or adjunct to 
professional training but as an integral part of professional training. 
Locus of control, a personality construct developed by Rotter (Rotter, 1966) that has 
been extensively researched (Boone et a/ 1996; BEM 1994; Burger 1993; etc.) is 
relevant in the context of education and training. The construct recognises that 
some people perceive the outcome of their actions as being controlled principally by 
themselves whilst others perceive the outcome of their actions as being controlled 
principally by external factors. The former are said to have an internal locus of 
control orientation and the latter an external locus of control orientation. 
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From his observations Rotter concluded that given identical conditions for learning, 
different people learn different things from the same lesson dependent upon their 
locus of control orientation, which sits well with Hofstede's observation that different 
people react differently to the same external stimuli. This suggests there may be a 
significant correlation between locus of control orientation and an individual's 
cultural background, which may have important implications with regard to using 
education and training as a means of developing common attitudes towards safety 
in a global industry. 
According to Rotter's and Hofstede's observations and as confirmed by Hale, safety 
training even if integrated with professional training, may not be effective in 
establishing common safety standards within the shipping industry. If that is the 
case, then it would be better to recognise the existence of heterogeneous attitudes 
towards safety and to overcome such diversity by placing greater emphasis on 
policing and enforcing existing regulations to ensure individual vessels comply with 
the strictures of the ISM Code. 
Holden (2002) however, contends that cultural differences are not a barrier to trans­
national organisational harmonisation but present simply another knowledge 
management task. He argues also (Holden 2002, p.22) that whilst culture shapes 
behaviour and influences one's view of the world, culture is also learned: it is 
therefore not a static dimension and can be changed. This implies that there may 
be a correlation between locus of control and an individual's cultural background 
and also that there may be a chronological aspect to locus of control orientation 
such that it may shift from external to internal as people feel increasingly competent 
to control events in their lives, as they gain knowledge from experience, education 
and training. 
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If this were the case, then greater emphasis on education and training such as that 
provided for in the 1995 STCW Convention would be the better path to follow to 
achieve a more homogenous attitude to safety amongst seafarers and the maritime 
community in general, thus ensuring that the objectives of the ISM Code are fulfilled. 
This chapter has outlined the background to the development of the modern 
shipping industry and how it has attempted to deal with safety in face of the 
industry's fragmentation and cultural diversity_ The next chapter describes the 
research design adopted to investigate the potential problems presented to safety in 
the shipping industry by the diversity of cultures and the steps that need to be taken 
to address them. 
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CHAPTER II 

APPROACH TO THE STUDY 

2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN 

It is useful at this point to recapitulate and provide a synopsis of the study's 
objectives. They are: 
• 	 To identify how the diversity of cultures impacts upon the implementation of 
maritime safety regulations; 
• 	 To determine what obstacles that impact may present to the development 
of safe practices and attitudes within the shipping industry; 
• 	 To ascertain whether stricter enforcement of existing regulations or more 
emphasis on education and training is the better way to overcome those 
obstacles. 
The vehicle to be used for studying and measuring safe practices within the 
shipping industry is the effectiveness with which individual shipping companies 
have implemented the provisions of the ISM Code. 
Following a comprehensive review of the relevant literature, a model of the 
working of the ISM Code is developed, based upon: 
• 	 A five-level safety hierarchy; 
• 	 Five levels at which economic and socio-cultural influences impact upon 
nation States, industry bodies, shipping companies and individuals; 
• 	 A connecting thread of relational contract practice running between the 
organisations and people involved at the various hierarchal levels of safety 
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management: flag State Administrations, Port State Inspectorates, shipping 
organisations and individuals. 
From the multi-stage model, development of which is described in Chapter IX, it is 
evident that there are a number of hierarchal levels at which the empirical study 
could be carried out, ranging from international governmental level at the upper 
end of the hierarchy to the individual behavioural level of seafarers on board ships 
at the other end of the hierarchy. 
However, it is also evident from the model that the most fruitful area of research 
would be within individual shipping companies, amongst their employees ashore 
and on board ship. That is where corporate safety policies and procedures are 
formulated, safety regulations are promulgated, safety management systems are 
developed and implemented and work procedures are undertaken. It is at this 
operational level rather than the administrative levels of government and industry 
bodies, that the OECD report and much of the criticism in the marine press 
regarding the efficacy of the ISM Code have been directed. 
2.2 IDENTIFYING THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The methodology used during the empirical stage of the study is described in 
detail in Part III, Chapter X, but it is useful to briefly describe here the methodology 
used and why it was chosen. 
The data to be gathered during the empirical phase of the study being both 
quantitative and qualitative in nature, it was decided that of the four most common 
research approaches used by those carrying out small-scale research projects, 
¥& A I.ta 
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experiment, survey, action research and case study (Blaxter et ai, 2000), the latter 
was the most appropriate, being not only well suited to the needs and resources of 
the small scale researcher (Blaxter et al) but also capable of accommodating a mix 
of both qualitative and quantitative data (Yin 1994). 
The methodology of choice therefore, was a comparative case study, the 
methodology being described more fully in Part III, Chapter X. In order to 
strengthen the rigour of the empirical research by enhancing content 
generalizability and validation, it was decided to compare and contrast two 
shipping companies operating in the same sector of the industry but in two 
different geographical regions and employing personnel from countries having 
distinctly different cultures. 
From the literature review it became evident that at the hierarchal safety levels at 
which the empirical research was to be carried out, there exist three specific 
elements that are important in the development, implementation and effectiveness 
of an SMS: 
• Leadership style I Senior Management commitment; 
• End user involvement; and 
• Suitability of the SMS. 
Associated with these three elements are a number of culturally influenced risk 
factors that could have either a positive or negative influence on the effectiveness 
of an SMS. It would therefore be necessary to identify and analyse the 
predominant cultural influences prevailing within each particular company's 
organisational structure. This would be achieved by using a number of indicators 
such as the nationality of senior managers, supervisory staff and vessels' crews, 
_ft 
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then applying Hofstede's cultural dimensions in order to determine their 
corresponding positive or negative effects upon the salient organisational 
elements. 
Having also determined from the literature review that an individual's locus of 
control may be influential in determining how useful education and training might 
be in establishing common attitudes towards safety across culturally diverse 
groups, Rotter's (1966) scale is used to develop a questionnaire for measuring the 
locus of control of two samples of seafarers and selected shore staff together with 
their following details: 
• 	 Nationality; 
• 	 Age and experience; 
• 	 Professional qualifications; and 
• 	 Academic attainment. 
Having collected sufficient data from the foregoing procedures, it would be 
reviewed together with each company's SMS: 
• 	 To determine whether or not the SMS was well suited to the organisation 
being studied; and 
• 	 To identify the organisation's strengths and weaknesses that might impact 
upon the company's overall safety culture. 
This would enable predictions regarding the effectiveness of the SMS to be made 
which could be confirmed by reviewing the company's annual safety statistics and 
safety records together with documentation regarding vessel classification status, 
ship detentions as a consequence of Port State Control inspections, etc. 
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Subsequently, having determined whether prevailing cultural factors contributed to 
or detracted from the effectiveness of the SMS, it would be necessary to establish 
the extent to which regulatory control on the one hand and education and training 
on the other hand were factors in determining the effectiveness of the SMS. 
Whilst this could possibly have been determined by a questionnaire style survey it 
would have involved a great deal of subjectivity, both on the part of the 
respondents and of the researcher. It was decided therefore that the most 
cognitively unbiased way of establishing the role both of regulatory control and of 
education and training was by: 
• 	 Reviewing company documentation, particularly safety records, staff 
training policies and any references to ship detentions by Port State 
Control; 
• 	 Observing the manner in which staff approached safety matters, their 
degree of involvement and commitment; 
II Asking questions by way of formal interview of key personnel; and 
II Relational discussions with various company employees both ashore and 
on board ship. 
From the foregoing it is evident that in each case study company there were 
several units or sub-units to be researched. Therefore, although the overall 
approach to the study would be holistic there would also be embedded 
components (Yin, 1994). This aspect of the comparative case study will be further 
discussed in Chapter X where details of the methodology and techniques utilised 
are provided. 
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PART II 

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
-4 4AAi 2 _ 
CHAPTER III 
THE INTERNATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT CODE 
3.1 ISM CODE OBJECTIVES 
Clause 1 of the ISM Code Preamble states that the purpose of the Code is to 
provide an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships 
and for pollution prevention. Clause 1.2 of the Code refines this overall purpose 
by identifying three specific objectives, namely to ensure: 
• Safety at sea 
• Prevention of human injury or loss of life, and 
• Avoidance of damage to the marine environment 
The remainder of the Code is devoted to guidance on how the objectives are to be 
achieved, in particular the introduction of a Safety Management system (SMS) by 
each ship operating company. 
3.2 AN INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
The provision of an international standard as cited in the ISM Code Preamble 
implies that certain criteria are agreed by all IMO Member States that are 
contracting States to the ISM Code Convention. This would involve considerable 
cross-cultural agreement since IMO has 166 Member States of which 156 States 
with approximately 99% of the world's merchant fleet gross tonnage on their 
registers are contracting States to the Convention (lMO, 2005). 
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Under the 'Guidelines on the Implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations' 
(the Guidelines) adopted under Resolution A.788(19), it is the flag State 
Administration, i.e. the Government of the State whose flag a ship is entitled to fly, 
that is responsible for verifying compliance with the ISM Code. By extension 
therefore, there is a presumption that all contracting States to the ISM Code have 
a common understanding of the aims and objectives of the Code. 
This presumption however, is not irrebuttable since the Preamble declares that the 
ISM Code is based on general principles and objectives and expressed in broad 
terms so that it can have widespread application. The inference therefore, is that 
there is wide scope for interpretation of the provisions of the Code. 
Indeed, the Guidelines at Clause 2.1.3 recommend that in determining conformity 
or non-conformity of the SMS elements specified in the ISM Code, Administrations 
should limit the development of criteria in the form of prescriptive management 
system solutions and leave the shipping company itself to develop the solutions 
which best suit that particular Company, that particular operation or that particular 
ship. Furthermore, the Guidelines at Clause 2.1.4 recommend that 
Administrations should ensure that these assessments are based on determining 
the effectiveness of the SMS in meeting specified objectives rather than detailed 
requirements in addition to those contained in the ISM Code. 
From this it is clear that it is the objectives specified in the Code that are of 
overriding consideration and companies are free to develop SMS elements in 
accordance with their operating requirements, provided that the SMS achieves the 
specific objectives of safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of life, and 
avoidance of damage to the marine environment, as outlined in the Code. 
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To remove some of the subjectivity and latitude afforded to companies developing 
an 	SMS, Clause 1.4 of the Code introduces functional requirements for safety 
management systems and elaborates on each requirement in further clauses. The 
correlation between the functional requirements and the elaborating clauses is 
shown in the following table, adapted from the tabulation by Sagen (1999): 
Basic Functional Requirements 	 Elaboration Clauses 
1.4 Every company should develop, implement 	and maintain a CI. 11 
safety-management system (SMS) which includes the following 
functional requirements: 
.1 A safety and environmental protection policy; 	 CI. 2/1.2 
.2 Instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships CI. 6,7 and 10 

and protection of the environment in compliance with relevant ­
international and flag State requirements; 

.3 	 Defined levels of authority and lines of communication CI. 3 and 5 

between, and amongst, shore and shipboard personnel; 

.4 Procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with CI. 9 

the provisions of this Code; 

.5 Procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency CI. 8 

situations; and 

.6 Procedures for internal audits and management reviews CI. 12 

TABLE 1: SMS FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS (AFTER SAGEN, 1999) 
However, although providing guidance to shipping companies and Administrations 
regarding the minimum functional requirements that must be included in an 
acceptable SMS, neither the functional requirements nor the elaboration clauses 
are prescriptive in nature. Thus, companies and Administrations are still left with 
considerable latitude in how they address the requirements of the Code. 
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There remains also a need for them to exercise subjective judgement both in 
interpreting the objectives of the Code and in deciding whether or not any 
particular SMS will lead to the objectives being satisfactorily addressed. 
3.3 SAFETY CULTURE AND THE ISM CODE OBJECTIVES 
Sagen (1999) terms the introduction of the ISM Code a paradigm shift in 
international ship operation and holds that the key factor in fulfilling the intentions 
and objectives of the ISM Code is the establishment of a Safety Culture in Ship 
Operation, noting the often quoted statement of former IMO General Secretary, 
William O'Neill that the ISM Code will provide ship owners with real business 
advantages, provided they truly want to change towards a Safety Culture. 
By prefacing the words Safety Culture with the indefinite article rather than the 
definite article both Sagen and O'Neill are presumably using the term generically 
to imply the observance of internationally agreed rules and regulations and the 
introduction of industry-wide working practices and attitudes agreed by convention 
to be safe, not simply that there is only one Safety Culture acceptable throughout 
the entire shipping industry. Indeed, the former is a basic assumption of the model 
on which the current study rests. 
A Safety Culture may be defined as the attitude of employees within an 
organisation towards managing personal, corporate or environmental safety within 
their sphere of work (Shaw, 2001). Whilst there are links between corporate, or 
organisational, culture and the way in which tasks are performed, including the 
development of safety consciousness within organisations (Carnall, 1995), 
national culture undoubtedly has a very strong influence upon both corporate 
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culture and safety culture (Hale, 1984; Hofstede, 1991; ACSN', 1993). This being 
the case, the interpretation and implementation of the ISM Code will have as much 
to do with beliefs and values as it will with mandatory regulatory compliance. 
In assessing whether a specific company's SMS will be successful in achieving the 
stated objectives of the ISM Code, the person making the assessment on behalf of 
the flag State Administration must make a subjective judgement based upon his 
own experience, education and training, all of which will inevitably be influenced by 
his own socio-cultural background. This is illustrated in figure 1 below for two 
different cultures, and the model may be extended to any number of cultures. 
CULTURE 'A' CULTURE 'B' 
PERCEPTION OF PERCEPTION OF 
SAFETY SAFETY 
PRACTICES AGREED BY CONVENTION 
TO BE SAFE 
l 
DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION 
OF A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
TO BRING ABOUT ATIITUDE CHANGE 
TO SUCH PRACTICES 
RESULTANT SAFETY CULTURE 
FIGURE 1 -IMPACT OF CULTURE ON SAFETY MODELS 
Shaw (2001) on the other hand is of the opinion that the notion of a safety culture 
per se is outdated and that safety should be viewed as an integral part of business, 
forming part of a company's overall risk management strategy. 
M 
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In the case of the ISM Code it is possible that there is no dichotomy in this respect, 
since the Code requires each ship operating company to develop its own integrated 
SMS, i.e. a systematic approach to integrating safety into work planning and 
execution, encompassing protection of employees, the public, and the environment. 
3.4 OBLIGATIONS ENGENDERED BY THE CODE 
As an International Convention the ISM Code places an obligation upon all States 
that are contracting parties to the Convention to ensure that its provisions are 
implemented within their jurisdictions. 
Specific provisions within the ISM Code relate to how the objectives are to be 
achieved, in particular the introduction of an SMS by each ship operating 
company. The Code creates therefore, a legal obligation for ship operating 
companies to address those specific provisions, to develop, implement and 
administer an SMS and for flag States to ensure that this obligation is fulfilled. 
The ISM Code also contains an objective declared in conceptual rather than 
specific terms: to provide an international standard for the safe management and 
operation of ships and for pollution prevention and thus ensure safety at sea, 
prevention of human injury or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the marine 
environment. However, safety is a relative rather than an absolute concept 
(Section 3.3 above) and different positions may be held by different people on 
what constitutes 'safety'. The stated objective of the Code therefore, creates a 
moral obligation for ship operating companies to develop an SMS that satisfies the 
spirit of the Code and for flag States to ensure that this obli.gation is fulfilled. This 
is discussed more fully in Chapter VII, sections 7.1 and 7.2. 
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CHAPTER IV 

AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER THE ISM CODE 
4.1 FLAG STATES & INTERNATIONAL LAW 
4.1.1 The Nationality of Ships 
The idea of the secular nation State with sovereign rights was a philosophy initially 
developed by writers of the Renaissance period, prior to which the imperial 
concept prevailed (MacLean, 1994). The subsequent emergence of a plurality of 
nation States, each with its own sovereign authority, was paralleled by a need to 
regulate relationships between sovereign States and was the driving force behind 
the development of modern international law. 
Today, the notion of the nation State, which sees all people in a geographical area 
as subject to one set of municipal laws, is the generally accepted political doctrine 
that governs international relations between States throughout the world. 
With the development of the nation State as the sovereign power came the 
concept of nationality. However, the concept of the nationality of merchant ships 
was not fully developed until the end of the 18th century (Ozqayir, 2001), prior to 
which the principal point of legal reference was the nationality of a vessel's owner 
rather than the flag the vessel flew. Today however, the fact that ships have 
nationality is recognised in international law under Article 90 of the 1982 United 
Nations Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention (UNCLOS,1982), which provides that 
every State whether coastal or land-locked has the right to sail ships under its flag 
on the high seas. 
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Article 91 of the 1982 LOS Convention further provides that: 
• 	 Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for 
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. 
• 	 Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. 
• 	 There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship. 
• 	 Each State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag 
documents to that effect. 
The 1982 LOS Convention came into force on 28 July 1996 and as of August 2006 
has been ratified by 123 of the 151 UN Member States participating in the 
Agreement. By virtue of the provisions of the Convention the nationality of a ship 
is evidenced by the ship's papers and its flag, and is determined by registration 
with a nation State's ship registry, the conditions for which are laid down by the 
municipal law of the particular State and vary from State to State, with some 
States having less stringent conditions than others. 
Churchill and Lowe (1999) and Ozgayir (2001) are of the opinion that the 
requirement for a genuine link between the State and the ship was introduced into 
the Convention in light of the judgement in the Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v 
Guatemala, 1955) in which the Court held inter alia that, "... international law 
leaves it to each State to lay down the rules governing the grant of its own 
nationality ..... On the other hand, a State cannot claim that the rules it has thus 
laid down are entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in 
conformity with this general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with 
the individual's genuine connection with the State which assumes the defence of 
its citizens by means of protection against other States". 
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Thus, in accordance with Article 91 Of the 1982 LOS Convention and the principle 
established in the Nottebohm case, the right to enjoy the privileges of the 
nationality of a State under international law, arises only where there is a genuine 
link between the State and its national. But what constitutes a genuine link 
between a State and a ship is a matter of some debate within the shipping 
community. 
In some States, simply incorporating a company in the particular State is sufficient 
to establish a genuine link as far as the municipal law of that State is concerned, 
although it is debatable whether that would be sufficient to satisfy public 
international law. However, the 1982 LOS Convention is silent on the 
consequences of there being no evidence of a genuine link between State and 
ship, and some maritime administrations have abandoned altogether any 
requirement for such a link as a condition for inclusion of vessels on their registers. 
The Marshall Islands Registry for example requires that vessels registered in the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands must be owned by a Marshall Islands citizen or 
national of a qualified foreign maritime entity (emphasis added). Foreign Maritime 
Entities are described in Section 3 of the Vessel Registration and Mortgage 
Procedures (2005) as 'legal entities created under the laws of a jurisdiction other 
than the Marshall Islands that are eligible to own vessels when registered in the 
Marshall Islands pursuant to Section 119 of the BCA'. 
Ship owners may be motivated to flag out their vessels to a foreign country where 
the link between the flag State and a ship is somewhat tenuous in order to reduce 
operating costs by taking advantage of that country's cheap registration fees, low 
or non-existent taxes and cheap labour costs. 
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When a ship registry offering such fiscal advantages also fails to demonstrate 
either the ability or the willingness to ensure that vessels on its register meet the 
operating, maintenance and safety standards contained in international 
Conventions, then that State is said to be a flag of convenience country. As of 
August 2003, the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF, 2003) named 
thirty-two nation States as offering a flag of convenience. 
The requirement for a genuine link was introduced partly in an attempt to limit the 
use of flags of convenience. That was considered necessary because it was 
apparent that some flag States were primarily interested in the revenue generated 
by ship registration and were not conscientious in fulfilling their obligations to 
ensure that ships flying their flags complied with the standards accepted by the 
flag State under the international conventions to which it was party. The revenue 
generated by a ship registry may be considerable. For example, between 1949 
(when it was established) and 1999 the Liberian registry remitted around US$700 
million to the Liberian government and in the year 2000 generated some US$18 
million (Africa Confidential, 2005) 
It is interesting to note that the ship registries of many maritime administrations 
associated with flags of convenience are not operated as part of the municipal 
administrative systems of those States but are incorporated as companies that 
operate on a purely commercial basis. Even their headquarters may be located in 
other States, as for example that of the Marshall Islands Registry. which is located 
in New York (Vessel Registration and Mortgage Recording Procedures, 2005). 
But commercial pressures currently prevail over the scruples of public international 
law and the majority of ships registered in the world's largest ship registries, 
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Panama, Liberia, Honduras and the Marshall Islands, are owned by foreigners 
who register their ships in those States for fiscal, monetary and economic reasons. 
Even traditional maritime nations such as Norway now have second, or open 
registers, that have more favourable fiscal arrangements than their main registers. 
Clearly, if individual nation States differ in the degree to which they ensure ships 
flying their flags comply with internationally agreed regulations and if ship owners 
are free to select the State whose flag they wish to fly, then disparities may well 
arise between the standards to which different ships are maintained and operated, 
not only between ships sailing under different flags but also between ships flying 
the same flag but having different ownership. 
4.1.2 Jurisdiction over Vessels 
Custom as a source of international law is recognised in Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. However, in the Asylum Case: 
Columbia v Peru (1950), the court held that, 'The Party which relies on a custom 
of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has 
become binding on the other Party". This view was supported in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (1969), in which the court held that, "Not only must the 
acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or carried 
out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered as 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. .... The States concerned 
must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. 
The frequency or even habitual character of the acts is not itself enough". 
Under customary international law the fundamental principle is that only the flag 
State may exercise jurisdiction over a vessel on the high seas (MacLean, 1994), 
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and this principle is now embodied in Article 92(1) of the 1982 LOS Convention 
(UNCLOS, 1982), which provides inter alia that: 
Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional 
circumstances provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, 
shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. 
The exceptional circumstances covered by the Convention refer to a limited 
number of criminal acts such as piracy, slave trading and unauthorised 
broadcasting. 
But as discussed in 4.1.1 above, not all flag State administrations are as effective 
or as conscientious as each other. And as each flag State is a sovereign power it 
enjoys sovereign immunity, there being no higher temporal authority to which it is 
answerable. As a UN agency IMO can be regarded as a supranational body, but 
as pointed out by Lord Donaldson (Donaldson, 2001) the flag States are all voting 
members of IMO thus rendering improbable any possibility of censure of an errant 
flag State. 
The question arises therefore, as to whether States other than a vessel's flag 
State can enforce the obligations and duties accepted by the flag State as 
signatory to an internationally recognised IMO Convention. 
4.2 PORT STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Under the 1982 LOS Convention, coastal States do have some rights over foreign 
flag vessels entering and transiting their territorial waters, particularly jurisdiction 
relating to navigation, defence and protection of the environment. These rights are 
provided for in Article 21 and Article 25 of the 1982 LOS Convention. 
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A port is generally considered to be part of a State's internal waters, and the 
general rule is that when a vessel voluntarily enters a foreign port it becomes 
subject to the coastal State's sovereignty and therefore a coastal State may 
enforce its national laws against foreign ships in its internal waters. This general 
rule was expressed in Wildenhus's Case (1887) by Wait CJ who held that, "It is 
part of the law of civilised nations that when a merchant vessel of one country 
enters the ports of another for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to the law of 
the place to which it goes, unless by treaty or otherwise the two countries have 
come to some different understanding or agreement". By way of explanation he 
continued, "As the owner has voluntarily taken of his vessels for his own private 
purposes to a place within the dominion of a Government other than his own, and 
from which he seeks protection during his stay, he owes that Government 
allegiance for the time being as is due for the protection to which he becomes 
entitled". 
However, the rule does not provide the coastal State with exclusive jurisdiction 
over the vessel. Matters that affect only the vessel and do not impact upon the 
coastal State or the port harbouring the vessel remain a matter for the flag State. 
Also, with regard to a ship's general condition and seaworthiness, the port State 
can not force the vessel to meet standards higher than those recognised by the 
flag State. Provided the ship's papers and certificates are in order and the vessel 
presents no perceived environmental threat, the port State is not at liberty to carry 
out detailed inspections of the vessel. These matters were discussed in the 
Nimbus case (Sellers v Maritime Safety inspector, 1998) in which William Rodman 
Sellers, master of the cutter Nimbus, had refused to carry the radio and 
emergency beacon equipment required as a minimum by the New Zealand 
Director of Maritime Safety. Sellers subsequently sailed the vessel from Opua 
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without obtaining the requisite port clearance. He was prosecuted for a breach of 
the New Zealand Maritime Transport Act 1994. His appeal was dismissed in the 
High Court but he was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
Allowing the appeal, Keith J stated, 'Our conclusion on the relevant rules of 
international law is, accordingly, that a port state has no general power to 
unilaterally impose its own requirements on foreign ships relating to their 
construction, their safety and other equipment and their crewing if the 
requirements are to have effect on the high seas. Any requirements cannot go 
beyond those generally accepted, especially in the maritime conventions and 
regulations .... In addition, any such port state powers relate only to those foreign 
ships which are in a hazardous state'. 
The court also held that 'Legislation regulating maritime matters should be read in 
the context of the international law of the sea and, if possible, consistently with that 
law' and the United Nations law of the Sea Convention 1982 (UNCLOS 1982) was 
referenced several times. Under that Convention a vessel's flag State has 
primacy of jurisdiction over the vessel but Articles 211 (3), 218 and 219 of the 
Convention provide a basis for port State jurisdiction, particularly with respect to 
pollution avoidance and containment, and to detain a vessel which is in violation of 
applicable international rules and standards relating to seaworthiness of vessels 
and thereby threatens to damage the marine environment (Article 219). 
The first SOLAS Convention of 1914 also included a provision for a coastal State 
signatory to the Convention to inspect the papers of a ship flying the flag of a 
contracting party in order to ensure that they were valid and that the vessel 
therefore met the required standards. During recent years Port State Control 
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provisions have been incorporated in a number of IMO Conventions. In particular 
Ozgayir (2001) cites: 
SOLAS 74, reg. 1119, reg. IXl6 and reg. X1/4; 

Load Lines 66, Art.21; 

MARPOL 73/78, Arts. 5 and 6, reg. 8A of Annex I, reg. is of Annex 

II, reg. 8 of Annex III and reg. 8 of Annex V; 

STCW 78, Art. X and reg. 1/4; 

Tonnage 69, Art. 12. 

Also, regulation 6 of Chapter IX of SOLAS 1974 refers specifically to Port State 
Control in respect of operational requirements with regard to the ISM Code. There 
are also provisions under the International Labour Organization No. 147, Merchant 
Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention 1976 for port States to inspect vessels 
to ensure that minimum standards agreed to in the Convention are not being 
breached. 
4.3 PORT STATE CONTROL 
Primary responsibility for ensuring that a vessel complies with national and 
international regulations unquestionably lies with the ship's owner. It is the owner 
who is responsible for ensuring that the vessel is adequately maintained, properly 
crewed, sufficiently funded and well managed. 
Secondary responsibility lies with the flag State. It is the duty of the flag State to 
ensure that the ship's owner is meeting the provisions of the State's municipal 
rules and the international conventions to which the State is a contracting party. If 
the ship's owner is not meeting those provisions then the flag State has both the 
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authority and the responsibility to insist that non-conformities are rectified, failing 
which it may remove the ship from its register, thus removing from the vessel the 
protection and privileges afforded by the State. 
But as noted in Section 4.1 above, not all flag State administrations are as 
effective or as conscientious as each other, and since they are all voting members 
of IMO any possibility of censure of an errant flag State is rendered improbable. 
A final defensive system against the operation of sub-standard shipping is 
provided by the littoral States, i.e. the coastal nations through whose territorial 
waters all vessels have the right under the 1982 LOS Convention to navigate 
unhindered. If a vessel founders in the territorial waters of a coastal State then it 
is the environment and citizens of the coastal State that are affected, not those of 
the flag State (Donaldson, 2001). This possibility has led to development of the 
Port State Control (PSC) system under which a percentage of ships entering a 
coastal State's ports are inspected. Any deficiencies found during the inspection 
are recorded and, if they are sufficiently serious, the vessel is detained until the 
deficiencies have been remedied. 
To make the system as effective as possible, regional groupings of port States 
have combined to produce comprehensive regional policies. The first regional 
grouping was formed by fourteen nation States that were signatories to the Paris 
Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MOU) 1982, to which a further five nations 
subsequently became signatories. 
The Paris MOU served as a model for other coastal States interested in 
developing systems of Port State Control with the result that the Tokyo MOU 1993 
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and the Caribbean MOU 1996 were established, both of which are recognised by 
the Paris MOU. A number of other regional groupings are currently developing 
MOUs for the Black Sea, the Indian Ocean, Latin America and the Mediterranean 
(Ozc;ayir, 2001). The USA and Australia each have their own unilateral Port State 
Control policies. 
Unlike the ISM Code which is prescriptive in outcome, the Paris MOU is 
prescriptive in process and spells out in considerable detail precisely what a PSC 
inspector shall examine and what shall constitute a deficiency. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter looked at who is responsible for administering the ISM Code and 
ensuring that vessels meet the minimum legal criteria for ensuring safety of life, 
property and the environment. In order of priority they are: 
• The Owner of the vessel 
• The manager I operator of the vessel 
• The vessel's flag State 
• Port States 
Each of these entities has a different interest in the vessel and therefore each may 
prioritise safety issues differently from the others. The cultural and socio­
economic pressures acting upon each of these entities will be looked at in more 
detail in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
5.1 SAFETY MANAGEMENT HIERARCHY 
Le Guen (1999) refers to a risk control hierarchy originafly advocated by the 
Robens Committee and since promoted by the Health and Safety Executive and 
the European Union. The concept of a hierarchy of norms associated with risk 
may be compared to Kelsen's pure theory of law (Ke/sen, 1967) which argues that 
within a legal system there is a hierarchy of norms beginning with the more 
abstract at the higher level to the more concrete at the practical Jevel. 
In using the term 'norm' Kelsen is referring to the way things ought to be or the 
way a person ought to behave in particular circumstances. Kelsen's theory is 
relativistic insofar as it rejects the concept of there being only one single truth, 
holding instead that norms are relative to the individual or social group under 
consideration (Wacks, 1993). According to Kelsen's theory a norm is valid only if 
it is authorised by another norm, which in turn must be authorised by a higher 
norm and so on until the basic norm, or as Kelsen called it the Grundnorm, is 
reached. Harris (2004) explains that in the case of a legal system the basic norm 
might be the written constitution of a State or, if the State has no written 
constitution, the norm-creating effect of custom. 
Based upon Kelsen's model it is possible to consider safety as a system or order 
of norms for it is convenient to break down the overall concept of safety 
management in accordance with a number of hierarchal levels that. although 
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comprehensively linked together, can be reviewed separately from each other with 
respect to how they impact upon, or are influenced by, the development of Safety 
Management Systems. For the purposes of this thesis it has been found useful to 
categorise safety under the following five heads: 
- Level 1. Imperative Safety Management - (the basic or constitutional norm). 

- Level 2. Institutional Safety Management - (general norm). 

- Level 3. Organisational Safety Management - (particular norm). 

- Level 4. Operational Safety - (particular concretised norm). 

_Level 5. Behavioural Safety - (particular fully concretised norm). 

These five categories, reviewed in more detail below, provide a helpful analytic 
framework for describing the emphasis adopted in the various safety management 
models described in section 5.2 of this chapter and in developing a model of the 
working of the ISM Code in Chapter IX. 
5.1.1 Imperative Safety Management 
Imperative safety management refers to safety regulation at governmental level: 
negotiation of international treaties and conventions, and drafting of municipal laws 
relating to protection of the environment and to safety and health of employees in 
the workplace (ES&H legislation). 
Drafted at governmental level, either by national governments or by international 
governmental bodies such as agencies of the United Nations, such regulation may 
be considered a reflection of the will of the people and therefore constitutes the 
basic or constitutional norm of safety management: the norm from which all 
subsequent safety management stems 
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5.1.2 Institutional Safety Management 
Institutional safety management refers to safety at an industry level, how industry 
bodies interpret and organise implementation of the edicts of government, such as 
employment laws and safety and health (ES&H) legislation. 
At this level the basic norm becomes a general norm and the fundamental idea of 
a duty of care starts to become concretised. At this level also, the fundamental 
ideas of the basic norm become influenced by practicalities such as cultural norms 
and the economic circumstances of the companies, individuals or social groups 
that comprise the industry bodies under consideration. 
5.1.3 Organisational Safety Management 
Organisational safety management is the way in which individual companies 
respond to regulations emanating from industry bodies implementing the edicts of 
government. This is safety management at the level of senior management. 
At this level the general norm becomes a particular norm relating to a specific duty 
of care within the ambit of safety management and it is here that policies regarding 
safety management and risk management are developed and promulgated. 
Decisions are made regarding the type and style of SMS that a company intends 
to follow and the resources that will be made available for its development. 
Monitoring of the company's safety performance is carried out at this leve! utilising 
feedback received by senior management from operations personnel. 
Safety management at this leve! of the safety hierarchy forms an embedded 
component (Yin, 1994) of the comparative case study carried out at the empirical 
research stage of this thesis. 
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5.1.4 Operational Safety 
Operational safety is the practical organisation and implementation of safety. The 
particular norm becomes concretised. An SMS is developed, work procedures are 
formalised, and safety procedures are implemented ensuring that safe working 
practices are followed and suitable safety equipment is provided. Checks and 
balances are put in place to: 
• Identify hazards; 
• Minimise the possibility of undue risks being taken; 
• Provide feedback to senior management. 
At this level the duty of care becomes a particular concretised norm in the form of 
a Safety Management System. Procedures have been promulgated and 
supervisors ensure that the procedures are followed. As with organisational 
safety, safety management at this level of the safety hierarchy also forms an 
embedded component of the empirical research. 
5.1.5 Behavioural Safety 
Behavioural safety is safety at the level of the individual, the psychology of human 
behaviour in relation to the problems of safety in the workplace. This is the 
shipboard or factory floor level, the level at which work procedures are performed 
and at which safety procedures are aimed. At this level of the safety hierarchy the 
particular concretised norm has become a particular fully coneretised norm. 
By observing company policies, procedures and work instructions formalised in the 
company's SMS, the individual will be exercising on behalf of the company the 
duty of care that the company legally or morally owes to people, property and the 
environment. 
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It is individuals who are responsible for ensuring that the duty of care is in fact 
exercised, but even though individuals are aware of their employers' policies and 
procedures they may sometimes choose to ignore some of those policies or 
procedures, just as some people choose to ignore particular laws. Why this 
should be so is a matter of much debate, but it may be that: 
• 	 The work instructions or safety procedures are ill-defined; or 
• 	 The individuals are not sufficiently experienced, well enough educated or 
adequately trained to carry out safely the tasks assigned to them; 
• 	 There are over-riding economic considerations. 
The first reason would be attributable to an organisational deficiency in the SMS 
caused at the organisational or operational level of safety management. The 
second reason would be an argument for more effective education and training. 
The third reason is looked at in some detail in Chapter VII, section 7.3 
Behavioural safety is particularly relevant in the area of education and training and 
is a key determinant in deciding whether stricter enforcement of existing 
regulations or greater emphasis on education and training is the better path to 
follow to ensure that the objectives of the ISM Code are achieved throughout the 
shipping industry. 
5.2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT MODELS 
Central to the ISM Code is the development and implementation of a Safety 
Management System (SMS). It is expedient therefore, to review the nature of 
safety and the differing approaches to safety management that have evolved. 
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5.2.1 Traditional Approach 
Attempts were made over 70 years ago by The Safety First Movement to promote 
the concept of safety management by the introduction of safety committees with 
joint representation of management and workforce, and the appointment of safety 
officers to monitor adherence to the standards in the workplace (Williams, 1960). 
This approach, which operated at safety hierarchy levels 3, 4 and 5, was partially 
successful but did not promote proactive decision making because, according to 
the ACSNI Human Factors Study Group (ACNSI, 1993), the main purpose of the 
safety committees was to investigate accidents, the process and outcome of the 
investigation being steered by the preconceptions of the investigators about 
accident causation. The investigation would attribute the cause of an accident to 
either: 
• 	 Unsafe behaviour (unsafe act), in which case in order to prevent a 
recurrence of the unsafe act the committee would devise a rule forbidding 
such behaviour; or 
• 	 Shortcomings in the working environment (unsafe conditions), in which 
case the committee would devise a technical solution to make the 
conditions safe or to protect people against the hazard. 
The approach fitted well with the then prevalent theory of subjective and objective 
risk. The former related to the psychological dimension associated with a 
perceived danger whilst the latter related to the mathematical probability of the 
occurrence of an accident. Watson (Watson, 1981) and others opposed the idea 
of there being a distinctive difference between subjective and objective risk, 
arguing that the theory was over simplistic and valued abstract mathematical risk 
models above public opinion. 
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Pidgeon (Pidgeon et ai, 1992) also attacked the theory on the grounds that 
.:"" 
objective risk assessment cannot be free from an element of subjectivity, and a 
Royal Society Report (Royal Society Report, 1992) concluded that subjective and 
objective risk assessment is no longer a mainstream theory. However, risk per se 
remains an important factor in safety management and is further investigated later 
in this chapter and in greater detail in Chapter VI. 
5.2.2 Safety Culture 
Sagen (Sagen, 1999) terms the introduction of the ISM Code a paradigm shift in 
international ship operation and holds that the key factor in fulfilling the intentions 
and objectives of the ISM Code is the establishment of a Safety Culture in Ship 
Operation. 
Shaw (2001) defined Safety Culture as the attitude of employees within an 
organisation towards managing personal, corporate or environmental safety within 
their sphere of work. The ACSNI (1993) is of the opinion that safety culture is a 
sub-set of, or at least profoundly influenced by, the overall culture of an 
organisation. Cooper (2000) and Young (1989) hold that far from reflecting shared 
values and beliefs, corporate culture is the result of conflict and alignment of many 
sub-cultures within an organisation, that it is an heterogeneous, not homogeneous 
phenomenon, leading Cooper to question whether industry-wide homogenous 
safety cultures will ever arise, let alone a global one. 
The difference between the views of Sagen and Shaw may be due to the fact that 
the former appears to view Safety Culture as operating at level 2 of the safety 
hierarchy whilst Shaw sees it operating mainly at levels 3, 4 and 5 of the safety 
hierarchy, as with the traditional approach to safety management. 
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Undoubtedly a nexus exists between organisational culture and the way in which 
tasks are performed, including the development of safety consciousness within 
organisations (Carnafl, 1995). But because national culture has an overwhelming 
influence upon both organisational culture and safety culture (Hofstede, 1991; 
ACSNI, 1993; Hale, 1984) it would be most unlikely for an industry-wide safety 
culture to be developed at level 2 of the safety management hierarchy and even 
less likely for a global safety culture to be developed at level 1 of the hierarchy. 
5.2.3 Safety Cultures and Safety Management Systems 
Current management practice encourages the development of safety cultures 
within organisations and identifies safety management systems, a concept 
examined in section 5.3 below, as an important element in developing safety 
cultures. The concept is illustrated in figure 2 which shows Cooper's Reciprocal 
Safety Culture Model (Cooper, 2000). 
PERSON Internal 
Safety Climate Psychological 
Perceptual Audit Factors 
ORGANISATION 
Safety Management System CONTEXT 
Obiective Audit 
JOB 
Safety Behaviour 

Behavioural Samolinq 

FIG.2: RECIPROCAL SAFETY CULTURE MODEL (COOPER, 2000) 
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Cooper's model, which adapts Bandura's model of reciprocal determinism 
(Bandura, 1986), comprises three interactive elements each of which impacts 
specifically upon one of the three component parts of a safety culture. The model 
also offers a means by which each element can be measured and the various 
facets of the model can be elaborated upon and summed up as follows: 
1. 	 Element - Person 
Personnel Selection - Person I Job Fit - Safety Training - Competencies ­
Health Assessments - Job Satisfaction - Organisational commitment. 
Impacts upon - Safety Climate 
2. 	 Element - Organisation 
Management Commitment - Management Actions - Communications ­
Allocation of Resources - Emergency preparedness - Status of Safety 
Personnel - Policy &Strategy Development. 
Impacts upon - SMS 
3. 	 Element - Job 
Risk Assessments - Required Workplace - Standard Operating Procedures 
- Teamwork - Involvement in Decision-making - Person I Machine 
Interface - Work Environment - Work Patterns 
Impacts upon - Safety Behaviour 
Means of Measurement 
• Safety Climate - Perceptual Audit 
• Safety Management System - Objective Audit 
• Safety Behaviour - Behavioural Sampling 
47 
5.3 INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Traditional safety law was prescriptive in process, specifying hazards and the 
preventive measures to be taken. A report by the Robens Committee (1974) - a 
safety hierarchy level 1 intervention that advocated self-regulation at safety levels 
2 and 3 rather than resorting to legislation - recognised the shortcomings of the 
traditional approach to safety and recommended instead explicit policy objectives 
and effective organisation with clearly defined individual responsibilities. The 
ACSNI Human Factors Study Group Third Report (1993) expressed the opinion 
that what Robens called self-regulation would now be termed safety culture. 
Interestingly, Robens' recommendation actually outlines the fundamental 
principles of a typical Safety Management System (SMS) that incorporates: 
1. A policy that recognises management responsibility for safety, and 
2. 	 A safety organisation that: 

Identifies potential hazards and 

Apportions responsibility for dealing with those hazards. 

5.3.1 Closed Cycle Safety Management Systems 
Genn (1987) has suggested that Robens' proposed self-regulation is successful in 
only a very limited number of companies, principally within firms that have clear, 
self-interested reasons for compliance, and that most employers will implement 
safety improvements only when detailed safety provisions are imposed upon them 
and the rules are enforced by an inspection system. Such an organisation may 
develop and implement an SMS such as that depicted in figure 3 below and which 
may be termed a closed cycle model. 
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FIGURE 3: MODEL OF A CLOSED CYCLE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
A closed cycle SMS is basic in design in so far as it is not incremental. Although 
the SMS may be fully integrated into the organisation's work system it is not open 
to outside influences and has only one point of feedback, suggesting that it has 
been introduced in order to achieve specific, limited goals. 
Such a system can grow and mature in only two ways: 
• By increasing the speed of the cycle; or 
• By adding additional layers to the cycle, similar to the skins of an onion. 
The first option is not realistic since the speed of the cycle will be constrained by 
the speed at which the work is performed. The second option is feasible but the 
system may become administratively cumbersome if too many layers are added. 
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An example of a closed cycle SMS may be found in Florida where State law 
(339.177 F.S.) requires the Department of Transportation to have an SMS in order 
to provide information needed to make informed decisions regarding the proper 
allocation of transportation resources. An SMS is broadly defined by the Florida 
State Safety Engineer's Office (Florida State Safety Engineer's Office, 2001) as 
the integration of the vehicle, the driver and the roadway elements into a 
comprehensive approach to solving highway safety problems. 
The example given demonstrates the use of an integrated SMS to achieve a 
specific goal: to reduce the number and severity of traffic crashes by analysing 
feedback to ensure that all opportunities to improve road safety are: 
• Identified, 
• Considered, implemented when and where appropriate, and 
• Evaluated. 
In terms of design, the system used by the Florida Department of Transport is a 
closed cycle SMS with single feedback. Although integrated into the 
organisation's work systems, the SMS operates on a closed cycle and is not 
intended to be further developed. 
Design of such systems is carried out by senior managers working at level 3 of the 
safety hierarchy, development and implementation of the systems is effected by 
middle management at level 4 of the hierarchy, and functional use of the systems 
is carried out by staff working at level 5 of the hierarchy. Feedback is between 
levels 5 and 4 of the safety hierarchy with no feedback other than work output, in 
this particular case information, at level 3. 
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5.3.2 Incremental Safety Management Systems 
The phased repeal of outdated safety law - which was prescriptive in process ­
and the introduction by the U.K. Health and Safety Executive (1992) of the 
Management of Health and Safety Regulations - which are prescriptive in 
outcome, specifying the steps which an employer should take to identify hazards, 
assess risks, and select, implement and monitor preventive measures rather than 
specifying specific hazards and the preventive measures to be taken - have 
resulted in a more proactive approach to safety management, with safety 
management systems of an incremental nature integrated into an organisation's 
general operating framework. 
The concept of an incremental integrated SMS with multiple lines of feedback is 
commensurate with a growing body of literature that recognises not only the 
personality factors and situational variables that affect both risk taking and risk 
taking behaviour, but also the influence of the organisational structure itself 
(ACSNI, 1993; Le Guen, 1999; Harveyet ai, 2001). 
A model of an incremental SMS is illustrated in figure 4 below. It is an open 
system with a comprehensive review mechanism at each level of operation, 
illustrated by the feedback loops in the figure, suggesting that the SMS is not only 
integrated into the organisation's work system but is also open to the influence of 
exogenous concerns such as public safety and environmental protection, and can 
be adapted accordingly. 
In an incremental SMS, both management and operational tasks progress 
sequentially through five steps, each with its own feedback loop and each open to 
outside influences, thus allowing the system to mature organically. 
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FIGURE 4: MODEL OF AN INCREMENTAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Employees and middle management working at levels 4 and 5 of the safety 
hierarchy carry out steps 1, 2, 3 and 4 of an integrated SMS whilst senior 
managers working at level 3 of the safety hierarchy not only influence the design 
of such systems but also actively engage in ensuring that the systems are 
effectively implemented and altered to accommodate changed circumstances as 
and when necessary, taking into consideration feedback received as indicated at 
step 5 in the diagram. 
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5.3.3 Comparison of SMS Models 
An important difference between the closed cycle and incremental SMS models is 
that the former involves single-loop learning whilst the latter embodies double-loop 
learning, a distinction first promulgated by Argyris (1977) and later developed by 
Argyris with Schon (1978). According to this distinction, single-loop learning 
comprises detection and elimination of errors in accordance with given variables, 
whilst double-loop learning comprises changing the variables themselves. 
Jankowicz (2000) notes the distinction propounded by Argyris and SchOn but 
highlights in addition that there are two different levels of language involved in the 
theory. The first apprehends control activities of an organisation at the operational 
level whilst the second is concerned with policy-making activities at the strategic 
level. These Jankowicz terms the subordinate and superordinate levels 
respectively, the former being associated with the learning organization and the 
latter with the adaptive organization. 
Applying this concept to the two models of SMS illustrated in figures 3 and 4 
above, it may be seen that the closed cycle SMS has no identifiable superordinate 
level of control. The model is based completely upon controlling the development 
and implementation of safe working practices in an operational setting. Such an 
SMS will be essentially procedurally specific, comprising mainly company 
procedures and reporting formats. It involves single-loop learning. 
In the incremental model however, safety forms part of the organisation's risk 
management policy. Whilst controls are in place at operational level to monitor 
and develop safe working practices, feedback is also supplied from the 
subordinate level to the superordinate level at step 5, forming one of the inputs 
zat 
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used by management to formulate strategic policy. Such an SMS involves double­
loop learning and may be more outcome specific than a closed cycle model, 
incorporating not only procedural requirements but also policy guidelines. 
An incremental SMS is most likely to be found in an organisation where 
management both empowers and encourages employees to exercise delegated 
authority and the SMS is seen as a way of systematically increasing the level of 
safety throughout the organisation. 
The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) 
(Brookhaven National Laboratory, 2001), which conducts research in the physical, 
biomedical and environmental sciences, and energy technologies, provides an 
example of such an organisation. 
All DOE contracts incorporate an incremental SMS that BNL describes as 
combining all the elements of environment, safety and health into one ES&H 
system focused on accomplishing work safely rather than ES&H requirements and 
programs for their own sake. BNL uses the acronym SIMPLE as an aid to 
remembering the five core functions of an incremental SMS: 
• Define the Scope of work. 
• Identify the hazards. 
• Mitigate the hazards. 
• Perform work within their controls. 
• Lessons learned, feedback and continuous improvement. 
According to BNL, the five core functions go hand in hand with the 'Eight Guiding 
Principles of Safety Management': 
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• Line management responsibility for safety 
• Clear roles and responsibilities 
• Competence commensurate with responsibilities 
• Balanced priorities 
• Identification of safety standards and requirements 
• Hazard controls tailored to the work being performed 
• Operations authorization 
• Worker involvement 
There is a significant correlation between the BNl safety philosophy and that of 
DuPont Safety Resources (1999) which is embodied in eleven principles, the first 
two of which are: 
• All injuries are preventable. 
• Management is responsible and accountable for preventing injuries. 
The DuPont philosophy is currently fashionable in management circles and large 
multinational companies such as Mobil Oil Corporation (now a part of the 
ExxonMobii Corporation) have had their operations audited by DuPont safety 
consultants. 
It is arguable however, whether the first of DuPont's eleven guiding principles is in 
practice attainable. Theoretically it may be possible to completely prevent all 
injuries, but it is surely unrealistic to believe that it is possible in practice to avoid 
all accidents and their consequences. Indeed, one of the fundamental concepts of 
risk management is the tolerability of risk and that where it is impractical to 
completely eliminate a risk then controls are put in place to reduce the severity of 
the potential consequences of the risk should it eventuate (Le Guen, 1999). 
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5.4 MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN SMS 

Whatever safety system an organisation puts in place, whether it is prescriptive in 
process or prescriptive in outcome, closed cycle or incremental in nature, the 
objectives remain the same: ensuring the safety of personnel, property and the 
environment. Thus there is a need to be able to measure the effectiveness of 
safety systems. 
The most common method of evaluating effectiveness is the recording of 
accidents, lost time incidents and hazardous occurrences (ACNSI, 1993). 
Fleming (Fleming, 2001) endeavoured to go beyond this and develop a Safety 
Culture Maturity Model (SCMM) to assist organisations in the offshore oil and gas 
industry to: 
• Establish their current level of safety culture maturity; and 
• Identify the actions required to improve their culture. 
According to Fleming, safety culture maturity is a new concept initially developed by 
the Software Engineering Institute for use in improving the way software is built and 
maintained. The draft model developed by Fleming to illustrate the concept is shown 
in figure 5 below. 
The draft model, which was not validated, is set out in five levels, which should not 
be confused with the five levels of safety management identified at section 5.1 of 
this chapter. In order to help avoid such confusion Fleming's levels of safety 
maturity will be referred to here as stages rather than levels and his diagram of the 
model has been relabelled accordingly. 
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Continually 
improving 
Stage 5 
Develop 
consistencyIc~op~~ating 	 and fight 
complacencyL___ 
 Stage4 
Involving ~}----r'~'-n-ga-g"""'e all staff t~ 
develop cooperation 
Stage 3 -.~"" and commitment to 
L----...c---~' ,.- improving safety 
Managing 	 Realise the importance 
of frontline staff andStage 2 develop personal 
responsibility 
Emerging 	 Develop 

management
Stage 1 commitment 
FIGURE 5: DRAFT SAFETY CULTUR§ M~_IygtIY I\1QPELJFLEMING. 2001) 
In Fleming's draft model organisations pro'gress sequentially through the five stages, 
moving from one stage to the next only when the strengths and weakness of each 
stage have been built upon or removed respectively, Fleming refers to the five 
stages as iterative, although he fails to danfy in what way such definitive stages can 
be iterative. 
Nor does he clarify how developments at each stage of the model are measured, 
although as the factors involved are then presumably measurement 
would be by perceptual audit. 
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If that is the case then the model is potentially very value laden and it is difficult to 
imagine the concept of safety maturity without asking who decides the criteria that 
determine maturity. Fleming endeavours to mitigate this aspect of the model by 
proposing that the SCMM is of relevance only to organisations that fulfil a number of 
criteria, including: 
• 	 An adequate SMS 
• 	 Technical failures are not causing the majority of accidents 
• 	 The company is compliant with health and safety law 
• 	 Safety is not driven by the avoidance of prosecution but by the desire to 
prevent accidents. 
If however, adequacy is meant to imply that the SMS is effective then this proposal 
overlooks two points: 
• 	 An SMS would be adequate only if it addressed the other three criteria. 
• 	 An effective SMS is self-improving and not a static system. It ensures that 
every hazardous occurrence and accident, whether or not it involves a lost 
time incident, is analysed to see what can be learned from the incident, what 
precautions can be put in place to prevent it happening again or to mitigate 
its impact if it cannot be prevented (Shaw, 2001). 
The term safety maturity implies that the system in place is more than just adequate: 
it implies that the system is highly effective and achieves stipulated safety 
objectives. 
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5.5 CHOICE OF SMS 

When developing an SMS for use in a shipping company the primary source of 
information concerning the structure of the system and the eventualities that it 
should encompass is the ISM Code and its Guidelines. The functional 
requirements for an SMS as envisaged by the ISM Code are laid down in Clause 
1.4 of the Code as follows: 
1. 	 A safety and environmental protection policy; 
2. 	 Instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and 
protection of the environment in compliance with relevant international and 
flag State legislation; 
3. 	 Defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and 
amongst, shore and shipboard personnel; 
4. 	 Procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the 
provisions of this Code; 
5. 	 Procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; and 
6. 	 Procedures for internal audits and management reviews. 
Other sources of information would include, but not be limited to: 
• 	 Rules and regulations promulgated by flag State Administrations 
• 	 Rules and regulations promulgated by port State Administrations 
• 	 Rules and regulations promulgated by industry bodies 
• 	 The company's own Quality Assurance system, comprising: 

Company Policies; 

Operating Procedures and work instructions; 

Feedback from management reviews. 
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Since Clause 1.2.3 of the ISM Code provides that the safety management 
objectives of the company should continuously improve safety management skills 
of personnel ashore and aboard ships, it is evident that the type of SMS envisaged 
by IMO should provide a systematic approach to integrating safety into work 
planning and execution, encompassing protection of employees, the public and 
the environment. 
A feature of an incremental SMS is that it strives to continually improve the overall 
safety performance of the organisation in which it is embedded. However, that 
does not necessarily mean that only an incremental SMS will meet the IMO 
requirements since on-going education and training within the parameters of either 
an incremental or a closed cycle SMS might also conceivably result in continuous 
improvement of the safety management skills of the trainees. 
So, in deciding what type of SMS is best suited to a particular shipping company 
various other factors also need to be taken into consideration, such as the size 
and type of vessels being operated, the number of crew members on board and 
the cultural and educational norms of the vessels' crews and shore-based 
management. 
These factors form an important part of the empirical research and are expanded 
upon in the methodology described in Chapter X. 
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5.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INTEGRATED SMS 
Implementation of an integrated safety management system in a shipping 
operation involves validation of the SMS by an external industry body or 
government agency representing the 'flag-State (ISM Code, Revised Guidelines, 
Section 2, 'Verifying Compliance with the ISM Code? which constitutes a level 2 
intervention at leve! 3 of the safety management hierarchy. Implementation also 
involves: 
• Liaison between the shipping company and industry bodies such as flag 
State Administrations and Classification Societies. This represents 
Organisational Safety at levels 3 and 4 of the safety hierarchy. 
• Liaison between shore management and shipboard management. In 
terms of the safety hierarchy this represents an interface at levels 4 and 5 
of the safety hierarchy: an interface between Operational Safety 
Management and Behavioural Safety. 
• A working relationship between the ship's senior officers and other 
members of the ship's complement. That is Behavioural Safety, a 
particular fully concretised norm at level 5 of the safety hierarchy. 
These interfaces between different levels of safety management frequently involve 
a cultural interface. The shore management and shipboard staff are, more often 
than not, of different nationalities (Donaldson, 2001), and even where they are of 
the same nationality then different organisational cultures may well prevail as a 
result of the different lifestyles and operating priorities that exist between shore 
management and shipboard staff. On board ship there is often a broad mix of 
nationalities, recent personal experience identifying nationals of five different 
nation States amongst a ship's staff comprising 12 persons. 
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However, whilst the input of personnel at levels 4 and 5 of the safety management 
hierarchy is directly relevant to the implementation of an SMS, its impact upon the 
design of an SMS is indirect, mainly by way of feedback to Level 3. From a 
management perspective implementation of an 8MS is an organisational 
development problem rather than a qualitative one. A company determined to 
introduce a particular style of safety management on board its vessels has every 
means at its disposal to ensure that such a system is in fact implemented. There 
may be some resistance from ship's staff but a determined ship owner or operator 
can overcome that by using well established techniques for dealing with resistance 
to change, although the practice may be more difficult than theory might suggest. 
Safety Management Systems are designed and embedded in the policies and 
procedures of ship operating companies at levels 3 and 4 of the safety hierarchy 
and it is at levels 4 and 5 that those policies and procedures are implemented. 
5.7 CULTURALLY INFLUENCED VARIABLES 
Holden (2002, p.22) notes that culture can be used as an organising principle at 
different levels of human endeavour, citing as examples the international, the 
national, the regional, the organisational, the professional, the personal, each of 
which may be seen as a sphere of social-cultural interaction wherein culture is not 
merely determined by social norms but is influential in moulding social norms. 
This concept maps conveniently onto the five-level safety hierarchy developed 
above. By acknowledging culture as a determining factor in the development and 
implementation of safety practices and then identifying the cultural dimensions (as 
per Hofstede, 1991) prevailing at levels 3, 4 and 5 of the safety hierarchy, it is 
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possible to establish whether they will have a positive (beneficial) effect upon the 
development and implementation of safety practices at those levels or whether their 
influence will be negative (counterproductive). That is, it would be possible to 
determine whether or not the prevailing cultural dimensions present particular risk 
factors to the establishment of safe working practices within an organisation. 
This concept will be examined in more detail in the next chapter, section 6.5 of 
which identifies the relevant organisational risk factors that need to be measured in 
the empirical stage of the study in order to assess the ways in which safety 
management of the observed companies may be affected by cultural factors. 
5.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter commenced by identifying a five-level safety management hierarchy 
and went on to review two different approaches to safety management: the 
traditional concept which was prescriptive in process and the present day notion of 
a safety culture which tends to be prescriptive in outcome. 
The concept of Safety Management Systems was then explored, including factors 
influencing the effectiveness of an 8MS and a comparison of closed cycle and 
incremental systems. 
Quantitative and qualitative methods of measuring the effectiveness of an SMS 
were discussed and the possibility of measuring safety culture maturity was 
examined. Finally, the relationship between cultural dimensions and safety risk 
factors was touched upon. In the next chapter, the relationship between culture 
and risk management will be more deeply examined. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CULTURE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
Safety, risk and the management of risk are closely associated (Gadd & Col/ins, 
2002) and there are dimensions to both risk and the management of risk that are 
influenced by cultural and psychological factors (Gadd & Collins, 2002; Schmidt et 
aI, 2001; Krampen and Weiberg, 1981). This chapter explores those dimensions 
to establish how they might need to be accommodated in the cross-cultural safety 
management strategy of international, trans-national or global companies. 
6.1 CULTURE 
As noted in Chapter I, section 1.7, Trompenaars (2000; 24) quoting Geertz (1973) 

defines culture as the means by which people communicate, perpetuate, and 

develop their knowledge about attitudes towards life. Culture is the fabric of 

meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their 

action. 

That is an excellent definition of culture in its broadest sense. However, culture 

needs to be more particularly defined when discussing specific social groupings, of 

which the following three are relevant to this current study: 

National Culture: 

A set of deeply held, shared beliefs and values that underline the characteristics 

exhibited by groups of people within defined political boundaries (Tayeb, 1996). 

MfM.. 
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Corporate (or Organisational) Culture: 
Operational practices and attitudes of people within an organisation developed as 

a result of organisational edicts, custom, and past practice. This definition 

synthesises definitions of organisational culture given by Pheysey (1993) and 

Schein (1992). 

Safety Culture: 

The attitude of employees within an organisation towards managing personal, 

corporate or environmental safety within their sphere of work (Shaw, 2001). Other 

definitions of safety culture have been developed (Glendon and McKenna, 1995; 

Confederation of British Industry, 1990; Hale, 2000) but there is a general 

consensus that safety culture constitutes a proactive stance towards safety (Lee 

and Harrison, 2000). 

6.2 CROSS-CULTURAL MANAGEMENT 
There are links between corporate culture and the way tasks are performed, 
including the development of safety consciousness within organisations (Camall, 
1995; Pheysey, 1992), and national culture is undoubtedly a compelling influence 
upon both corporate culture and safety culture (Hale, 1984; Hofstede, 1991; 
ACSNI, 1993). This implies that in global, international or trans-national 
organisations effective safety management requires good cross-cultural 
management. 
Holden (2002) contends that cross-cultural management practitioners should not 
approach cultural diversity as a challenge to be dealt with but as a contextual 
factor in the administration of trans-national corporations, whilst Carnal! sees 
65 
national culture as a broader part of our affairs that requires an effective manager 
to display empathy, sensitivity to cultural differences and to be able to 
communicate in an intelligible fashion in a multi-cultural or cross-cultural 
organisation. 
Effective cross-cultural management therefore, requires a manager to become 
familiar with the characteristics of the cultures of the people who may be regarded 
as stakeholders, both within and outside the organisation being managed. 
6.3 MEASURING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
Trompenaars (2000) argues that it is possible to distinguish cultures from each 
other by observing the differences in shared meanings they expect and attribute to 
their environment. This accords with the findings of Hofstede (1991) who 
identified five dimensions along which national cultures differ from one another. 
These differences he termed: 
• 	 Power-distance: a measure of the inequality in society; 
• 	 Collectivism: a measure of the degree of individualism in society; 
• 	 Gender roles: a measure of the assertiveness of individuals in society; 
• 	 Uncertainty avoidance: a measure of a society's tolerance of ambiguity; 
• 	 Long-term orientation: a measure of the time frame against which a society 
measures its values. 
Hofstede illustrated how differences in these five dimensions could impact upon 
national affiliates of international organisations and it is therefore instructive to 
expand somewhat upon each of the dimensions. 
MI' -5"R! 7..... 
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6.3.1 Power-Distance 
Hofstede's Power-Distance Index (POI) simply described is a measure of the 
deference shown by people in a society to other people of different status within 
the same or a different society. It may also be seen as a measure of the 
inequality between people in authority and their inferiors, and the extent to which 
that is accepted. 
Trompenaars (2000) is of the opinion that it is also a measure of how we accord 
status: whether it is ascribed by virtue of age, class, gender, education, etc. or 
attained as a result of an individual's personal achievements. 
6.3.2 Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance is a measure of the degree to which an individual or society 
is comfortable with ambiguous situations, the extent to which they are willing to 
tolerate uncertainty. 
Uncertainty avoidance should not be confused with risk aversion. The former 
refers to the avoidance of ambiguity in situations whilst the latter refers to an 
unwillingness to take a chance of achieving a possible outcome of an action with 
known outcome variables if there is a high degree of probability that the required 
outcome may not be achieved. 
6.3.3 Gender Roles 
This dimension does not refer to the supremacy of males or females within a 
society but to the extent to which a culture stresses achievement or nurture. 
Hofstede notes that different societies display to differing degrees characteristics 
that can be readily identified as male or female characteristics. 
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A culture that displays primarily masculine traits emphasises ambition, wealth 
acquisition and differentiated gender roles whilst a culture that displays primarily 
feminine traits emphasises caring behaviour, sexual equality, environmental 
awareness and quality of life. 
This dimension is also referred to as the masculinity versus femininity dimension 
and sometimes as the achievement versus relationship orientation. 
6.3.4 Collectivism I Individualism 
Collectivism as opposed to individualism is a measure of the degree to which 
people in a particular society believe that their duty is to act primarily for the 
greater good of that society rather than to their own personal advantage. It 
focuses on the relationship between the individual and the group within a society 
or an organisation. 
Highly collectivist cultures believe the group is the most important unit and 
encourage primary loyalty to the group, decision-making based upon what is best 
for the group, and dependence upon organisations and institutions in the 
expectation that they will take care of the individual. 
Highly individualistic cultures on the other hand, see the individual as the most 
important unit and encourage people to be responsible for their own well-being 
and decision-making based on individual needs. 
6.3.5 Long Term Orientation 
To the four dimensions referred to above, originally defined by Inkeles and 
Levinson (1969), an additional dimension reflecting time orientation was 
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subsequently added following studies in the Far East by Hofstede and Bond 
(Hofstede, 1988). Originally termed Confucian dynamism by Bond, Hofstede uses 
the attitudes of different cultures to values such as perseverance, thrift and 
harmonious relationships, to compare and contrast long-term and short-term 
orientation in those cultures. 
The significance of long term orientation is that prior to its identification as an 
important dimension in an Oriental culture, studies had evaluated cultural 
dimensions from a purely Occidental standpoint, thus missing some of the 
important factors in cultures other than Western cultures. 
6.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 
The fifth level of the safety management hierarchy described in Chapter V section 
5.1 is behavioural safety, which is safety exercised at the level of the individual. 
Three psychological factors that have a strong bearing on behavioural safety are 
Locus of Control, Risk Perception and Cognitive Biases, all of which may be 
affected by the educational, cultural and socio-economic background of an 
individual. 
6.4.1 Locus of Control 
According to Heider (1958) we observe the behaviour of others and then attribute 
causes to it Heider's attribution theory holds that people see behaviour as being 
caused by either dispositional or situational factors, making a distinction between 
internally initiated actions and those resulting from reaction to external factors. 
eprt 
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Other researchers (Rotter, 1966; Kelly, 1967; Weiner, 1974; Calder, 1977) 
developed Heider's work, with Rotter concentrating on the situational and 
dispositional factors. Rotter identified in this an important personality trait which 
led him to develop a theory of locus of control orientation, devising a personality 
test to measure an individual's locus of control orientation. 
Locus of control orientation is a measure of a personal belief system about 
whether the outcome of one's actions is attributable to one's own actions and 
efforts (internal locus of control) or is contingent upon events outside one's 
personal control (external locus of control). Barnett (1999) has represented this 
process diagrammatically as shown in figure 6 below: 
Behaviour -+ Observe -+ Determine Intent -+ Assign Reason 
Occurs Behaviour of Behaviour for Behaviour 
1 1 1 
Unintended INTERNAL EXTERNAL 
(e.g., luck or Personal cause Situational cause 
chance) (e.g., ability, (e.g. task difficulty 
personality or motivation) luck, etc) 
FIG. 6 DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF Locus OF CONTROL (BARNETT, 1999) 
Subsequent studies using Rotter's inventory (Simons et aI, 1987; Trompena ars, 
2000) demonstrated that locus of control orientation is associated with an 
individual's socio-cultural background, family style and resources, and CUltural 
stability. 
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Trompenaars (2000, ch.10) utilised Rotter's scale to measure the loci of control of 
30,000 managers in 48 different countries and found significant differences 
between geographical areas. Trompenaars concluded that national cultures are a 
very potent influence on individual loci of control to the extent that certain cultures 
have an overriding tendency towards internal control and others towards external 
control. He further contends however, as does Mintzberg (1979), that for an 
organisation to succeed in business any significant corporate tendencies towards 
internal or external control need to be reconciled, a theme further developed by 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) in their model of deliberate and emergent strategy. 
Gaa (Gaa and Shores, 1979) and Krampen (Krampen and Weiberg, 1981) also 
found evidence to suggest links between culture and locus of control whilst Bayne 
(2002) established a significant positive correlation between individualism and 
internal locus of control although he found no evidence that collectivism was 
correlated to external control. 
Some researchers, notably Furnham (Furnham and Henry, 1980), disputed the 
findings of those researchers who argued that there is positive evidence to link 
culture and locus of control, citing inaccuracies in their studies and methodologies. 
However, on balance it would appear from the literature that the general 
consensus of opinion is that three cultural dimensions, power-distance, uncertainty 
avoidance and individualism are indeed closely associated with locus of control 
such that the lower the PDI and UAI and the greater the degree of individualism of 
a person the stronger will be the tendency towards an internal locus of control 
orientation and vice versa. 
71 
J 
A measure of an individual's locus of control therefore, may be a rich source of 
information when studying behavioural safety at level 5 of the safety hierarchy. By 
measuring the locus of control of individuals and comparing it with their educational 
attainments, cultural backgrounds and work roles it might be possible to discern 
whether or not locus of control has situational and chronological aspects, moving 
from external to internal as people gain knowledge and experience or gain 
promotion, Le. as they gain greater control over their lives. 
Such correlation would have a significant bearing upon deciding whether or not a 
greater emphasis on education and training would be successful in helping to 
establish common standards of safety throughout the shipping industry. 
6.4.2 Risk Perception 
Research by Haley and Stumpf (1989) provided some evidence that personality 
traits may predispose a manager to particular idiosyncratic biases, one of which is 
risk perception. Risk perception is a measure of the extent to which a person 
believes a particular course of action, or inaction, may result in harm occurring. 
Faced with a situation involving risk an individual makes a subjective assessment 
of probability based on data of limited validity, which are processed in accordance 
with heuristic principles (Kahneman et ai, 1982, p.3). Although the precise 
relationship between risk perception and risk behaviour is unclear (Rundmo, 
2000), research by Simon (Simon et aI, 1999) identified three cognitive biases as 
lowering risk perception: 
1. Overconfidence in the extent of one's knowledge; 
2. Overconfidence in one's skills; 
3. Belief in the law of small numbers. 
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The nature of these cognitive biases tends to indicate that they are the 
consequence of one or more of the following factors: 
1. Lack of suitable education to be able to properly assess the risk; 
2. Lack of adequate training to be able to properly assess the risk; 
3. Lack of sufficient experience to be able to properly assess the risk. 
This suggests that improved education and training should result in raising levels 
of risk perception, although it is unclear whether that would result in either 
improved safety attitudes or a reduction in accidents. 
6.4.3 Cognitive Biases 
Cognitive biases are mental errors caused by the simplified mental processing of 
information as a result of fundamental limitations in human mental processes that 
not only cause us to perceive what we expect to perceive but also influence what 
information we remember and retrieve (Heur, 1999). 
Unlike other forms of bias such as organisational bias or bias resulting from self­
interest, cognitive biases do not result from an intellectual predisposition towards a 
particular decision or judgement but from subconscious mental procedures for 
processing information based upon generalisations, simplifications and rules of 
thumb, which may in turn be based upon false premises. 
When making decisions managers use their experience and knowledge to review 
the information available to them. However, if they reach their decisions using 
inductive reasoning rather than normative judgements then cognitive biases may 
lead them to adopt inappropriate mental frameworks to evaluate the information, 
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thus affecting the accuracy of any decision, regardless of the extent to which risks 
have to be estimated (Kahneman et ai, 1982). 
From their research, Kahneman et a/ established the existence of the following 

categories of definitive cognitive biases: 

Input Biases: 

These occur when decision-makers are selective in the data upon which they rely, 

giving some classes of data more weight than others. 

Output Biases: 

These occur when decision-makers fail to evaluate data appropriately, make 

guesses in the absence of data or supplement insufficient data with questionable 

data. 

Operational Biases: 
These occur when decision-makers either draw conclusions from inappropriate 
samples or jump to conclusions in the absence of data. 
6.5 RISK AND THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 
The concept of risk is frequently associated with safety management models and 
covers a wide range of issues including self-reported risk taking, perceptions of 
risk within the workplace and attitudes towards risk and safety (Gadd and Col/ins, 
2002). 
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6.5.1 Defining Risk 

In everyday speech the terms hazard and risk tend to be used interchangeably. 

However, Le Guen (1999) argues that pedantically speaking hazard refers to the 

intrinsic propensity of any thing to cause harm, whilst risk refers to: 

• 	 The degree of probability of adverse consequences occurring as a result of 
a particular action or inaction taken in response to a potential hazard. 
• 	 A measure of the harm that may be done if those adverse consequences 
do in fact occur. 
When people say that they are prepared to 'take a risk' then they are intimating not 
only that they have weighed up the chances of the adverse consequences 
occurring and the degree of harm that will result if those consequences do occur, 
but also that they are prepared to incur a chance of those adverse consequences 
occurring in expectation of a probable benefit (Le Guen, 1999). 
Studies on the perception of risk carried out by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992), and Pidgeon et al (1992), demonstrate that the 
concept of risk is strongly influenced by personal preferences and the values of 
the society in which we live. Whether or not a person, or an organisation, is 
prepared to take a risk depends upon a number of factors such as ethical and 
social considerations, economic and technical pressures, ignorance or knowledge 
of the potential adverse consequences and the degree of probability of those 
consequences occurring. 
Based upon those considerations, preferences and values, individuals and 
organisations differentiate between risks they consider to be unacceptable, those 
that they perceive to be tolerable and those that are both negligible and broadly 
acceptable. Le Guen (1999) illustrates these factors as shown in figure 7 below. 
,. 
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Unacceptable Risk cannot be justified save in 
region extraordinarY circumstances 
Control measures must be 
introduced for risk in this region to 
drive residual risk towards the 
broadly acceptable region. Tolerable 
region If residual risk remains in this 
region, and society desires the 
benefit of the activity, the residual 
risk is tolerable only if further risk 
reduction is impracticable or 
requires action that is grossly 
disproportionate in time, trouble 
and effort to the reduction in risk 
achieved. 
Broadly acceptable 
region 	 Level of residual risk regarded as 
insignificant and further effort to 
reduce risk not likely to be required 
as resources to reduce risks likely 
to be grossly disproportionate to 
the risk reduction achieved. 
Negligible risk 
FIGURE 7: HSE CRITERIA FOR THE TOLERABILITY OF RISK (Le Guen 1999) 
6.5.2 Managing Risk 
Risk management is a system of identifying potential hazards and their possible 
consequences then putting in place policies and procedures to deal with them. An 
effective risk management system enables a company to deal with strategic 
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uncertainty by identifying threats and then either eliminating the associated risks or 
minimising the severity of the consequences should the risk eventuate. 
Reflecting upon the diagram in figure 7 it is clear that in order to arrive at an optimal 
risk management strategy a business must strike a balance between a cavalier 
attitude to risk on the one hand and obsessive risk aversion on the other. 
Hisrich et al (2005) reviewed the concepts of risk taking and risk management as 
part of a study into entrepreneurship. Whilst noting that risk taking is indeed one 
aspect of being an entrepreneur, Hisrich concluded that despite many studies no 
conclusive causal relationships between entrepreneurship and a general propensity 
to take risks had been determined. Hisrich continued by describing specific risk 
reduction strategies in a context where risk refers to the probability and magnitude 
of downside financial loss. 
But the need to address hazards and reduce risk to an acceptable level by 
assessing the risks, evaluating the effectiveness of risk reduction measures and 
carrying out cost-benefit studies is applicable to all kinds of organisations not just 
entrepreneurial businesses, in which the ability to make measured risk estimates is 
well established. Indeed, in many companies, particularly large multi-national 
corporations, the hazards and risks that need to be assessed go far beyond simple 
financial loss and involve more complex areas such as public perception and 
cultural acceptability, as discussed later in Chapter VIII, section 8.4, which deals in 
some detail with culture, values, decision-making and managing cultural diversity in 
the context of a global industry. 
Ib 
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6.5.3 Embedded Risk Management Systems 
Shaw (2001) is of the opinion that safety should be viewed as an integral part of 
business, forming part of a company's overall risk management strategy. By 
extension of Shaw's reasoning, a company's corporate risk management system 
should form an embedded part of the company's SMS in order to increase its 
effectiveness. 
This should be a relatively straightforward process since the four fundamental 
steps in risk management (Nonprofit Risk Management Centre, 2001), are in many 
respects similar to, and map well upon, the five steps of a safety management 
system (figures 3 and 4 above). The four fundamental steps in risk management 
are: 
1. Acknowledge and identify risks. 
2. Evaluate and prioritise risks. 
3. Select risk management tools. 
4. Evaluate results and revise strategies. 
6.6 IDENTIFYING SALIENT ORGANISATIONAL RISK FACTORS 
The risk factors with which this study is concerned are those associated with the 
development and implementation of an effective SMS rather than those associated 
with operational procedures per se since the latter are addressed by the 
Operational Procedures embedded within a company's SMS. 
Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil and Cule (2001) developed a framework of eleven 
common risk factors for identifying risk in Information Systems development 
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projects. The framework can be readily adapted and reliably applied to the 
development and implementation of an SMS in a shipping organisation because: 
• 	 There is a lot of common ground in any project development; and 
• 	 The framework developed by Schmidt et al arose from a study carried out 
from a cross-cultural perspective and is therefore particularly suited for 
adaptation to the study of a company operating in a global context. 
As noted in Chapter II, section 2.2 and further discussed below, at hierarchal 
safety management levels 3, 4 and 5 there exist three specific elements that are 
important in the development and implementation of an SMS and are the main 
determinants of its effectiveness: 
• 	 Leadership Style; 
• 	 End user involvement; and 
• 	 Suitability of SMS. 
Therefore, in adapting the framework of Schmidt et al so as to identify the risks 
inherent in the development and implementation of an SMS in a shipping 
company, the risk factors identified by Schmidt were reviewed in relation to those 
three salient elements, rejecting any items not relevant to the project and including 
under each head those items that were relevant. 
Finally, any other factors that might affect the effectiveness of an SMS but which 
did not fit within one of the three main categories were also reviewed. 
The individual elements are discussed below and subsequently summarised in 
Table 2. 
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6.6.1 Leadership Style 
Leadership style gives form and direction to organisational culture (Schein 1992) 
and it is a sine qua non throughout safety management literature that without 
senior management commitment there will be only token commitment to safety 
within any organisation (Pidgeon &O'Leary, 2000; Cox & Flin, 1998; Cheyne et aI, 
1998). 
The introduction of an SMS, whether initially or to replace another SMS, involves 
an organisational change and subsequent monitoring of the system. To ensure 
that the new system is implemented effectively it is essential for senior 
management to consistently disconfirm patterns of behaviour not in keeping with 
the new organisational philosophy and consistently support any evidence of 
movement in the direction of the new assumptions (Schein, 1992: p.328). 
6.6.2 End User Involvement 
Similarly, unless end users of a safety system are given a sense of ownership 
through participation and involvement in the development and operation of the 
system, then safety procedures may not be followed with any degree of 
enthusiasm, if at all (Schein 1992, p.134), and authoritarian measures may need 
to be employed in order to achieve corporate safety goals (Etzioni 1975). 
6.6.3 Suitability of SMS 
The type of SMS envisaged by IMO should provide a systematic approach to 
integrating safety into work planning and execution, encompassing protection of 
employees, the public and the environment. 
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The suitability of an organisation's SMS for achieving these objectives was 
discussed in some detail in Chapter V and from the discussion, particularly at 
section 5.5 entitled Choice of SMS, it is evident that if the style and type of SMS 
developed is incompatible with the type of vessels being operated, the number of 
crew members on board, the behavioural norms of the vessels' crews and the 
socia-cultural backgrounds of the shore management, then the suitability of the 
SMS will be questionable, leading to misunderstandings and possibly unsafe work 
practices. 
6.6.4 Effectiveness of SMS 
With the first three risk factors suitably addressed there is still the possibility that 
other factors such as insufficient or inappropriate staffing may militate against the 
effectiveness of an organisation's SMS. Therefore, the fourth risk item comprises 
any other discern able factor affecting the adequacy and competency of human 
resources for the SMS to be effective and leading to failure to achieve 
expectations. 
Table 2 below summarises the four risk factors considered to be important in the 
development and implementation of an SMS: leadership style, end user 
involvement, suitability of the SMS and any other factor affecting the adequacy or 
competency of human resources. Whilst all four risk factors are generally 
applicable to both the development and the implementation of an SMS, the first 
two are particularly relevant to its development and the second two are particularly 
relevant to its implementation. 
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Risk Factor 
1. Leadership style results in: 
a. Lack of top management 
commitment to a project 
b. Conflict between user 

departments 

2. Lack ofadequate user 
involvement/commitment 
3. 	 Poorly drafted SMS 
resulting in 
misunderstanding of the 
objectives: 
a. 	By shore based staff 
b. 	By sea going staff 
4. Insufficient I inappropriate 
staffing or lack of required 
knowledge/skills in either 
shore based or seagoing 
personnel 
Brief Description 
a. Lack of executive oversight, visible support 
and public endorsement as well as active 
policy intervention. 
b. 	 Serious differences in project goals, 
deliverables and design shared by 
different departments in an organization. 
Active participation by end-users is missing 
due to failure of developers to involve them. 
There is no commitment to deliverables and 
responsibilities. 
a. 	 Lack of executive and middle 
management understanding of ISM 
Code requirements and/or the cultural 
traits of the seagoing staff and 
operations/maintenance personnel. 
b. 	 Consequent lack of understanding by 
sea going staff of what is required of 
them. 
Risk that high expectations are mismatched 
with deliverable due to insufficient or 
inappropriate staffing, implying an inability to 
allocate a skilled workforce with suitable 
knowledge and/or experience in ship 
operations and maintenance, regardless of 
availability. 
Table 2: SMS Effectiveness Risk Factors 
(Adapted from Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil and Cule, 2001) 
m 
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6.7 THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON THE RISK FACTORS 
This study recognises safety management systems as subsystems of 
organisations, and that the observations of Hofstede (1991) on cultural differences 
and how they relate within organisations may well be applicable to safety 
management systems. Hence, the integrated SMS, particularly the incremental 
model, is regarded as a highly value-laden system based upon subjective 
judgements that might well vary from one culture to another. 
Therefore, having identified the risk factors associated with the development and 
implementation of an effective SMS, it is instructive to analyse how cultural 
dimensions might impact upon each risk factor, whether positively or negatively, 
i.e. whether the impact of a particular cultural dimension increases or decreases 
the likelihood of a particular risk eventuating. 
For example, in situations where there is a high power-distance index, particularly 
where it is combined with a high degree of collectivism, then we may expect to see 
an organisation that is highly stratified and places great emphasis on the 
workforce being seen to obey the dictates of management. 
Table 3 below (McGill University, 2002) presents a synopsis of the impact of 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions on management issues. 
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POWER DISTANCE 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 

ROLE OF MANAGER 

PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT 

STATUS SYMBOLS 

IMPORTANCE OF SAVING "FACE" 

UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE 
CORPORATE PLANS 

BUDGETING SYSTEMS 

CONTROL SYSTEMS 

RISK 

COMPETITION 

INDIViDUALISM 
DECISION MAKING 

ORGANISATIONAL CONCERN 

REWARD SYSTEMS 

ETHICS / VALUES 

MASCULINITY I FEMININITY 
VALUED REWARDS 

NETWORKING 

INTERPERSONAL Focus 

BASIS FOR MOTIVATION 

Small 
Relatively flat 

Facilitator 

Possible 

Relatively Unimportance 

Less Important 

Weak 

Seen as Guidelines 

Flexible 

Loose 

Take 

Seen as Advantageous 

Collectivist 
Group Consensus 

Look After Employees 

Group Based 

Particularism 

Feminine 
Quality of Life 

Important for Relationships 

Maintaining Relationships 

Service to Others 

Large 
Hierarchical Pyramid 

Expert 

Not Possible 

Very important 

important 

Strong 
Seen as Important Rules 

Inflexible 

Tight 

Avoid 

Seen as Damaging 

Individualist 
Individual look After Selves 

Employees 

Individual/Merit Based 

Universalism 

Masculine 
Money, Perronnance 

Important for Perrormance 

Getting the Task Done 

Ambition - Getting Ahead 

TABLE 3: IMPACT OF HOFSTEDE'S CULTURAL DIMENSIONS ON MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
(McGill University, 2002) 
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The following examples expand upon the synopsis given in Table 3 and indicate 
how the impact of the cultural dimensions together with organisational 
weaknesses can increase or decrease the particular risk factors identified as being 
important in the development and implementation of an effective SMS. 
The examples are not an exhaustive examination using all of the Hofstede I 
Trompenaars cultural dimensions in relation to all risk situations, but provide 
illustrations of how the application of specific cultural dimensions to the four 
specific risk factors can be used to identify potential risks to the effectiveness of a 
shipping company's SMS and hence assist in enabling steps to be taken to negate 
or decrease the potential impact of the risks. 
6.7.1 Risk Factor 1 
Leadership style results in: 
a. Lack of top management commitment to the project; and 
b. Conflict between user departments 
Two cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede considered to be very influential 
upon leadership style are power distance and collectivism. In a society with a high 
power distance culture there tends to be a rigid hierarchy and societies with strong 
collectivism tend to be group orientated with members of one class tending to 
segregate themselves from those of another class. The end result of a 
combination of both dimensions is that subordinates do not question their 
superiors, and managers do not get involved in matters they have delegated to 
their staff. 
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Whilst this satisfies societal goals of avoiding confrontation and maintaining an 
ostensible harmony in the workplace, it also results in top managers distancing 
themselves from middle and junior managers and therefore not being fully aware 
of the needs or progress of the project, both of which are essential for 
commitment. 
Collectivism on its own can have either a positive or a negative effect on 
leadership style. In the context of a low power~distance culture it might have a 
positive influence because collectivism engenders, or at least emphasises, 
harmonious relationships and deters confrontation. But, in a high power-distance 
context it might have a negative influence because groups of people within an 
organisation in such a culture will tend to favour their own group over another and 
if this leads to conflict then neither group will defer to their senior manager as he 
will already have distanced himself from the conflict. 
6.7.2 Risk Factor 2 

Lack of adequate user involvement / commitment. 

I n a high power distance culture there is a high degree of stratification and each 
layer of management distances itself from the layer below. This leads to a system 
of management by command rather than management by consultation. This does 
not lend itself to feedback analysis nor to a climate of user involvement or 
empowerment. 
A high power distance index therefore tends to increase the risk of lack of user 
involvement or commitment whilst a lower power distance index tends to have a 
positive effect and decrease the risk. 
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6.7.3 Risk Factor 3 

Poorly drafted SMS resulting in misunderstanding of the objectives: 

a. By shore based staff; 
b. By sea-going staff 
In a society where a prevailing cultural trait is high power-distance, a senior 
manager will give an instruction and expect his orders to be followed without 
question. When the order is to develop and implement an SMS, middle managers 
and supervisors charged with developing the system may similarly remain aloof 
from their subordinates, in this case the end users of the system, and pretend to a 
higher level of expertise than they actually have simply in order to 'keep face' and 
demonstrate their authority. But without end user involvement and participation, 
the outcome may be an incomprehensible or poorly drafted SMS. 
Power distance therefore plays a significant role in the development of a well 
drafted and effective SMS. A high power distance index tends to increase the risk 
of lack of user involvement and hence poor drafting of the SMS whilst a lower 
power distance index tends to have a positive effect and decrease the risk. 
6.7.4 Risk Factor 4. 
Failure to achieve expectations due to 
a. insufficient I inappropriate staffing; and 
b. lack of required knowledge / skills in either shore based or seagoing 
personnel. 
Risk factor 4(a) relates to how well senior management understand the concept of 
a Safety Management System as required under the ISM Code and how 
committed they are to safety management. A truly committed senior management 
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will ensure that adequate and properly trained staff are appointed to develop, 
implement and operationally monitor the company SMS. A senior management 
that only pays lip-service to safety management and does not truly understand 
what is required to develop, implement and sustain an effective SMS may result in 
insufficient and/or inappropriate staffing to the project. 
Risk factor 4(b) is inherently connected with safety training, vocational and 
professional training and human resources management. It reflects the ability of a 
company to employ and develop a skilled workforce having suitable knowledge 
and experience in ship operations and maintenance, regardless of overall 
availability. 
6.8 THE ROLE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
Companies that do not have an optimal risk management strategy are not operating 
as effectively as they could be (Shaw, 2001), and whilst most risk management 
strategies have to be cost effective values are also important, because whilst risk 
management is frequently about containing or reducing the probability and 
magnitude of downside financial loss (Hisrich, 2005) it also concerns human well­
being, and it is here that education and training have a role. 
Whilst newcomers to an organisation tend to learn patterns of behaviour from the 
people with whom they work (Lave and Wenger, 1991), not only at the level of 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers but also at professional and managerial 
levels (Easterby-Smith and Araujo, 1999), there is a need for more formal training to 
ensure that existing personnel as well as new entrants to the shipping industry are 
both professionally competent and safety conscious (DECO, 1996; Squire, 2005). 
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As noted in section 6.4.2 above, in order to arrive at an optimal risk management 
strategy, businesses must strike a balance between a cavalier attitude to risk on the 
one hand and obsessive risk aversion on the other. But a suitable balance cannot 
be achieved by safety training alone, for despite the notion that safety training will 
cure most ills in regard to accidents, evidence exists showing that it is not always 
effective (Hale, 1984). 
This may be related to the variability of the quality of training given or, alternatively, 
to the cultural attitudes of the trainees. It may also be due to a fundamental lack of 
competence by the trainee since a person involved in deciding upon a specific 
course of action must have a certain level of knowledge in order to perceive the 
existence of a hazard and the associated degree of risk (Hale, 1984). 
Common standards of safety require common standards of competency, which in 
turn requires common standards of education and training. This does not mean 
safety training per se but ensuring that individuals have the technical knowledge to 
safely operate equipment under their control, such as ships and their machinery 
(Tay/or, 1911). 
Squire (2005) puts the point very succinctly when he says that the competence of a 
mariner will depend not only on good and effective education and training but also 
on his aptitude, knowledge and understanding of the subject, on the availability of 
opportunities to develop his skills and, ultimately, his experience. Squire adds that 
competent people make the difference - they make the ship safe. 
Concerns have been expressed about the adequacy of professional training of 
seafarers and its impact upon the levels of safety in shipping operations and 
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practice (DECO, 1993; Donaldson, 2001). Clause 6 of the ISM Code requires 
companies to ensure that Masters and seafarers on board their vessels are 
properly qualified and that training requirements are identified and provided. The 
Clause requires the company to: 
• Ensure that the Master is properly qualified to command eCI. 6.1.1); 
• Ensure that each ship is manned with qualified and certificated seafarers 
(CI. 6.2); and 
• Establish training requirements and ensure that it is provided (CI. 6.5). 
Shipping companies that interpret the Clause simply as a requirement to ensure 
that any seafarers it employs are properly qualified and in possession of the 
requisite certificates may have fulfilled their legal obligations. It is debatable 
however, whether they have fulfilled their moral obligation to interpret the Clause 
within the spirit of the ISM Code as discussed in Chapter III, Section 3.4. 
Regulations and standards are by definition minimum requirements. The spirit of 
the ISM Code is to introduce a genuine safety culture within the shipping industry 
and this implies training of staff beyond minimum stipulated requirements. 
It is the maritime administrations of flag States that have both the responsibility 
and the authority for setting the required minimum standards of education and 
training for the award of their national certificates of competency. Historically 
however, there has been wide divergence between flag States regarding their 
stipulated minimum standards of education and training. Recognition of this 
disparity prompted IMO to implement the 1995 revision of the 1978 STCW 
Convention, which entered fully into force in 2002 and contains provisions for an 
internationally agreed basic minimum standard of competency for the award of 
certificates of competency to seagoing personnel. 
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Lord Donaldson (2001) highlighted an important administrative difference between 
the ISM and STCW Conventions. Flag States signatory to the ISM Convention 
operate within a self-regulatory system under which the flag States certify to IMO 
that they are fully discharging their obligations under the Convention. The STCW 
Convention on the other hand, contains a provision under which the signatory 
States to the Convention delegate to IMO the authority to assess whether or not a 
signatory is complying with its obligations under the Convention. How rigorously 
and with what ardour IMO monitors and enforces the provisions of the revised 
STCW Convention may well decide the effectiveness of the Convention in 
practice. 
6.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter explored: 
• 	 Risk and risk management and the way in which both are influenced by 
cultural and psychological factors; 
• 	 The link between national, organisational and safety cultures that establish 
the context in which cross-cultural management takes place; 
• 	 A number of cultural and psychological dimensions and how they could 
interact with four specific risk factors considered to be important in the 
development of an effective SMS; 
• 	 The role of education and training in relation to safety management. 
The next chapter comprises a review of the pressures and constraints, legal and 
moral, cultural and economic, acting upon and within organisations implementing 
the ISM Code and how those pressures and constraints might influence people 
employed in those organisations. 
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CHAPTER VII 
PRESSURES & CONSTRAINTS INFLUENCING 

ISM CODE IMPLEMENTATION 

7.1 OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH THE ISM CODE 

A Convention agreed between sovereign nations gains the force of municipal law 
when the sovereign nations introduce legislation in their individual parliaments 
adopting the Convention. When sufficient nations have adopted the Convention it 
becomes recognised as part of international law. But unless laws are obeyed, 
then instead of ensuring a basic minimum standard of performance within their 
area of concern, they become merely goals to be attained. 
The ISM Code was incorporated within to the international SOLAS Convention 
(1974) by the 1994 amendments to that Convention and as such is a part of 
international law. It is therefore, important to examine what mechanisms are in 
place to ensure that the provisions of the Code are followed and what constraints 
and pressures might militate against observance of those provisions. 
Safety is not an absolute but a variable that is influenced by the following factors 
which are determinants in the manner in which organisations and individuals 
respond to their obligations to observe the provisions of the ISM Code. 
" The socio-economic context in which safety is to be observed; 
" The hierarchal level at which safety is to be exercised; 
• A legal imperative to act safely; 
• A moral obligation to act safely. 
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What differentiates a legal duty from a moral obligation is a matter of 
jurisprudential philosophy, a detailed study of which is outside the scope of this 
thesis. However, for the purposes of this thesis moral obligations may be 
understood to arise from the values and beliefs of a society, those factors which 
provide social cohesion, whilst legal duties are the result of rules of behaviour that 
are superimposed upon society and are supported by sanctions. 
Harris (2004, p22S) holds that most public men believe that there is also a moral 
duty to obey the law and continues by identifying the following arguments for such 
a moral duty: 
1. 	 Conceptually, if a regulation is recognised as 'law', it would be a 
contradiction to deny that it is binding or valid; 
2. 	 A duty exists because it is related to other moral concepts, specifically: 
a. Gratitude; 
b. Promise keeping; 
c. Fairness; 
d. Promoting the collective good. 
Safety also may be regarded as a moral concept insofar as it concerns the 
relationship between a society's individuals, their property and their environment. 
Whilst individual views regarding safety will be influenced by a person's own 
cultural and socio-economic background, there is a common thread running 
between all the different aspects of safety, and that is respect. Safety of the 
environment entails respect for the environment, safety of personnel entails 
respect for personnel, safety of property is a measure of respect for property and 
personal safety involves respect for oneself (Trafford, May 2005). 
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This implies the existence of a moral as well as a legal obligation to exercise a 
duty of care. Accidents happen because someone is careless, either in their acts 
or omissions, or in their evaluation of the risks posed by a particular hazard: they 
have not treated their environment, property under their control, other people or 
themselves with the respect that they should have done. 
Respect is the basic societal norm of morality upon which the concept of safety is 
based just as a duty of care is the basic norm upon which the legal enforcement of 
safety is based. Together they form the basic norm of the hierarchy of safety 
developed in Chapter V. 
Therefore, as was touched upon in Chapter III, Section 3.4, companies and flag­
States should observe the provisions of the ISM Code not only to the letter but 
also within the spirit of the Code, the former in recognition of a legal duty and the 
latter in recognition of a moral duty_ 
7.1.1 Obligations at Safety Hierarchy Level 1 
Maclean (1994) suggests that international law is relevant at three separate levels 
in international relations: the levels of co-operation, co-existence and conflict. 
With respect to the adoption and ratification of IMO Conventions the most 
appropriate level is that of co-operation and the obligations assumed by States 
that adopt the Conventions can be considered in the same light as obligations 
assumed under the law of contract. 
At the very least, treaties and conventions agreed between nation States may be 
likened to relational contracts, the parties to which realise that it is not possible to 
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provide for every possible contingency when the agreement is initially drafted and 
that later amendments or even complete redrafting may be necessary. 
Unlike private contracts, agreements between nation States are not readily 
changed and thus full compliance by all parties may not be possible. Parties to an 
international agreement may accept therefore, tacitly or otherwise, that substantial 
compliance may be enough to satisfy the terms of the agreement. 
Furmston (2001) noted that obligations created by a contract are not all of equal 
importance and it is primarily for the parties to set their own value on the terms 
that they impose upon each other. He continued by pointing out that it is rare for 
contracting parties to express with any degree of precision what they have in their 
minds. Although Furmston was referring principally to the degree of emphasis 
each party might put upon particular contractual terms, the same argument can be 
applied to how contractual obligations are interpreted by parties having divergent 
cultures. Any differences of perception may be magnified when a degree of 
latitude is apparent in the need to fully comply with the terms of the contract. 
Trompenaars (2000) noted that in collectivist societies the relationship between 
contracting parties is more important than the detailed clauses of the contract itself 
and Ehrlich (1936) acknowledged the dynamic nature of relational contracts when 
he distinguished formal sources of law from what he termed 'living law', by which 
he meant norms that prevail when the parties do not resort to litigation. 
Wacks (1993) proposed that the law of contract is best understood through 
empirical studies rather than by studying formal sources of law, citing in support of 
his proposal a study by Macauley (1963) which showed that the actual operation 
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of commercial practice took precedence over the law of contract. A study by 
Beale and Dugdale (1975) provided similar results, leading Wacks to conclude that 
the social context strongly influences the way in which contract law is practiced. 
Therefore, whilst the culture of the society in which a contract is developed will 
impact upon the nature and content of the contract, the culture of the society in 
which it is administered will influence the manner in which it is performed, 
particularly where the contract incorporates standards that can be determined by 
reference to community and commercial ethics such as good faith, due care or 
fairness. 
A society's law constitutes the chief bond between its culture and its organisation; 
it is the external manifestation of the embedded ness of the former in the latter 
(Unger, 1977). Individuals follow the norms of the societies with which they are 
associated. They obey laws to the extent that their observance is in conformity 
with, and sanctioned by, the norms of the social group of which they are members. 
There is also a political element to imposing regulations upon international 
commercial enterprises such as imposing the ISM Code upon the shipping 
industry. In the ordered societies of the developed world it may seem quite proper 
for nation States to agree among themselves a set of rules for the regulation of 
international shipping, but it gives rise to a deeply political question regarding the 
extent to which it is appropriate to impose minimum standards on people engaged 
in a commercial activity. 
Whilst nation States may have a moral obligation to encourage maritime safety 
and protection of the environment, commercial business is an economic affair the 
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principal objective of which is to make profits and thereby to increase the net 
present value of shareholders' wealth. Wealth creation is seen, particularly in 
developed, capitalist societies, as not only an acceptable objective but also the 
preferred way of doing business and this raises the question of the right of 
governments to interfere with people's freedom to contract. 
But whether or not governments do have any such right, the concept of caveat 
emptor has for many years had a limited application in business transactions in the 
developed world. In the United Kingdom for example, the freedom to contract has 
been restricted by numerous statutes regulating various aspects of commerce 
such as contract exemption clauses (Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977) 
employment (Employment Protection [Consolidation] Act 1978) and the health and 
safety of employees in the workplace (Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974). 
The phenomenon of the law intervening to restrict and regulate the freedom to 
contract and provide an equitable balance between the contracting parties is not 
solely a product of post-industrial philosophy: it was clearly evident in Britain in the 
Middle Ages when market courts were established to administer the law merchant 
and deter unethical trading (Walker 1980, Furmston 2001). 
Today, most societies in developed countries that support the concept of 
commercial profitability have laws governing socially unacceptable ways of 
maximising profit, such as for example by employing child labour, paying low 
salaries and condoning unsafe working practices. But that is not the case in 
many developing countries where business ethics do tolerate child labour, low 
salaries and unsafe working conditions. 
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Yet another approach to commerce and the role of the State was taken by the 
command societies of the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe, which looked 
upon personal wealth creation as morally repugnant and promoted instead the 
concept of collective wealth creation (Krysakowska-Budny, 1991). It is debatable 
whether the State as employer in centrally controlled economies was less 
concerned about the health and safety, employment rights and working conditions 
of the individual than was the State as legislator in capitalist economies. 
But whether pmfit maximisation is seen as an individual or a collective notion, one 
factor militates in favour of imposing the rules contained in the ISM Code: the 
introduction of minimum standards throughout the entire shipping industry would 
be an equitable measure that would establish a basic norm, a 'level playing field', 
for companies involved in international shipping operations. 
People generally will agree, or at least concede that commercial dealings should 
be conducted fairly, either because they agree with the propOSition or because 
they are not willing to express opposition. But Cooke (1989), in discussing the 
concept of fairness as a criterion for judicial decision making, contends that, 'For 
fairness to work as an effective criterion it is necessary that the society [has] a 
more-or-Iess common set of values and that this value is high amongst them'. This 
presents an argument in favour of stronger policing of eXisting regulations by Port 
State Control inspectorates since the global diversity of cultures must infer a 
diversity of values. 
From the discussion, the pressures and constraints to be found at level 1 of the 
safety hierarchy may be briefly summarised as: 
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• The way in which the political and legal institutions have been shaped by 
the culture and history of individual nations; 
• 	 The manner in which a society views law, whether as a body of regulations 
to be obeyed or as identifiable targets to be achieved; 
• 	 The degree to which nation States are industrially developed and are 
prepared to accept what developed nations consider to be fair and just 
standards. 
7.1.2 Obligations at Safety Hierarchy Level 2 
When considering the ISM Code, the primary organisations at Level 2 in the safety 
hierarchy are the flag State Administrations. They have both the obligation and 
the authority to administer national and international maritime rules and 
regulations that have been sanctioned by their respective governments. 
However, they are also under pressure to increase the amount of shipping flying 
their national flags thereby increasing national revenue and as discussed in 
Chapter IV, Section 4.1.1 this has given rise to a number of ship registries paying 
only lip service to the implementation of maritime rules and regulations, allowing 
unscrupulous ship owners to operate what has become known colloquially in the 
marine industry as sub-standard tonnage, i.e. vessels which neither comply with 
the requirements of international conventions nor meet the requirements of the 
Classification Societies. 
Introduction of the ISM Code and policing of ship standards by Port State Control 
bodies have gone some way towards counterbalancing this tendency. As noted in 
Chapter III, section 3.4, under the provisions of international law, flag State 
Administrations are obliged to ensure that ships on their registers are operated in 
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conformity with the ISM Code, and the practice of policing of ship standards by 
Port State Control bodies is one means of ensuring that the flag States do in fact 
meet their obligations. 
The pressures and constraints to be found at level 2 of the safety hierarchy are 
occasioned principally by the same agencies as those at level 1 and may be briefly 
summarised as: 
• 	 A legal and moral obligation by maritime administrations to ensure that the 
provisions of the ISM Code are implemented and enforced; 
• 	 Economic obligation by maritime administrations to ensure that ship 
owners will continue to provide revenue by registering ships with them; 
• 	 Public pressure, particularly in countries where a large number of people 
are engaged in the shipping industry, to remain competitive and ensure 
that employment within the industry is not jeopardised by inflationary costs; 
• 	 Public pressure on maritime administrations to ensure that vessels entering 
their waters do not cause damage or pollution of the environment. 
7.1.3 Obligations at Safety Hierarchy Level 3 
When a company registers a vessel in a particular State the act of registration 
signifies the company's agreement to observe the State's domestic laws including 
obligations arising from international Conventions which the State has adopted. 
This imposes a legal obligation on the company to run their operations in 
accordance with the provisions of such Conventions, for example the provisions of 
the ISM Code. 
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The judgement in the case of MN Eurasian Dream (Papera Traders Co Ltd v 
Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd, 2002) highlights the fact that shipping 
companies also have obligations to corporate stakeholders, i.e. those who are 
directly or indirectly affected by corporate decision-making such as charterers, 
shareholders, cargo interests and insurance companies, to run the company and 
the vessels it operates in accordance with the latest industry standards. 
MN Eurasian Dream was a car carrier discharging its cargo in Sharjah when one 
of the vehicles caught fire. That led to the vessel being abandoned and destroyed 
by the fire. The judge held that the claimants, who were the cargo interests, had 
proved that the carrier had breached Article III of The Hague 1 Hague-Visby Rules 
because the vessel was unseaworthy due to 'numerous failures and errors of 
judgement that amounted to professional negligence in respect of the provision of 
equipment, competent master and crew and adequate documentation'. 
Although at the time of the fire the vessel was not ISM certified nor was it required 
to be, the ship had been provided with copies of the managing company's ISM 
procedural documentation and was subject to the same company procedures as 
all other vessels in the fleet. However, the judge was highly critical of the SMS 
documentation on board because it was not ship-specific and hence largely 
inappropriate and irrelevant. He was also very critical of the company's training 
policies, describing the Master as a 'car carrier novice'. 
The judge found that the ship management company had failed to exercise due 
diligence based upon reasonable standards and practices of the industry at the 
time and the fact that although the vessel had onboard much of the ship managers 
ISM documentation their SMS was utterly deficient. 
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From the foregoing and the discussions in Chapter III Section 3.4 and Chapter VII 
Section 7.1 above it is apparent that the following constraints and pressures bear 
upon senior decision-makers in shipping organisations: 
• 	 There is both a moral and a legal obligation to run their operations in 
accordance with the provisions of the ISM Code; 
• 	 There are economic factors to take into consideration which may be 
reflected in budgetary constraints with regard to safety, training and the 
quality of ship maintenance 
• 	 The type and style of safety management system developed and 
implemented will reflect: 
a. The prevailing cultural norms of the decision makers; 
b. The organisation's corporate culture; 
c. Management style; 
d. Managerial competence 
7.1.4 Obligations at Safety Hierarchy Level 4 
The ISM Code is aimed principally at the shore-based management of shipping 
companies rather than the seagoing staff. It does however address the ship/shore 
interface at level 4 I level 5 of the safety hierarchy, in so far as the functional 
requirements for an SMS defined in Clause 1.4 of the Code require: 
• 	 Safety and environmental poliCies developed by shore based management 
to be conveyed to seagoing staff by way of instructions and procedures; 
• 	 Defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and 
amongst, shore and shipboard personnel. 
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The requirement for defined levels of authority and lines of communication is 
expanded upon in Clauses 4 and 5 of the Code, which: 
• 	 Require the appointment of a designated person ashore (DPA) to provide 
a link between the company and those on board, and 
• 	 Outline the Master's responsibility and authority for implementing, 
reviewing and reporting upon the shipboard provisions of the company's 
SMS. 
Once a decision has been made by senior management to comply with the 
provisions of the ISM Code, it is the responsibility of middle management and 
supervisory staff to give effect to that decision, utiliSing the resources available to 
them, following the guidelines of the ISM Code and taking into consideration the 
prevailing organisational and cultural norms, both ashore and on board ship. 
The constraints and pressure operating at safety hierarchy level 4 therefore, bear 
principally upon middle management and supervisory staff who, in developing and 
implementing an SMS, will be influenced not only by the ISM Code guidelines but 
also: 
• 	 The extent of available resources; 
• 	 Prevailing organisational and cultural norms; 
• 	 Their own competencies and understanding and that of the seagoing staff. 
7.1.5 Obligations at Safety Hierarchy Level 5 
The most important aspect of safety at level 5 of the safety hierarchy is 
behavioural safety, safety at the level of the individual, the psychology of human 
behaviour in relation to the problems of safety in the workplace. It is particularly 
relevant in the exercise of a duty of care, because although the law may recognise 
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that companies and organisations owe a duty of care to others, it is individuals 
who have both a legal and a moral responsibility for ensuring that the duty is in 
fact exercised. 
The Master of a merchant ship is both the legal representative and agent of the 
ship owner. He is therefore, in a position of trust and under an obligation to act in 
the interests of the ship owner, but always within the parameters of the law. The 
Master of a merchant ship is also responsible for the safety of the ship, its cargo 
and its crew. 
Occasions may arise when the interests of the owner conflict with the 
requirements of safety and in such circumstances the Master should act in the 
interests of safety and would be under pressure to do so, the obligation being both 
a moral one and a lega\ one. 
In a well-found company, policies and safety procedures contained within the SMS 
would be sufficiently detailed to provide guidance in the event of a conflict arising 
between the ship owner's interests and the Masters obligations. In less 
conscientious companies however, if such a situation were to arise the Master of 
the vessel might well find himself under considerable pressure to put the interests 
of the owner before matters of safety. 
In the former type of company there would be pressure on the vessel's Master and 
senior officers to ensure that the company's policies, procedures and SMS were 
fully implemented. In the latter type of company the policy and procedure manuals 
and the SMS documentation would all be found on board the vessel but there 
would be no pressure from the company for the Master to ensure the 
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implementation of their contents. Rather he would be given little guidance and 
expected to use his initiative and act in the company's best interests, particularly 
its economic interests. This appeared to be the situation in the case of the 
Eurasian Dream outlined above. The Master was new not only to the vessel but 
also to the ship management company. He was not familiar with the vessel's fire 
fighting systems, had apparently received no training relevant to car carriers and 
had been instructed simply to read the hundred or so manuals on board. 
But even in a well-found and conscientious company there may be gaps in the 
company's operational procedures as was noted in the case of Davis v Stena Line 
(2005). The case concerned the circumstances surrounding the death by 
drowning of a passenger who went overboard from the ferry MN Koningin Beatrix 
on the morning of the 29th October 2000. The judge noted that 'In October 2000, 
Stena's current Standing Orders and Operational Procedures Manual contained 
no guidance and no specific operational procedure for rescuing a man overboard 
in the event that it was not possible to launch the vessel's own rescue boat'. 
However, gaps in company procedures are not the only reason why correct 
procedures are sometimes not followed. Safety, like law, comprises a system of 
rules and regulations and although individuals may be aware of their employers' 
policies and procedures they may sometimes choose to ignore some of those 
policies or procedures, just as some people choose to ignore particular laws. Why 
this should be so is a matter of debate, not only amongst psychologists and legal 
philosophers but also amongst people charged with ensuring safety directives are 
not only promulgated but also acted upon. It may be due to personality traits, 
psychological dimensions or pressure from the company to ignore its safety rules 
in return for a perceived corporate benefit. 
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However, non-observance of safety rules and regulations at this operational level 
may be due simply to the person involved not being aware of the prevailing rules 
and regulations, which in turn might well be due to the type and style of SMS that 
has been developed, lack of training or sheer incompetence on the part of the 
individual. 
The most salient constraints and pressures acting at this level of the safety 
hierarchy are: 
• 	 Obligation to follow Company policies and procedures; 
• 	 Educational and training norms as reflected in the competency of individual 
seafarers; 
• 	 Psychological dimensions of the individual such as locus of control. 
7.2 PENALTIES FOR NON-COMPUANCE 
Why people obey the law is a matter of much debate amongst writers of books 
about jurisprudence but is also relevant when considering how best to enforce the 
provisions of international conventions such as the ISM Code. 
In the field of jurisprudence Rawls' (1972) social contract theory of justice argues 
that there is a moral obligation to obey the law per se whilst advocates of the 
utilitarian theory argue that people obey laws to the extent that the law is in 
conformity with, and sanctioned by, the norms of the social groups of which they 
are members. Legal positivists such as Kelsen (1957) contend that duty and 
sanction exist separately but if a valid law exists then it is binding and people obey 
the law because of the fear of sanctions that will be incurred if they do not obey 
the law. These jurisprudential arguments revolve around three possibilities: 
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• People obey the law because they have a moral duty to do so; 
• People obey the law for fear of sanctions; 
• People obey the law because of perceived benefits; 
What is also of interest in the present study is how people conceive the strictures 
of the law: whether as strict rules to be obeyed or as goals to be achieved. This 
may well vary between people with different cultural backgrounds and is pertinent 
to the introduction by a shipping company of an integrated SMS in compliance with 
the ISM Code since the way in which the provisions of the SMS are interpreted 
and to what extent they are followed may well determine whether or not a vessel 
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I!passes or fails a safety audit by either a flag State or a port State inspectorate. 
There are no stipulated penalties for non-observance of the provisions of the ISM 
Code, only the possibility that failure to observe its provisions may result in 
detention of a vessel, withdrawal of its Safety Management Certificate (SMC) or, in 
the case of a serious breach, withdrawal of the operating company's Document of 
Compliance (DOC) thus rendering the company unfit to manage vessels. Clause 
3.12.1 of the ISM Code states 'The Company is responsible for determining and 
initiating the corrective action needed to correct a non-conformity or to correct the 
cause of the non-conformity. Failure to correct non-conformities with specific 
requirements of the ISM Code may affect the validity of the Document of 
Compliance and the related Safety Management Certificate'. 
Only the flag State that issued them can withdraw a vessel's SMC or an operating 
company's DOC. However, as discussed in Chapter IV, section 4.2, a port State 
may detain a vessel if it considers the condition of the vessel to be such that it 
poses a threat to the safety of the nation's environment or nationals, although 
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according to Lord Donaldson (2001) detention of a vessel may not be overly 
burdensome for its owners, presenting more of an inconvenience than deterrence. 
Donaldson argues that in order to provide an incentive for owners to comply with 
the provisions of the ISM Code and a deterrent against flouting its provisions, 
detention should be both costly for the errant ship owner and highly profitable for 
the port authority compelled to provide harbour space for the vessel until the noted 
deficiencies have been made good. 
This argument however, is somewhat contentious for two reasons. Firstly, 
detention of a vessel becomes more than an inconvenience to owners if as a 
result of the detention the revenue-earning potential of the vessel is affected, as 
for example when a vessel loses a charter. Secondly, allowing a port authority to 
impose high charges on a detained vessel pre-supposes that the ship owner is the 
guilty party and the port State control inspector is the virtuous party. Such a 
situation could lead to corrupt officials detaining vessels of innocent parties. 
7.3 ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
The OEeD report (1996) sets out to demonstrate that ship owners can obtain 
competitive advantages by deliberately failing to observe applicable international 
rules and standards pertinent to the safe operation of ships. 
Although brief, the OECD report endeavours to cover an extremely wide field I 
inevitably leading to advocacy and generalisations without factual sUbstantiation. 
An example is the assertion that approximately 80 per cent of all shipping 
accidents are attributable to human error. This very point was dealt with by Lord 
Donaldson (2001) who countered by stating 'Virtually all accidents, marine or 
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otherwise, are indeed caused by human error, but the real issue is what was the 
precise nature of the error and when did it occur?'. lord Donaldson continued by 
pointing out, 'It may have been historic or it may be current. In a marine context it 
may have occurred at the stage of design, construction, operation, supervision or 
whatever. Unless you answer these questions and a good few more, you are 
unlikely to know what to do to improve safety'. 
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The OECD report is of the opinion that considerable scope exists for ship owners 
to deliberately avoid compliance with international rules and standards which 
govern safety and pollution prevention. However, this is difficult to reconcile with 
the ever-increasing number of surveys that ships are forced to undergo, such as: 
• Flag State inspections 
• Port State inspections 
• Classification Society surveys 
• Charterers' inspections 
• P&I Club surveys 
• Financiers' inspections 
But it would also be naive to believe that any ship owner would maintain his vessel 
to a very high standard unless he saw an economic advantage in doing so. An 
owner operates and maintains his vessels in compliance with regulatory 
requirements with regard to four overriding criteria: 
• The earning potential of the vessel 
• Charterers' requirements 
• The resale value of the vessel 
• Market trends 
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These four criteria dictate the economic viability of the vessel. It would not make .~ 
economic sense for an owner to spend more than necessary to operate or II 
maintain his vessel to meet charterers' requirements if it meant that his 
expenditure exceeded the earning potential of the vessel. By the same token, it 
. .1
would not make economic sense for an owner to spend less than needed to 
operate and maintain his vessel to charterers' requirements if the under-
expenditure compromised the earning potential of the vessel. As Shaw (2001) 
points out, in order for organisations to operate efficiently, financially and 
otherwise, it is necessary for them to strike a balance between having on the one 
hand no safety standards at all and having on the other hand excessive and 
.
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obsessive safety standards. 
This is not to deny that some ship owners spend more on maintenance and 
operations than others but the reasons are far more complex than those identified 
in the OEeD report. The major oil companies tend to maintain their vessels within 
the level identified by the OEeD report as that of good practice, Le. a high level of 
expenditure adopted by a minority of ship owners. There is one over-riding reason 
for that. Reputable ship owners, particularly major oil companies, know that 
accidents cost money and may create bad publicity, as was the case when the oil 
tanker MfT Exxon Valdez went aground on Bligh Reef, Alaska, on 24th March 
1989, spilling 38,800 metric tonnes of crude oil into Prince William Sound. They 
are therefore, concerned to ensure that their vessels are maintained and operated 
to a high standard, thus reducing the risk of an accident occurring, subsequent 
actions for damages, and the negative impact of any ensuing publicity. 
Some owners operate in less demanding markets than those controlled by the 

major oil companies. In such markets older tonnage, often purchased second­
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hand, is frequently employed. In relational discussions with Loucas Haji-Ioannou 
(1994), head of the family with the largest privately owned fleet of oil tankers in the 
world, he noted an additional criterion that may be added to the four criteria 
mentioned above regarding standards of operation and maintenance. Haji-
Ioannou argued that no ship owner successfully operating second hand tonnage 
would sell a vessel as a going concern because it would be used in competition 
against him. Instead, when a vessel reached the end of its useful working life a 
ship owner would sell it for scrap. And because it would be economically illogical 
to send a ship to the breakers yard in pristine condition, it does not make 
economic sense in the final years of a vessel's working life to maintain it to 
anything other than the basic minimum standard acceptable to flag State, 
Classification Society, Insurers and Charterers. 
A major difference between an independent tanker owner and the shipping 
division of an oil company is that the former relies solely on the vessels to provide 
an income, whereas the latter has an assured income from the provision of marine 
transportation to the company's production, refining and sales divisions. Whereas 
oil companies work out their budgets on a five year rolling plan and tend to be 
long-term orientated with regards to their shipping operations, an independent 
tanker owner may be either long-term orientated or short-term orientated 
depending on forward contracts. 
In exercising due diligence, charterers, particularly major oil companies, 
increasingly demand not only a high standard of ship operation, especially with 
regard to safety and environmental protection, they also require chartered-in 
tonnage to be well maintained, structurally, mechanically and also cosmetically. 
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For this very reason the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) set 
up in the 1990's the ship vetting programme known as SIRE. 
There are ever-increasing pressures on ship owners to raise standards and at the 
same time to reduce costs, and such pressures are unlikely to change in the 
foreseeable future. Whilst the two goals are at odds with each other, they are the 
usual pressures found in most organisations, and the pressure to reduce costs 
does not necessarily result in a lowering of standards. 
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In support of its contention that economic pressures have forced an increasing 
number of ship owners on to a survival footing, characterised by cost saving 
initiatives and expenditure cutbacks on safety-related maintenance with the risk of 
violating international rules and standards, the OECD cites a study by Intertanko 
showing a decrease in the amount of time spent in dry-dock by very large crude 
carriers (VLCCs). The report notes a reduction of 27.5% in dry-dockings between 
1991 and 1994 with the average number of days spent in dry-dock falling from 24 
to 22. The report however, fails to consider pertinent factors such as prevailing 
market conditions during that period, the five year docking cycle of VLCCs, 
increases of efficiency in shipyards due to technological advances, the improved 
performance of underwater hull coatings enabling intermediate surveys to be 
carried out whilst vessels are afloat, and the possibility of using afloat repair 
squads to carry out essential repairs and maintenance during ballast passages. 
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7.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter commenced with an examination of the legal and moral obligations of 
organisations and individuals at various operational levels in the shipping industry 
to comply with the ISM Code and the constraints and pressure that influenced the 
way in which those obligations are addressed. 
, ' 
The legal and operational consequences of non-compliance with the provisions of 
the Code were also reviewed. 
, 
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The possibility that non-compliance may be because of economic advantages to 
be gained by ship owners who avoid implementing the rules as suggested in an 
OECD report was examined. However, it was determined that in general the 
arguments in the OECD report served only to demonstrate that ship owners are 
under pressure to cut costs, which is usually the case in any industry supplying a 
product or a service. Economic considerations are only one of a number of 
constraints and pressures operating at level 3 of the safety hierarchy. 
To complete the literature search and build upon those components of the study 
reviewed so far, the next chapter explores how personal and societal values relate 
to safety and risk perception, and the effects of globalisation upon those values. 
Subsequently, in Chapter IX, having completed the literature search and reviewed 
all those culturally influenced factors that impact upon the development and 
implementation of an SMS, a model of the ISM Code is developed. 
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CHAPTER VIII 

GLOBALISATION 

8.1 WHY GLOBALISATION IS IMPORTANT 

Globalisation is increasingly discussed in cross-cultural management literature for 
a number of reasons, three of which are germane to the present investigation. 
Firstly, this study is investigating the impact of the diversity of cultures upon the 
implementation of an international convention within a global industry, and it is 
important therefore to understand how globalisation is increasingly instrumental in 
fostering the interplay of cultures by the exchange of values between them. 
Secondly, globalisation means different things to different people and since the 
international convention in question affects the shipping industry, which operates 
in a global environment, it is important to understand the nature of globalisation 
within the context of this study_ 
Thirdly, the international convention with which this study is concerned relates to 
safety management. Therefore, in addition to the values and contextual aspects 
of globalisation, it is necessary to understand how knowledge travels, how safety 
techniques are disseminated, how objectified ideas (Czamiawska, 1996) such as 
safety rules, regulations and guidelines may be dis-embedded from one culture 
and re-embedded in another. 
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8.2 SPREADING OF IDEAS BETWEEN CULTURES 

Traditionally, the spreading of ideas was seen as a process of diffusion (Rogers, 
1962; Levitt, 1988). The diffusion metaphor is however, limited in its application 
since it implies that ideas travel in only one direction, cascading from levels of high 
saturation to levels of low saturation, ignoring situations such as the so-called 
'brain drain' where the reverse occurs. 
For this reason Czarniawska (1996) prefers Latour's (1986) translation model, 
which comprehends the dual association of the word translation: firstly its 
association with movement in its meaning of transference, and secondly its 
association with language in its meaning of interpretation. The model sees ideas 
as images which become known in the form of pictures or sounds. The ideas are 
materialized in the form of objects, which give rise to actions, which may 
eventually result in the institutionalisation of the ideas. 
Czarniawska theorises that an idea can travel only when it has been objectified. A 
person receiving the objectified idea translates it into a new idea coloured by his or 
her own values and beliefs (Le. their culture) and then either discards the idea or 
objectifies it. And so the process continues, ideas travelling globally and being 
particularised locally. 
Czarniawska's theory applied to two different cultures is depicted graphically in 
figure 8 below. In the diagram each idea is translated within a particular culture in 
localized time and space whilst the ideas travel from one culture to another 
through globaJised time and space 
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Culture A idea ---ll-object --+ action--. institution 
Re-embedded 
Dis-embedded 
Culture B idea --+ object --. action --+ institution 
FIGURE 8: How IDEAS TRAVEL 
But ideas do not travel without being affected by various influences. Objects from 
one train of translation impact upon ideas in other trains of translation and the 
result will be entirely determined by the interpretation of the receiver. 
Within each culture and at each level of the safety hierarchy. each idea is 
subjected to constraints and pressures at each stage of its translation to 
objectivity, action and institutionalisation. Hence, close examination of a detailed 
chain of translation will provide great insight into the prevailing constraints and 
pressures affecting the chain of translation and the resultant outcome of those 
constraints and pressures. 
But the translation model is not just two dimensional: it is three-dimensional with 
layers of translations occurring in both the horizontal and vertical directions as 
illustrated in figure 9 below. Czarniawska's three-dimensional translation model is 
fractal in two senses. Firstly, as each layer is peeled off then another train of 
translation is revealed underneath. Secondly, the greater the magnification of the 
detail of the influences upon each stage of a train of translation the greater the 
richness of information discerned. 
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8.3 RELATIONAL ASPECTS OF GLOBAUSATION 
8.3.1 Defining Globalisation 
Amin (1997) is of the opinion that the more we read about globalisation from the 
mounting volume of literature on the topic, the less clear we seem to be about 
what it means and what it implies: we are assailed by opposing interpretations. 
Some writers see globalisation as a new economic world order, organised and run 
by trans-national financial institutions and international conglomerates. Costea 
(1999) leans towards this concept as does Mann (1928) who referred to 
globalisation as a hierarchical cosmopolis, i.e. the subjugation of nation States to 
supra-national, quasi-governmental, organisations that promulgate international 
rules, particularly for the harmonization of trade and ordering of world peace. 
Spybey (1996) also leans towards this view, but recognises a cultural aspect to 
globalisation, stressing the need to retain the view of the individual as a human 
agent routinely engaged in the reproduction of social institutions, but with the 
capacity to translate them in the course of day-to-day activities. This is a view very 
much in line with that of Czarniawska (1996). 
Amin (1997) too recognises a cultural aspect to globalisation, but rejects the idea 
that globalisation is either an economic world order or a hierarchical cosmopolis, 
arguing that even a cursory awareness of the globalisation literature cannot fail to 
cast doubt over the idea of globalisation as a neo-liberal conspiracy or simply a 
system of trade and investment exchange between nations. 
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According to Amin, even the term neo-liberal has different meanings for different 
people, depending upon which aspects of globalisation most concern them; 
whether it is the economic and political aspects, the socio-cultural and identity 
aspects or perhaps the very radical concept of global revolution. 
As far as socio-cultural aspects are concerned, the neD-liberal conspiracy theory 
holds that not only is business done internationally in a new way but there is also a 
challenge to cultural diversity. For example, the domination of the global media by 
U.S. companies projects an American view of world affairs, deregulation of 
international finance leads to a greater division between the rich and the poor in 
developing nations, and globaJisation of large corporations leads to token multi­
culturalism at the expense of indigenous non-Western cultures. 
If this theory is correct then logically the differences between cultures will become 
less defined as globalisation increases and eventually the entire human race will 
subscribe to a common set of values and beliefs. This view however, ignores: 
• 	 The difference in styles that exists between systems of corporate 
governance such as that in Japan, Germany and the United States, which 
contradicts the neo-liberal idea that globalisation has resulted in there 
being only one way of doing business in the capitalist world; 
• 	 The effects of language. Language is a means of encoding experiences 
(Jankowicz, 1998) and the existence of a diversity of languages will tend to 
support the continuing existence of a diversity of cultures; 
• 	 Localised particularisation of globalised ideas whereby ideas interpreted 
and objectified in one culture are not necessarily coincident with the way in 
which other people in other cultures interpret and objectify those same 
ideas (Czarniawska, 1996). 
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The extent to which globalisation has blurred the distinctions between cultures has 
implications for the international agreement and enforcement of maritime safety 
conventions such as the ISM Code. Blurring of distinctions between cultures 
results in more homogeneity in the interpretation of ideas and therefore, a greater 
tendency towards a common interpretation of the meaning of safety and how 
safety regulations should be applied. Sharpening of distinctions between cultures 
on the other hand results in greater heterogeneity in the interpretation of ideas and 
consequently a greater tendency towards differing interpretations of the meaning 
of safety and how safety regulations should be applied. 
This distinction is important when conSidering whether greater emphasis on 
education and training (an attempt at homogeneity) or stricter enforcement of 
existing regulations (a practice that recognises heterogeneity) is the better path to 
follow to ensure that the objectives of the ISM Code are fulfilled. 
8.3.2 Global versus International 
The adjectives global and international are often used interchangeably, implying 
that an increase in globalisation indicates an increase in international trade. But 
whilst there may be an increase in globalisation, there is not, in fact, an increase in 
the volume of international trade. As Amin (1997) points out, quoting Hirst and 
Thompson (1996), at the height of the imperial age between 1878 and 1914 
international flows of investment, exports and people exceeded current levels. 
Nor is international trade something new. As Hirst and Thompson also pointed 
out, world capitalism as a system of international exchange is several centuries 
old. Indeed, international trade and transport have been features of the business 
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world for a very long time: from the era of the Phoenician Traders in the Classical 
Age, to the large international conglomerates of modern times. 
Domestic producers have always sought ever-wider markets for their goods and 
are positively encouraged by national governments to export their commodities in 
order to generate foreign income and thereby increase the wealth of their home 
nations. 
Importers have always sought out cheaper or more exotic produce from distant 
markets to sell in domestic markets. Such imports may deplete foreign reserves 
built up by exporters but they improve the overall material well being of the home 
nation. Such trade is fundamental to the shipping industry. 
But, importing and exporting are only a part of international business. Spybey (1996) 
reminds us that the rise of Western States to their position of global economic 
dominance is inextricably connected with the development of capitalism and the 
global economy and the extension of Western influence in global terms was 
coincidental with maritime expansion, the control of international commodity markets 
and the establishment of an international division of labour. 
Whether there is in fact a rational difference between a global and an international 
organisation or just a conceptual difference is debateable. Perhaps a global 
company might be distinguished from an international company insofar as the 
former might imply that the company is not merely trading internationally but is 
also utilising the personnel, assets and expertise available to it world wide. Lloyd's 
Register of Shipping for example has traditionally been seen as an international 
company with headquarters in London and overseas offices staffed and managed 
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mainly by British expatriates. However, following recent changes to the way the 
organisation is structured with more locally recruited staff at all levels of operation, 
both in the UK and overseas, and more autonomy given to regional offices 
(Williams, 2000), the organisation may now be seen as a global company 
8.3.3 Communications and Transportation 
Globalisation may in fact simply be business jargon for a worldwide market pl.ace 
linked by rapid communications and rapid transportation. Certainly, it is now more 
fashionable to refer to global markets than to international markets and to talk of 
globalisation rather than internationalisation. But even if the distinction between 
international and global described above is valid, both phenomena owe their 
existence to the advent of rapid communications and rapid transportation. 
Developments in communications and transportation have resulted in companies 
being able to deal in a much wider market place than ever before. The advent of 
air travel in the early twentieth century enabled key staff such as engineers, 
accountants, and marketing specialists to be sent to overseas offices and factories 
on an ad hoc basis to check up on local operations. The invention of computer­
based communications in the late twentieth century enabled overseas offices to 
report back to head office with consummate ease and speed whilst the 
development of container ships introduced a whole new era of sea transportation. 
The advent of rapid communications and transportation has also impacted upon 
international take-overs. According to a newspaper article (Daily Mail, 2000) 
quoting an OECD report, in 1999 British firms spent £164 billion on overseas 
acquisitions, accounting for nearly one third of the total amount of money spent 
worldwide on foreign takeovers. 
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So it is debatable whether globalisation really exists at all, or whether it is simply a 
contextual factor deriving from a manifestation of rapid communication and rapid 
transportation, which can be addressed by conventional approaches to knowledge 
management and transfer (Holden, 2002). 
8.3.4 Globalisation and Culture 
With regard to the present study however, the importance of globalisation is its 
cuttural aspect. Whether it is the cause of, or a product of technological advances 
that have precipitated changes to the way that business is administered in the 
post-industrial age, globalisation may be considered a vehicle of change, a change 
agent playing an important role in the development of both national and corporate 
cultures. 
Hofstede (1991) holds that we grow from the way in which we respond to our 
environment and the less an activity is determined by technical necessity the more 
it is ruled by values, and thus influenced by cultural differences. However, the way 
we think, the way we act, our most deeply held beliefs, our very culture, can be 
changed by the way we perceive and respond to exogenous influences (Holden, 
2002). These changes take place through processes of translation by human 
agents and this occurs against a background of influences external to immediate 
social interaction many of which are, in a globalised society, global institutions 
(Spybey, 1996). 
As noted by Amin (1997), it is essential to look beyond the idea of globalisation as 
simply a new world order, either economic or organisational, and look at the 
impact of globalisation upon regional cultures. 
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It is self-evident that the ever-increasing speed of communication and 
transportation exposes individuals in nation States and in trans-national 
corporations to international cultural influences to an ever-increasing degree. It is 
the effects of such exposure that are not always clear, for the international traffic of 
ideas is always a selective process (Hofstede, 1991). 
8.4 GlOBAUSATION, SAFETY AND RISK PERCEPTION 
8.4.1 Culture, Values and Decision-making 
The cross-fertilisation of cultures must inevitably impinge upon corporate 
management decision-making worldwide. Regional differences will no doubt 
remain, but the question arises as to whether greater emphasis will be put upon 
safety and the avoidance of pollution in some countries than in others or whether a 
general consensus of opinion will arise regarding what is safe and what is unsafe, 
what is acceptable and what is unacceptable. Even if a general consensus does 
arise, it remains to be determined whether or not people from some cultures are 
more likely to take a risk than people from other cultures. 
The preferences, values and beliefs of society engender certain expectations. But 
such preferences, values and beliefs are not static and according to Le Guen 
(1999) current shifts are linked in part to: 
• 	 The rapid rise in information technology; 
• 	 The increased pace in exploiting advances in scientific and technological 
knowledge; 
• 	 Greater affluence in society. 
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Le Guen's synopsis of the causes of current shifts is closely related to the concept 
of globalisation as a manifestation of the ever-increasing speed of communication 
and transportation. He is of the opinion also that these shifts in preferences and 
values result in: 
• 	 A growing perception that risks imposed on people should be justified; 
• 	 An increasing reliance by the public on regulators that they trust; 
• 	 Calls for greater openness and involvement in the decision-making 
process. 
With regard to the latter point, Drucker (1996) pointed out that management is a 
decision-making process and whatever a manager does he does through making 
decisions, whether as a matter of routine or after years of systematic analysis. 
But what is important to this study are the first two points identified by Le Guen. 
These concern matters that influence managers since they relate to the factors 
taken into consideration when making decisions. Even strategic decisions are 
influenced by prevailing environmental and cultural preferences, and safety is, or 
most definitely should be, a part of the strategy of any well-run company. 
8.4.2. Culture, Values and Globalisation 
With the increasing impact of globalisation there is a move towards international 
standardisation of rules and regulations, bringing ever-increasing pressure to bear 
upon national companies, national governments and multinational corporations to 
adopt socially acceptable and environmentally responsible strategies and safe 
working practices. 
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There is evidence to suggest that exposure to the standards and ethics of 
industrialised nations has influenced newly industrialising nations to follow similar 
practices. For example, in 1997 the local authorities in Nanjing, China, introduced 
regulations to standardize the region's rapidly growing shipbuilding and ship repair 
industry. The regulations require companies wanting to open shipbuilding or ship 
repair businesses to ensure that design, construction and reparation of ships 
comply both with national rules and with international standards. 
The environmental and social awareness of Western societies has put a great deal 
of pressure on governments and companies In Europe and North America to act in 
a socially responsible, environmentally aware and safe manner. Governments are 
pressed by their electorates to demonstrate their commitment to socially 
acceptable policies by the introduction of public safety regulations and 
environmentally aware legislation. Companies too, have become increasingly 
pressed to develop safe and socially responsible operating strategies. 
When Shell Oil decided that the most economical way to dispose of a redundant 
North Sea oil rig was to tow it out into the Atlantic Ocean and sink it, the public 
outcry was so great that the corporation was forced to rethink its strategy. This 
has since been reflected in the attitude of other major oil companies. Mobil 
(1999), for example, acknowledged that decommissioning offshore production 
platforms is a controversial subject, presenting operators with both environmental 
and safety challenges, and recently as part of a huge project to decommission the 
North West Hutton platform 130km north-east of the Shetland Islands, British 
Petroleum has undertaken extensive consultation with all concerned parties 
(ExxonMobil, February 2005). 
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However, not all countries have such socially responsible and environmentally 
aware societies, as can be seen by the lack of social welfare and high levels of 
pollution in many newly industrialised countries. Safety is also lower on the list of 
priorities in developing countries as may be discerned from incidents such as the 
Union Carbide debacle in Bhopal, India, where thousands of people were killed 
and injured due to poor maintenance and lor sub-standard operating procedures. 
8.4.3 Managing Cultural Diversity 
Given that there is a global diversity of cultures that impacts in varying ways upon 
decision-making in the field of safety management, organisational safety and 
behavioural safety, then as first highlighted in Chapter I section 1.1, it remains to be 
resolved whether the best way to deal with the results of that impact in the shipping 
industry is by stricter enforcement of existing regulations, such as that undertaken 
by Port State Control inspectors (a practice which recognises heterogeneity) or 
greater emphasis on education and training such as that provided for in the 1995 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(an attempt at homogeneity). This will form a part of the empirical study_ 
8.5 SUMMARY 
Globalisation highlights three questions that are at the centre of this study: 
a. 	 Are people in some cultures more safety conscious than people in other 
cultures or are their expectations simply different? 
b. 	 Are managers in some cultures more inclined than managers in other 
cultures to put profits before safety, i.e. are they more prepared to 'take a 
risk'? 
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c. 	 Can people be educated to the same level of safety consciousness 
irrespective of their cultural background? 
This chapter commenced by explaining that globalisation: 
• 	 Is increasingly instrumental in fostering the interplay of cultures by the 
exchange of values between cultures; and 
• 	 Is an important aspect of this study because it provides the context within 
which the shipping industry operates and within which (MO is 
endeavouring to introduce a common standard of safety. 
The mechanism by which knowledge travels and safety techniques are 
disseminated was then explored, and the means by which cultural influences 
might impact upon ideas as they travel from one culture to another was examined. 
An attempt was made to define globalisation. Various writers have expressed a 
number of different views, defining globalisation in terms such as: 
• 	 A hierarchal cosmopolis; 
• 	 A new economic world order; 
• 	 A neo-liberal conspiracy. 
A proposal was then put forward that globalisation might be simply a manifestation 
of the ever-increasing speed of transportation and communication, providing the 
context in which trans-national companies operate. International organisations 
were distinguished from global organisations but it was noted that both benefited 
from increasingly rapid transportation and communication. 
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It was noted that greater exposure of cultures to each other could either: 
• 	 Blur the differences between cultures leading to a greater homogeneity of 
interpretation of safety regulations; or 
• 	 Sharpen the distinctions between cultures, leading to greater heterogeneity 
of interpretation of safety regulations. 
This left open the question of whether the best way to ensure effective 
implementation of the ISM Code objectives was greater emphasis on education 
and training, an attempt at homogeneity, or stricter enforcement of existing 
regulations, an approach that recognises heterogeneity. 
Finally, the impact of globalisation upon culture and consequently upon safety and 
risk perception was examined. It was debated whether that impact presented a 
challenge to managers or, as Holden (2002) contends, merely provided a context 
within which global companies operate, the problems being dealt with by 
conventional approaches to knowledge management and transfer. 
In the next chapter a model of the working of the ISM Code is developed and it is 
demonstrated that the trains of translation involved in the development and 
implementation of practices compliant with the ISM Code follow Czarniawska's 
model of how ideas travel. As outlined in Chapter VII, section 7.1.1, the nature of 
the constraints and pressure impacting upon the trains of translation vary in 
accordance with the level of the safety hierarchy at which they impact and in 
accordance with the background culture within which the development and 
implementation of the safety practices take place. This is reflected in the ISM 
Code model. 
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CHAPTER IX 

DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL OF THE ISM CODE 

9.1 A MULTI-STAGE MODEL OFTHE ISM CODE 

Figure 10 below is a diagrammatic representation of the working of the ISM Code. 
It is a mUlti-stage model upon which are superimposed the five levels of the safety 
hierarchy enabling the model to be used as an organising framework to determine 
where and how cultural pressures and constraints bear upon organisations 
developing and implementing an SMS in accordance with the ISM Code. 
The model also identifies the various stages at which national cultures might 
influence industry organisations, flag State Administrations and hence companies 
operating vessels under the aegis of those administrations. 
The entire operation depicted by the model is set within a globalised context. 
From the figure it is evident that implementation of the provisions of the ISM Code 
involves a chain of translation, decision-making and action. At each hierarchal 
level of safety management an idea is objectified and travels to the next level of 
safety management where it is translated into an idea that is again objectified in a 
new format and then travels to the next level of safety management. 
The process is a continuum from the initial adoption of the convention at an 
international level and ratification at municipal level by the governments of nation 
States at safety management level 1, through to its interpretation and 
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promulgation by government agencies and industry bodies at safety management 
level 2, its adoption as a management tool by senior managers of shipping 
companies at safety management level 3, its formulation into a system of 
instructions and procedures by middle management and supervisors at safety 
level 4, and finally its transformation into positive action by shipboard personnel at 
safety management level 5 where it is recognised as the shipboard 
implementation of an operational safety management system 
I n Figure 10 the various pressures and constraints that impact upon the 
development and implementation of an SMS and compliance with the provisions of 
the ISM Code at each level of safety management are shown in the text-boxes 
and the entire process is shown taking place in a global context, which presents 
additional pressures and constraints. 
From further examination of the model it can also be seen that each hierarchal 
level of safety forms a superordinate level of management to the one below it and 
a subordinate level to the one above it. These are not simply different seniority 
layers but distinct subordinate and superordinate levels of control (Jankowicz, 
2000). This is an important distinction from a practical point of view since it helps 
to clarify the effects of consultancy interventions and information feedback at the 
various hierarchal levels. 
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9.2 SOCIO-CUlTURAl INFLUENCES 
9.2.1 Influences at Hierarchal level 1 
Safety level 1 of the ISM Code model (Figure 10) represents a nation's 
fundamental socio-cultural and political systems that produce the constraints and 
pressures which dictate a nation's approach to, and colour its interpretation of, 
international laws and conventions. The systems comprise political, social and 
economic institutions, trade unions, social stratification, educational systems and 
pressure groups. Level 1 of the safety hierarchy, the level at which these 
constraints and pressures operate, is the level at which nation States send 
delegations to international forums to discuss and negotiate treaties, conventions 
and similar concordats. It is the level at which IMO conferences operate. 
The constraints and pressures operating at this level of the safety hierarchy were 
discussed Chapter VII, section 7.1.1, and may be briefly summarised here as 
follows: 
• 	 The way in which the political and legal institutions have been shaped by 
the culture and history of individual nations; 
• 	 The manner in which a society views law, whether as a body of regulations 
to be obeyed or as identifiable targets to be achieved; 
• 	 The degree to which nation states are industrially developed and are 
prepared to accept what developed nations consider to be fair and just 
standards. 
9.2.2 Influences at Hierarchal Level 2 
Safety level 2 of the ISM Code model represents government agencies, non­
governmental organisations and industry bodies such as Flag State 
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Administrations, Port State Control Inspectorates, and Classification Societies, that 
are either directly responsible, or have assumed responsibility for overseeing the 
implementation and administration of the decisions made and agreements entered 
into by nation States. 
This represents an intervention at nation State level by the bodies that control the 
shipping industry. How those bodies respond to and interpret national legislation 
resulting from national governmental adoption of international agreements will to a 
greater or lesser degree be influenced by national culture and attitudes towards 
the implementation of HSE legislation. 
Here it should be noted that not only are shipping companies commercially 
orientated but so too are some of the controlling bodies, particularly the Shipping 
Registries of Flag State Administrations, as discussed in Chapter IV, section 4.1.1, 
and further evidenced by advertisements regularly placed in the marine press by 
Flag State Administrations in an attempt to persuade ship owners to register their 
ships with them, e.g. the Dominica Maritime Administration (Lloyd's List, 22 
October 2001) and the Cambodia Ship Registry (Lloyd's List, 31 October 2001). 
As noted in Chapter VII, section 7.1.2, and illustrated in the ISM Code model, the 
pressures and constraints found at safety hierarchy level 2 are occasioned 
principally by the same agencies as those at level 1 and may be briefly 
summarised as: 
• 	 A legal and moral obligation by maritime administrations to ensure that the 
provisions of the ISM Code are enforced; 
• 	 Economic obligation by maritime administrations to ensure that ship 
owners will continue to provide revenue by registering ships with them; 
134 
• Public pressure, particularly in countries where a large number of people 
are engaged in the shipping industry, to remain competitive and ensure 
that employment within the industry is not jeopardised by inflationary costs; 
• 	 Public pressure on maritime administrations to ensure that vessels entering 
their waters do not cause damage or pollution of the environment. 
9.2.3 Influences at Hierarchal Level 3 
Safety level 3 of the ISM Code model reflects the outcome of the interaction 
between the first two levels of safety management. It is how individual shipping 
companies respond to the legal and moral obligations brought to bear upon them 
by flag State Administrations, their responses being tailored to the economic 
circumstances of individual companies, the cultural norms of their management 
and the country in which their operational offices are established. 
The purpose of the ISM Code is to provide an international standard for the safe 
management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention. In the context of 
Figure 10, this objective as viewed by both a shipping company and its flag State 
Administration would clearly lie between hierarchal safety levels 2 and 3 of the 
model and would therefore be subject to the impact of national socio-cultural and 
political systems on both the shipping company and the flag-State Administration. 
It is at this level of the safety hierarchy that this study commences empirical 
research with entry into two shipping companies at senior management level in 
order to carry out a comparative case study. 
Since the purpose of the Code as stated in its three objectives is safety at sea, 
prevention of human injury or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the marine 
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environment, then by extension the objectives must themselves also be subject to 
the impact of national socio-cultural and political systems. 
As noted in Chapter VII, section 7.1.3, and as illustrated in Figure 10, the principal 
constraints and pressures that bear upon senior decision-makers in shipping 
organisations may be summarised as follows: 
• 	 Both a moral and a legal obligation to run their operations in accordance 
with the provisions of the ISM Code; 
• 	 Consideration of economic factors which may be reflected in budgetary 
constraints with regard to safety, training and the quality of ship 
maintenance; 
• 	 The prevailing cultural norms of the decision makers; the organisation's 
corporate culture; management style; and managerial competence. 
9.2.4 Influences at Hierarchal level 4 
Safety level 4 of the model represents the level at which middle management and 
supervisory staff operate. It is here that the policies formulated by senior 
management are translated into concrete procedures and work instructions to form 
a corpus of rules that make up the company's Safety Management System. 
As noted in Chapter VII, section 7.1.4, and shown in Figure 10, the constraints and 
pressures operating at safety hierarchy level 4 bear principally upon middle level 
managers and supervisory staff who, in developing and implementing an SMS, will 
be subject to constraints and pressures generated by: 
• 	 The provisions and guidelines of the ISM Code; 
• 	 The extent of available resources; 
136 
• Prevailing organisational and cultural norms, and the heuristics of 
individual managers and supervisory staff that mould the way in which they 
interpret the provisions and guidelines of the ISM Code; 
• 	 Their own professional competencies, proficiency and understanding with 
regard to the provisions of the ISM Code, safety matters, ship maintenance 
and ship operations in general. 
9.2.5 Influences at Hierarchal Level 5 
Safety at level 5 of the model is safety at the on-board-ship or shop floor level. It 
is behavioural safety, safety at the level of the individual, the psychology of human 
behaviour in relation to the problems of safety in the workplace. 
This is the level at which individuals operate ships and have both a moral 
obligation and a legal duty to do so in accordance with company policies, 
procedures and work instructions formalised in the company's SMS. Failure to do 
so may be because: 
It The work instructions or safety procedures are ill-defined; 
It The individuals have a cognitive bias due to a psychological factor such as 
an external locus of control which prevents them from taking the initiative 
when required to do so; or 
.. The individuals are not sufficiently experienced, well enough educated or 
adequately trained to carry out safely the tasks assigned to them. 
As summarised in section 7.1.5 of Chapter VII, the principal constraints and 
pressures acting at this level of the safety hierarchy are: 
• 	 A moral obligation and legal duty to follow Company policies and 
procedures; 
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• Educational and training norms as reflected in the competency of individual 
seafarers. This may also be related to Company employment philosophy 
insofar as that may influence Company training policies; 
• 	 Those personal psychological dimensions of individual seafarers that might 
impact upon their behavioural safety patterns; 
• 	 A possible fear of sanctions if they do not comply with the provisions of the 
ISM Code. 
Empirical research at this level of the safety hierarchy can be expected to provide 
rich material for the study. 
9.3 AREAS IN WHiCH TO CARRY OUT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
As outlined in Chapter 1 section 1.1, the model of the ISM Code illustrated above 
in Figure 10 was developed in part as a predictive model and in the main to 
provide an organising framework showing where, and in what manner, cultural 
influences might reasonably be expected to impact upon the interpretation and 
implementation of the provisions of the ISM Code and with this in mind to 
determine at which levels of the shipping industry empirical research could most 
beneficially be carried out. 
If the subsequent empirical research were to indicate that the diversity of cultures 
is an influential factor in the uneven interpretation and implementation of the ISM 
Code, the study would endeavour to determine whether greater policing by Port 
State Control inspectors (a practice which recognises heterogeneity) or greater 
emphasis on education and training (an attempt at homogeneity) would be the 
better path to follow to ensure that the objectives of the ISM Code are fulfilled. 
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Taking into consideration the conflicting views discussed in Chapter I section 1.5 
regarding whether or not the ISM Code is actually effective in achieving its 
specified objectives, the multi-stage model of the ISM Code was reviewed to 
determine the main areas in which the empirical research should be carried out. 
From the model and as noted in Section 5.6 of Chapter V, it is at levels 3 and 4 of 
the safety hierarchy that safety management systems are designed and 
embedded in the policies and procedures of ship operating companies, and it is at 
levels 4 and 5 of the safety hierarchy that those policies and procedures are 
implemented and education and training are carried out. 
Therefore, it was decided that the empirical research for this investigation would 
be carried out principally at safety levels 3, 4 and 5 of the model of the ISM Code 
(Figure 10), involving: 
1. 	 Shipping company senior management at safety hierarchy level 3; 
2. 	 Shipping company middle management, supervisory staff and organisation 
at safety hierarchy level 4; and 
3. 	 Seagoing staff at safety hierarchy level 5. 
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PART III 

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 

_''!1:WJ!lII 
CHAPTER X 
METHODOLOGY 
10.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
As discussed in Chapter V section 5.1 and illustrated in the ISM Code model 
(Figure 10), the deliberations and edicts of governments as interpreted by 
government agencies and industry bodies become concretised in imperative 
instructions formulated at level 2 of the safety hierarchy. Those instructions are 
then passed on to shipping organisations at level 3 of the safety hierarchy where 
the initial stages of development and implementation of an SM8 take place in 
accordance with the provisions of the ISM Code. 
Constraints and pressures that can be influenced by cultural values and attitudes 
exist at all levels of the safety hierarchy as discussed in Chapter VII section 7.1. 
However, from the ISM Code model it is apparent that culturally influenced 
constraints and pressure start impacting upon the implementation of the various 
provisions of ISM Code, including development of an SMS, at Safety Level 3. It is 
at this level therefore, that the empirical research is commenced. 
Clause 1.4 of the ISM Code requires companies to develop, implement and 
maintain an 8MS that includes procedures for internal audits and management 
reviews. In addition, to ensure that ship-operating companies adhere to the IMO 
rules with regard to the ISM Code, each ship-operating company must undergo an 
initial flag State audit before it can be issued with a Document of Compliance (DOC) 
confirming that it has in place an acceptable 8MS. 
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The emphasis on procedures, audits and management reviews infers a system of 
continuing dialogue between a ship's crew and its Master, the Master and the 
Designated Person Ashore (DPA) (Le. the shore-based safety officer who has 
access to the highest levels of management in accordance with Clause 4 of the ISM 
Code), and between the DPA and senior management. 
The emphasis on procedures, audits and management reviews also infers the 
development of an auditable paper trail, which produces a great deal of both 
qualitative information such as hazardous incident reports and quantitative data 
such as accident statistics. Therefore, of the four main research methods available, 
interpretive, experiment, survey and case study, it was decided to utilise the latter 
for the empirical research, a comparative case study strategy being capable of 
accommodating a mix of both qualitative and quantitative data in addition to being 
well suited to the smail scale researcher (Yin, 1994). 
The empirical research was carried out in two shipping companies, each of similar 
size and operating in similar sectors of the industry but in different geographical 
regions and having their operational headquarters located in two countries 
identified with respect to Hofstede's and Trompenaars's dimensions as being 
culturally distinct from each other, thus maximising the effects of cultural 
differences on the management and staff of the two companies. 
In order to replicate a comparison (Yin, 1994) between the two companies that 
determined the manner in which each had interpreted and implemented the 
provisions of the ISM Code, the same methodological techniques were used to 
gather data in each company. 
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10.2 SELECTED ORGANISATIONS 
The two shipping companies selected for the comparative case study were both 
engaged in the operation of Offshore Support Vessels such as Supply Boats, 
Anchor Handling Tugs and Safety Stand-by Vessels. 
Due to the nature of the work involved, this sector of the shipping industry is 
generally recognised as being particularly hazardous and has traditionally had a 
poor safety record in comparison with other sectors, such as the operation of 
general cargo vessels or container ships. Consequently, any improvements in 
operational safety in the companies since the introduction of the ISM Code could 
be expected to be more readily identifiable than in companies operating in other 
sectors of the industry where safety records have traditionally been better. 
The selected companies, referred to for purposes of anonymity as Company A and 
Company B throughout this thesis, were both divisions of multinational companies 
and therefore similar to each other in organisational structure but quite different 
from each other in many other aspects such as their financial underpinning, areas 
of operation and the nationality of the crews and shore staff employed. 
The similarity in structure was considered advantageous to the study since it 
would tend to minimise any differences in safety strategies resulting from 
organisational differences or corporate structural pressures, whilst differences in 
other areas such as financial liquidity and the cultural diversity of employees would 
help to highlight those constraints and pressures resulting from financial strictures, 
cultural traits and social factors, identified as operating at Safety Level 3 in the ISM 
Code model (Figure 10). 
we t 
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The following points summarise the salient contrasts between the two companies: 
• 	 One company was cash rich whilst the other was heavily leveraged with a 
very high debt to equity ratio; 
• 	 One company employed entirely British shore-based staff whilst the other 
employed a multi-cultural shore-based staff; 
• 	 One company employed almost exclusively British seafarers whilst the 
other employed principally Filipino seafarers; 
• 	 One company operated vessels in the North Sea from an office in England. 
The other company operated vessels in the Middle East and South East 
Asia from an office in Dubai, United Arab Emirates 
10.3 RESEARCH PROTOCOL 
To effectively undertake the empirical research a protocol was adopted that 
incorporated three phases. 
The first phase involved entry into each company at a senior level of management. 
This was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, because as a simple matter of 
courtesy and practicality it was necessary to gain the permission and cooperation of 
each organisation's senior managers before embarking upon a study of company 
documentation and interviewing supervisory personnel. Secondly, because as 
noted in the ACSNI report (1993), commitment by senior management is a sine qua 
non if an SMS is to be effective and therefore entry into each company at a senior 
level was necessary to facilitate research into the commitment of each 
organisation's senior management towards safety management and compliance 
with the provisions of the ISM Code. 
-
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The second phase involved research at Safety levels 3 and 4 of the ISM Code 
model and collection of data using the techniques described below. Results from 
analysis of the data were compared and contrasted to highlight how the various 
constraints and cultural factors shown in the ISM Code model influenced the way 
in which each company approached compliance with the Code, the type of SMS 
developed and the degree of effectiveness achieved in satisfying the objectives of 
the ISM Code. 
The third phase involved research at Safety level 5 of the model, the level of 
behavioural safety. The research used two means of enquiry, the first of which 
involved distribution of a two-part questionnaire amongst representative samples 
of British and Filipino seafarers to measure the locus of control orientation, rank, 
experience, and professional and academic qualifications of each respondent. 
Comparison of their locus of control orientation with the other variables to identify 
any significant correlations would help to determine any constraints or pressures 
resulting from prevailing personality traits or psychological dimensions. 
The second means of enquiry in the third phase involved visiting ships, observing 
their overall condition and holding relational conversations with crewmembers to 
gain an impression of how they viewed the introduction of the ISM Code. 
The three phases of the empirical investigation entailed research at Levels 3, 4 
and 5 of the safety hierarchy. Research at those particular levels was crucial to 
the empirical investigation since those are the levels at which organisational safety 
management, operational safety and behavioural safety are exercised, all of which 
impact upon the development and implementation of an effective SMS. 
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10.4 RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 

The study utilised four distinct but complimentary research techniques to collect 
data and as anticipated there was some degree of overlap (Blaxter, 2000), 
elements of each technique being used in each of the three phases of the study. 
The four techniques used were: 
• 	 Interviewing selected managers and supervisory personnel; 
• 	 Documentary review; 
• 	 Questionnaire survey of ship's personnel; and 
• 	 Relational conversations with individuals and observation of various things 
such as actions and reactions, management style, incidents arising, etc. 
10.4.1 Interviews 
Although the ISM Code is prescriptive in outcome rather than in process, certain 
functional requirements fundamental to its operation are specified, such as the 
requirements for the company to: 
• 	 Establish a safety and environmental protection policy (CI. 1.4, and 2.1); 
• 	 Develop instructions and procedures to ensure implementation of the 
corporate safety and environmental protection policy in compliance with 
relevant international and flag State legislation (CI. 1.4.2) 
• 	 Ensure that the policy is implemented and maintained at all levels of the 
organization, both ship-based and shore-based (CI. 2.2). 
These requirements are reflected at Safety Levels 3 and 4 of the ISM Code model 
(Figure 10) and from a practical standpoint senior management normally 
establishes company policy, middle management develops instructions and 
procedures to implement company policy, and junior management or supervisory 
staffs oversee the implementation of those instructions and procedures. 
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Based upon those criteria six people at varying levels of seniority, working in the 
operations head office of each company at Safety Levels 3 and 4 of the ISM Code 
model, were interviewed regarding their views of the company's safety philosophy 
and safety record, particularly with regards to the implementation and 
effectiveness of the ISM Code. 
The objective of this purposive sampling was to end up with a set of key informant 
interviews in each company that would reflect the views of both senior and middle 
management and also supervisory personnel (Tremblay, 1982), thus providing an 
indication of the prevailing attitude to safety and implementation of the ISM Code 
within each company. Detailed profiles of each of the respondents are given in the 
appropriate section of the next chapter. 
A semi-structured interview technique was employed. The selected shore-based 
staff were interviewed using pre-determined questions drawn up and used as an 
aide-memoire by the researcher (see Annexes A and B) to ensure that each 
respondent was asked the same questions, the directional thrust of which was 
firstly, to determine the heuristics and biases of the interviewees resulting from their 
cultural origins, educational attainments and employment backgrounds, and 
secondly, to discern their commitment to safety and the successful implementation 
of an SMS in the company. 
The list of questions covered: 
1. The Respondent's Personal Profile; 
2. The Company Profile; 
3. Vessel Reporting Procedures; 
4. Ship Manning Policies; 
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5. Safety, Education and Training Perceptions; 
6. Interpretation of the Company's SMS; 
7. Maturity Level of the Company Safety Climate; 
8. Perception of the ISM Code; 
9. Overall View of Safety 
The list of questions was not however, a check-box document nor was it given to 
the respondents for their responses. The respondents were interviewed 
individually and the questions were asked in such a manner that there was 
sufficient latitude for the respondents to answer the questions in their own words. 
The responses therefore, related to the various pressures and constraints acting 
upon the individual as shown in the boxes at Safety Levels 3 and 4 in figure 10. 
For purposes of analysis it would have been possible to group the respondents in 
a number of different ways, such as their level of managerial responsibility, their 
direct involvement with seafarers, or their own seagoing or shipping company 
experience, and then analyse their responses by groupings reflecting those 
individual aspects. 
However, the objectives of the study were to determine whether: 
1. 	 Significant heuristics or biases emanating from different cultural 
backgrounds influenced the way in which the respondents viewed 
safety, particularly with reference to the ISM Code and its 
implementation; 
2. 	 Whether education and training or better policing and enforcement of 
existing regulations is the better path to follow in ensuring the 
objectives of the ISM Code are achieved. 
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Consequently, nominal values (B/axter, 2000) were assigned to the ethnic and 
formative backgrounds of the respondents as shown in Table 4. This helped the 
development of a tabular format for presentation of the interview responses, which 
in turn facilitated comparison of individual responses relative to a combination of 
ethnic origins and cultural background on the one hand and formal education 
together with managerial background on the other hand in each of the question 
areas. 
VARIABLE CODE VARIABLE CODE 
North European 1 
Tertiary education and structured 
managerial development 
A 
Indian 2 
Tertiary education and informal 
B 
managerial development 
Sri Lankan 3 
Secondary education and 
C 
structured training 
Filipino 4 
Secondary education and no 
structured training 
0 
TABLE 4: MATRIX OF RESPONDENT VARIABLES 
Copies of the tabulated transcripts of the responses to the interviews carried out in 
each of the two companies are contained in Annexes A and B and detailed 
comparison of those transcripts is appended as Annexe C. Subsequent analysis is 
made in Chapter XII. 
10.4.2 Documentary Review 
Selected documentation in each company was reviewed to determine the extent to 
which the company had been successful in implementing an effective SMS within 
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the organisation. The principal documentation utilised for this purpose was the 
company's safety records, its accident statistics, and the documented SMS. 
Comparison of the personnel accident records of each of the two companies with 
each other provided one variable against which to measure other variables such 
as the cultural dimensions of management and the seafarers employed as well as 
the type of SMS developed by each company. 
Comparison of each company's accident statistics with the annual statistics 
produced by the International Support Vessel Owners' Association for the shipping 
industry offshore sector as a whole provided a measurement of each company's 
safety record against the average for the industry sector, thus providing an 
indication of the overall effectiveness of the company's safety strategy. 
10.4.3 Survey of Ships' Personnel 
The locus of control of individual seafarers was identified in Chapter VI, section 
6.2, of the literature review, as the most relevant culturally influenced 
psychological dimension affecting behavioural safety. Therefore, as noted in 
section 10.3 above, the third phase of the research included the development and 
distribution of a questionnaire designed to measure the loci of control of the 
seafarers employed by the two shipping companies. 
The questionnaire comprised two parts. The first part consisted of questions 
requiring factual responses regarding the respondent's cultural background, 
educational attainments and experience. The second part comprised a series of 
questions based on Rotter's I-E scale of locus of control orientation (Rotter, 1966). 
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Company A employed mainly Filipino seafarers supplied by crewing agencies in 
Manila. The use of such agencies is a common practice, particularly amongst 
companies employing seafarers from developing nations. Therefore, Anglo­
Eastern Crew Management (Philippines) Ltd was approached to issue the 
questionnaires to sea staff they process. 
Company B employed their seagoing staff through a crewing agency that is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Company B's parent company, the seagoing staff 
being drawn from the general pool of British seafarers. In order to gain meaningful 
responses, Stena Line and the Warsash Maritime Centre (a division of 
Southampton University) were approached to issue the questionnaires to a 
representative cross-section of British seafarers employed in the short sea trade. 
By this means two sets of data were obtained from two culturally distinct groups of 
people working within similar sections of the shipping industry. To obviate any 
linguistic heuristics or biases, the questionnaires distributed in the United Kingdom 
were written only in English whilst those distributed in the Philippines were written 
in both English and Tagalog, the two predominant languages spoken in the 
Philippines. 
Chapter XIV contains a statistical analysis of the responses to the questionnaire. 
A copy of the questionnaire, the questionnaire scale and the responses 
spreadsheet are to be found in Annexes E and F. 
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10.4.4 Relational Discussion and Observation 
This part of the empirical research involved having objective conversations with 
people employed at various levels of authority and in various disciplines and 
observing how they interacted with one another in day-to-day situations and how 
they acted or responded to events in the normal course of their work. 
The technique involved not only talking to individuals and listening to their 
comments but also watching the actions, inter-actions and reactions of the 
individuals. In addition, non-participative observation of organisational actions and 
reactions to events was undertaken, noting for example how feedback concerning 
incidents was handled. Also, objective observation of the relative condition of 
vessels in each company was used to gauge the effectiveness of the company's 
SMS and the accuracy of statements made by respondents during interviews and 
research conversations. 
Written notes were made of conversations and observations considered to be of 
significance to the study and have been used to provide examples, or vignettes, in 
support of the conclusions drawn from other techniques, thereby helping to counter 
any tendency to interpret results subjectively. 
The conversations and observations ran in parallel with the other techniques used 
during the empirical phase of the study, the objective being to provide data to assist 
in contextualising the analysis (Blaxter, 2000; p.191) and to assist in determining 
from an objective standpOint the attitude of senior management, supervisory staff 
and ships' crews towards the following factors necessary for the development of an 
organisational safety culture (Fleming, 2000; ACSN', 1993): 
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• Management Commitment and Visibility 
• Line management Commitment and Visibility 
• Commercial Management Involvement 
• I ntercomm unication 
• Operational Pressure versus Safety 
• Provision of Safety Resources 
• Employment Philosophy 
• Training Programmes 
• Mutual Trust Between Management and Workforce 
• Shared Perceptions About Safety 
Clearly, some of those factors are highly value laden and were therefore more likely 
to be cultura"y influenced than others. Identification of the degree to which various 
factors have been culturally influenced in organisations in culturally divergent 
countries was one of the aims of the research. 
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10.5 SUMMARY OF APPROACH TO THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research Comparative Case Study Method 
Research 
Protocol Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Safety 
Component 
Organisational 
Safety 
Manaqement 
Operational 
Safety 
ManaQement 
Behavioural 
Safety 
Hierarchal 
Safe!y Level Level 3 Level 4 LevelS 
Staff Level Senior Management 
Middle 
Management and 
Supervisory Staff 
Seafarers 
Interview Interview Questionnaire 
(Qualitative (Qualitative (Statistical 
Analysis) Analysis) Analysis) 
Relational Relational Relational 
Discussion and Discussion and Discussion and 
Research Observation Observation Observation 
Techniques 
Employed 
(Qualitative 
Analysis) 
(Qualitative 
Analysis) 
(Qualitative 
Analysis) 
Documentary 
Review 
(Statistical and 
Qualitative 
Analysis) 
Documentary 
Review 
(Statistical and 
Qualitative 
Analysis) 
Documentary 
Review 
(Qualitative 
Analysis) 
TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Table 5 above summarises the research methodology employed for the empirical 
research whilst the ensuing four chapters provide a synopsis of that research. 
Chapter Xl provides an overview of the two case-study companies based upon 
information drawn from a review of each company's promotional literature, key 
informant interviews and relational discussions. The overview provides the 
situational context within which the empirical research was carried out 
1S3 

Chapters XII, XIII and XIV detail the empirical research carried out into each 
company's Organisational Management, Operational Management and shipboard 
Behavioural Safety respectively, with a view to identifying those data that are 
commensurate with the aims and objectives of this study, i.e. to: 
• 	 Identify how the diversity of cultures impacts upon the implementation of 
safety regulations; 
• 	 Determine what obstacles that impact may present to the development of 
safe practices and attitudes within the shipping industry; 
• 	 Ascertain whether strict enforcement of existing regulations or more 
emphasis on education and training is the better way to overcome those 
obstacles. 
Chapter XII reviews the Organisational Management of the two companies and 
develops a broad picture of how shipping companies respond to their legal and 
moral obligations, their responses being tailored to the economic circumstances of 
the individual companies and prevailing cultural norms. 
A comparative analysis in Chapter XIII of each company's Operational 
Management presents a more detailed picture of how individuals respond to the 
dictates of management, and whether the prevailing cultural norms add additional 
constraints and pressures at level 4 of the safety hierarchy to those already 
identified at level 3 of the safety hierarchy. 
In Chapter XIV the results are presented of statistical and qualitative enquiries into 
how seafarers respond to safety regulation. Analysis of the results provides 
insights into whether or not seafarers with different cultural backgrounds respond 
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differently to safety regulations and whether or not education, training and 
experience are factors that influence their responses. 
Chapter XV summarises the results of the empirical study presented in the 
previous four chapters and utilises the information to establish a comparison of the 
safety culture maturity of the two case study companies. A means of establishing 
relative safety culture maturity between two companies working in differing cultural 
environments could be a useful tool in future research. 
Finally, in Chapter XVI the main findings of the study are discussed, conclusions 
are drawn and areas for further research are identified. 
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CHAPTER XI 
CASE STUDY: A REVIEW OF THE COMPANIES 
In the second half of 2004 over a period of two months a study was carried out in 
Company A utilising the methodology described in Chapter X, and in the summer 
of 2005 a similar study was carried out in Company B utilising the same 
methodology. The information contained in this chapter was obtained from various 
sources, principally company prospectuses, press releases, key informant 
interviews and relational discussions. 
11.1 OVERVIEW OF THE COMPANIES 
11.1.1 Company A 
Company A was a sub-division of an American owned company, Corporation A 
International Inc., with headquarters in the USA and comprising three divisions, 
one division operating oil tankers, one operating tugs, supply boats and barges in 
the United States, and another operating offshore support vessels. The Offshore 
Division was the largest of the corporation's three business divisions and operated 
the world's second largest fleet of specialised vessels for support of offshore oil 
and gas facilities used in exploration, development and production. 
The Offshore Division had two operations offices, one in Europe responsible for 
vessels working principally in Africa, the other in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 
responsible for vessels working principally in the Middle East and South East Asia. 
The latter organisation, Company A, formed one of the case study companies. 
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11.1.2 Company B 
The second case study company was a sUb-division of Corporation 8 Holdings 
Inc, an American operations and investment conglomerate the principal business 
activities of which were managed under six divisions: Offshore Marine, Inland 
River, Aviation, Environmental Services, Logistics and Other, the latter division 
encompassing strategic software and radio communications. 
Company B operated from the United Kingdom as an autonomous unit within a 
subsidiary company that was a part of the Offshore Marine division of the parent 
company headquartered in the USA. 
The Offshore Marine division operated a large fleet of diversified marine support 
vessels primarily dedicated to supporting offshore oil and gas installations in 
various locations world wide. Company B, which formed the second case study 
company, was involved in the support of offshore installations in the Southern 
North Sea and the operations office was located in England. 
11.1.3 Corporate Structures 
Whilst the organisational structures of the two companies were similar their 
financial structures were very different. Corporation A International Inc was 
financially a heavily leveraged organisation engaged principally in ship ownership 
and operations whilst Corporation 8 Holdings Inc was a cash-rich company with a 
diversified portfolio in which shipping was of increasing importance. The 
difference in their financial structures was due principally to the manner in which 
the two companies had developed. 
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Corporation A International Inc used cash to buy competitor companies, 
sometimes paying grossly exaggerated premiums in order to increase market 
share. As a result, the corporation built up a debt of some US$800 million and 
was subsequently taken over by an international investment company. 
Corporation B Holdings Inc on the other hand issued shares to raise the capital 
required to acquire carefully targeted companies, enabling expansion into the 
offshore sector of the shipping industry whilst retaining sufficient financial reserves 
to engage in a steady new vessel building programme and subsequent asset play. 
The OECD report (1996) discussed in Chapter I section 1.4, argued that there are 
economic advantages to be gained by ship owners who avoid implementing the 
safety provisions of the SOLAS Convention to the full. The fact that one of the 
case study companies belonged to an organisation with a large debt to equity ratio 
whilst the other belonged to an organisation that was cash rich, would tend to 
accentuate and help identify any attempts to save money at the expense of safety. 
Economic constraints and pressures to 'cut corners' at the expense of safety are 
shown at Safety Level 3 in the ISM Code model (fig. 1 0). 
Culturally the two case study companies were also quite different from each other 
and each operated in an area of the world culturally distinct from the other. 
Company A had a multinational shore staff comprising Arab, British, Filipino and 
Indian operations staff and Indian, Filipino and Pakistani support staff. The 
company employed primarily Filipino seafarers with a sprinkling of Hondurans and 
East Europeans. Company B on the other hand employed British shore staff and 
primarily British seafarers with a sprinkling of East Europeans. These cultural 
differences would tend to highlight any cultural influences that impacted upon the 
development, implementation and administration of each company's SMS. 
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11.2 CORPORATE SAFETY CULTURES 
11.2.1 Company A 
The development of the Offshore Division of Corporation A International Inc in the 
early 1990s involved the takeover of several offshore vessel-operating companies. 
At that time the ISM Code had not entered into force but it had received a lot of 
coverage in the marine press. Corporate management instructed Company A to 
develop and implement an SMS compliant with the requirements of the ISM Code. 
The rationale for that decision was not simply to satisfy corporate safety 
requirements but also to provide a marketing tool for the commercial department. 
Company A duly developed an SMS and after a satisfactory audit a Document of 
Compliance (DOC) was issued on behalf of the relevant maritime administration. 
However, during the first annual audit a number of serious non-conformities were 
noted and the DOC was withdrawn. Because compliance with the ISM Code was 
at that time voluntary the withdrawal of the DOC was of no immediate practical 
consequence. 
In the late 1990s, Corporation A International Inc was taken over by an investment 
company and a new corporate President, formerly a senior executive in a major 
international oil company was subsequently appointed. That resulted in financial 
and corporate restructuring and the recruitment of a new management team 
selected principally from amongst former oil company professionals. 
Since it is widely accepted that the major oil companies set the standards of safety 
for oil tankers, refineries and offshore production facilities, it is not surprising that 
the appointment of a new management team so closely associated with the oil 
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industry brought about major changes in corporate culture and operational safety 
was given a high priority, particularly within the Offshore Division. 
The high degree of commitment to safety was demonstrated by the decision of the 
new senior managers at Company A to develop without delay a new management 
system that met the ISM Code requirements in full. 
Upon review, the old SMS was found to have been drawn up in isolation without 
taking into consideration the actual structure of the company and without 
employee involvement. It was recognised that the new system would have to 
avoid similar mistakes and also, because of the diversity of corporate and national 
cultures inherited from recently acquired companies, the new SMS would have to 
be suitable for use by a polyglot management ashore and a polyglot sea staff. 
The new SMS had to be kept as simple as possible yet still be effective. That 
required commitment from senior management and also giving to people involved 
with the SMS, both ashore and on board ship, a sense of ownership. 
A new SMS was subsequently drawn up, selected shore staff were trained as 
internal auditors, the new documented procedures were distributed and a 
successful external audit was conducted following which a new DOC was issued. 
Senior management recognised however, that achieving compliance with the ISM 
Code was only the start of developing a true safety culture within the company. As 
noted in Chapter VI section 6.5.1, the introduction of an SMS, whether initially or to 
replace another 8M8, involves an organisational change and requires subsequent 
monitoring of the system. 
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To ensure that a new system is implemented effectively it is essential for senior 
management to consistently disconfirm pattems of behaviour not in keeping with 
the new organisational philosophy and consistently support any evidence of 
movement in the direction of the new assumptions (Schein, 1992; p.328). 
In order to raise the safety awareness of individuals Company A employed various 
tools such as no-blame incident reporting and five star safety awards for vessels 
with a good safety record. One tool that stood out as being not only novel, 
innovative and creative but also practical and successful was the introduction of a 
quarterly HSE Safety Incidents Booklet, distributed throughout the fleet and also 
amongst clients. Not only was the booklet unique in its concept of open reporting 
of safety-related incidents, but it also had great diversity of content from the 
statistical to the practical, from the humorous to the serious, reflecting the values 
of the contributors to the booklet. 
In today's environment, which places great emphasis on not only being safe but 
also being seen to be safe, it is most unusual and counter-intuitive for a company 
to be so forthright in acknowledging its actual lapses of safety and to advertise 
them so widely. But this very concept of transparency in accident reporting 
provided the quarterly HSE Safety Incidents Booklet with a unique and innovative 
character whilst at the same time raiSing the safety awareness of its readers. 
Steady standardization of the company's safety culture over a period of years was 
a long-term objective of the Company. However, there could be no short-cuts 
since in a multicultural, global environment it takes time to distil and codify the 
many different values and perceptions into a standardized format suitable for 
developing a true safety culture. 
161 
11.2.2 Company B 
The President and CEO of the Corporation B Holdings Inc conglomerate was a 
licensed attorney admitted to practice in New York State and the District of 
Columbia. However, through his business enterprises he had been associated 
with shipping for a considerable number of years, having bought, operated and 
sold a number of shipping enterprises. 
Company B had its roots in early 2000 with the demise of the fishing industry in 
the North Sea. An amalgamation of former fishing companies then operating 
offshore safety stand-by vessels in the North Sea was acquired by a wholly owned 
company within the Offshore Marine division of Corporation B Holdings Inc. The 
newly acquired company was subsequently integrated into the organisational 
management structure of Corporation B Holdings Inc but remained an 
operationally and financially autonomous company within the Offshore Marine 
division of the organisation. 
Most of the staff of the newly acquired company were formerly employed in the 
fishing industry and subsequently transferred to Company B when the takeover 
occurred in the year 2000 but still tended to identify with their former corporate 
culture. Because of this, it might be expected that a lower level of safety 
awareness prevailed in Company B than in Company A. However, that was not 
the case. All staff interviewed in Company B, in both formal interviews and 
relational conversations, were well aware that both corporate and organisational 
senior management placed great emphasis on safety and that offshore clients 
such as BP Amoco, Shell, Parenco, Conoco and Phillips demanded a very high 
standard of safety from the management and crews of vessels that they chartered. 
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Indeed, in both Company B and Company A the safety culture was not only the 
result of senior management commitment but was also upward driven, with 
offshore clients demanding ever higher standards of operational safety and a 
target of zero accidents. Client driven safety requirements applied a constant 
upward pressure on operations staff and senior management alike, and this is 
reflected at safety levels 4 and 5 in the ISM Code model (figure 10). 
Also in common with Company A, Company B encouraged the reporting of 
accidents and hazardous incidents by introducing a no-blame culture in which a 
person can report a minor accident or a hazardous incident without incurring any 
blame even though they were at fault. In neither company did this mean that a 
seafarer would not be sacked or suffer some form of sanction for causing serious 
injury, extensive property damage or heavy environmental pollution through 
negligent or reckless action. In both companies people were expected to take 
responsibility for their actions. In Company B this was referred to as a 'just 
culture'. 
11.3 CULTURAL CONTEXT 
In terms of Hofstede's cultural dimensions, those prevailing in the geographical 
regions where the two case study companies operated were diametrically opposite 
to each other in terms of Power-Distance and Individualism I Collectivism but 
similar to each other in terms of Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculinity I 
Femininity. This was also true of the cultural dimensions of the staff employed by 
the two companies. 
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Utilising the values determined by Hofstede in his study, the index values of the 
prevailing cultural norms relevant to each company are shown in Table 6 below: 
British Filipino Indian Arab Pakistani Other 
Company 8 100 % - - - - -
Shore Staff 
Company A 9% 6% 70% 12% - 3% 
Shore Staff 
Company B 96% - - - - 4% 
Sea Staff 
Company A 
- 47% 30% 2% 6% 15% 
Sea Staff 
POI Score 35 94 77 80 55 -
IDVScore 89 32 48 38 14 -
UAI Score 35 44 40 68 70 -
MAS Score 66 64 56 53 50 -
TABLE 6: MATRIX OF PREVAILING CULTURAL NORMS 
From the literature review Individualism I Collectivism and Power-Distance were 
determined to be the two cultural dimensions most likely to impact upon 
Organisational Management and Operational Management. The percentages and 
differentials between cultural dimensions shown in Table 6 above for the seagoing 
and shore-based staff of the case study companies also indicate that those are the 
two most relevant cultural dimensions in relation to the current study. 
164 
11.4 SUMMARY 

The two companies selected for the comparative case study were Company A 
which operated offshore support vessels in the Middle East and South East Asia, 
and Company B which operated offshore support vessels in the North Sea. 
Both companies were subsidiaries of American conglomerates and their corporate 
structures were therefore similar, thus minimising any resultant constraints and 
pressures emanating from that quarter. However, Company A was financially a 
heavily leveraged company and employed mainly Asian personnel whilst 
Company B was cash-rich and employed essentially British personnel, thus 
maximising any differences in corporate cultures resulting from the impact of 
financial and cultural influences. 
The corporate safety cultures of the two companies had developed differently. 
Company A was a relatively new company that had assimilated several other 
companies. The resultant safety culture had consciously developed the strong 
points of the safety cultures of the assimilated companies. Company B, also a 
relatively new company, operated North Sea safety stand-by and supply vessels 
which had been taken over by Corporation B Holdings Inc. The pre-existing 
corporate culture was still evident in Company B. 
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CHAPTER XII 
CASE STUDY: PHASE ONE 

ORGANISATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT 

12.1 KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
Six people from each company were interviewed in order to: 
• 	 Gain a comprehensive view of the company and its organisational structure; 
• 	 Explore the effect on each company of the legal and moral obligations and 
corporate economic considerations shown in the ISM Code model, (fig. 10), 
to be acting at Safety Level 3; and 
• 	 Determine the commitment of each organisation's senior management 
towards safety management and compliance with the provisions of the ISM 
Code. 
The following respondents were interviewed: 
CompanVA 	 CompanvB 
1. Managing Director Area General Manager 
2. Operations Manager Operations Manager 
3. Operations Superintendent Technical Director 
4. QA-HSE Manager Area Safety Manager 
5. HR Manager 	 Personnel Manager 
6. Crewing Supervisor Senior Crewing Coordinator 
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In Company B the Technical Director rather than the Operations Superintendent 
was interviewed because at the time of the field research the role of Operations 
Superintendent in Company B was being undertaken by the Technical Director. 
The respondents were selected on the basis of two criteria: 
1. 	 All had a responsibility within the parameters of their job function for 
ensuring safe operation of the vessels by the people on board; 
2. 	 They represented the various tiers of management and supervision within 
the companies for which they worked. 
In both companies the Safety I HSE Manager was also the Designated Person 
Ashore (DPA), a role clearly identified in CIA of the ISM Code as providing a link 
between the Company and those on board the ships. 
The interview responses reflected the views of both senior and middle 
management and also supervisory personnel, thus providing an indication of the 
overall prevailing attitude to safety and implementation of the ISM Code within 
each company (Tremblay, 1982). 
To assist in identifying any heuristics and biases exhibited by the respondents 
resulting from their cultural origins, educational attainments and employment 
backgrounds, transcripts of the interview questions and responses were formatted 
and grouped according to the socio-cultural backgrounds of the interviewees as 
shown in Table 4 (Chapter X). Copies of the transcripts are attached as Annexes 
A and B of this study. 
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12.2 THE INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS 
The cultural, educational and occupational backgrounds of the twelve key 
informants are described in some detail in the Key Interviews Response Analysis 
in Annex C. For ease of reference they are summarised in Tables 7 and 8 below 
using the scale established for Table 4 in Chapter X. 
Respondent MD 
Op'ns. 
Manager 
DPA 
Op'ns. 
Super. 
HR 
Manager 
Crewing 
Super 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational I 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
TABLE 7: COMPANY A KEY INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS 
Senior 
Op'ns. Tech. HR 
Respondent Area GM DPA Crewing
Manager Director Manager 
Coordinator 
Ethnic Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational I 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
TABLE 8: COMPANY B KEY INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS 
Scale: 
North European: 1 Indian: 2 
Sri Lankan: 3 Filipino: 4 
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Tertiary education and structured managerial development: A 
Tertiary education and informal managerial development: B 
Secondary education and structured training: C 
Secondary education and no structured training: D 
12.3 ORGANISATIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND PRESSURES 
The constraints and pressures prevailing at level 3 of the safety hierarchy are 
shown on the ISM Code model (fig. 10) and were outlined in some detail in 
Chapter VII section 7.1.3. They can be briefly summarised as follows: 
1. 	 There is both a moral and a legal obligation to run their operations in 
accordance with the provisions of the ISM Code; 
2. 	 There are economic factors to take into consideration which may be 
reflected in budgetary constraints with regard to safety, training and the 
quality of ship maintenance 
3. 	 The type and style of safety management system developed and 
implemented will reflect: 
e. The prevailing cultural norms of the decision makers; 
f. The organisation's corporate culture; 
g. Management style; 
h. Managerial competence 
The manner in which those constraints and pressures have impacted upon each of 
the case study companies and the way in which those companies have dealt with 
them are examined in tum in the following sections of this chapter using 
information acquired from analysis of the key informant interview responses 
together with information gathered during research conversations and observation. 
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12.4 LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS 

As noted in Chapter III, section 3.4 and as further discussed in relation to 
education and training in Chapter VI, section 6.8, and in relation to the ISM Code 
in general in Chapter VII, sections 7.1 and 7.2, every shipping company has: 
• 	 A legal obligation to develop and implement policies and procedures 
compliant with the provisions of the ISM Code; 
• 	 A moral obligation to observe the spirit of the Code and not simply the 
detail of the regulatory requirements, i.e. it ought to develop policies and 
procedures that do not simply meet regulatory requirements but also serve 
to achieve the ISM Code objectives of safety at sea, prevention of human 
injury or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the marine environment 
To determine the approach of the management and supervisory staff towards 
these issues in the two case study companies, the respondents were asked what 
they believed was the prime motivation behind the company's Safety Management 
policies. The responses to that question are shown at Q.F.3 in Annexes A and B 
and are reproduced below in Tables 9 and 10 for ease of reference. 
Analysis of the responses indicates that all respondents in both companies were 
not only well aware of the legal requirements imposed upon them by the 
introduction of the ISM Code but also fully supportive both of its introduction and of 
the need of the companies to implement its provisions. 
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Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic 
Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational 
/ Managerial A B C B 0 D 
Group 
To comply with 
regulatory 
Top 
management 
drive it to 
ensure safety 
on board the 
vessels but 
middle 
management 
drive it to 
comply with 
regulatory 
requirements 
To enhance 
safety 
performance 
To 
enhance 
safety 
performanc 
e and in 
order to 
comply 
with safety 
requ'mnts 
requirements, 
enhance safety 
performance and 
avoid legal actions. 
However, the prime 
reason is for 
commercial 
considerations, e.g. 
boats under 500 grt 
do not require ISM 
but Company Ado it 
anyway for 
marketing reasons 
To comply 
with 
regulatory 
requ'mnts 
To comply 
with 
regulatory 
requ'mnts 
- safety is an 
added bonus. 
TABLES 9: COMPANY A RESPONSES TO QUESTION F.3 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr Crew Respondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational 
/ Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
A combination 
of factors: 
1st - to 
avoid legal 1. 
Commercialactions50% to Primarily to advantage;
comply with 2nd -to enhance safety 2.
regulatory comply with performance regulatory
requirements To enhance To enhance 
regulatory and as a requirementsand 50% to safety safety
requ'rmnts secondary 3.enhance performance performance 
consideration To keep safety 3rd - to to avoid legal employeesperformance. 
enhance actions. safe 
safety 4. 
performance Less accidents 
means less 
expenditure 
--.---- -------­
TABLE 10: COMPANY 8 RESPONSES TO QUESTION F.3 
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The similarity of views expressed across the cultural divide may have been due in 
part to the effects of globalisation blurring cultural differences but most probably in 
the main to all respondents having undergone ISM Code training. As shown in 
response to Question 0.13 in Annexes A and B, eight of the twelve key informants 
had attended identical training courses covering ISM familiarisation and auditor 
training, two had attended in-house ISM introductory seminars and the remaining 
two were qualified lead auditors of management systems. This is supportive of the 
argument for standardised training to implement a common standard of safety in a 
global industry. 
With regard to the moral obligations imposed upon the company and its 
employees to act within the spirit of the ISM Code and not merely in strict 
accordance with its regulatory provisions, its is clear from the answers given to the 
questions in section G of the interview 'Perceptions of the ISM Code' (see 
Annexes A and B) that all respondents were very positive about the potentia! 
benefits of the introduction of the ISM Code, although in the case of Company A's 
Operations Manager it was felt that his responses may have been influenced to 
some extent by social desirability. 
12.5 ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
When the new management took control of Corporation A International Inc the 
corporation was very heavily leveraged with a debt of some US$800 million. The 
need to reduce that debt was a critical factor in the decisions of corporate 
management and was reflected in the decision making of Company A's senior 
managers. 
------~ 
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Strategic steps were taken to either reverse losses by applying standard 
management techniques or to cut losses by retreating from particular areas of 
operation as illustrated by the examples in Table 11. 
Problem Area Resolution 
Company shipyard 
sustaining heavy losses 
Shipyard sold 
High overheads Office relocation and staff reduction 
Cost of stockpiling 
equipment remaining from 
High value parts distributed to vessels. Other 
parts and equipment sold. Warehouse closed. 
former project. 

Large outstanding payments 1. Specific staff assigned to debt recovery. 

receivable. 2. Future charters covered by letters of credit 

TABLE 11: EXAMPLES OF COST CONTAINMENT MEASURES 
Economic considerations were not however, allowed to impact upon safety in 
operational areas in either of the two companies. From an examination of 
company records, analysis of the responses to the relevant interview questions, 
relational conversations and observation it was possible to establish that areas of 
safety potentially subject to cutbacks as a result of economic considerations were 
in fact not affected by cost containment policies. 
It was clear that both companies sought economies wherever and whenever 
money had to be spent. Shipyards were invited to tender for repairs, purchase 
orders for spare parts and consumable items were placed on the most economical 
suppliers, bulk order discounts were sought, staff headcount was reduced where 
possible and insurance requirements were regularly reviewed with a view to 
reducing premiums. 
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However, those measures were simply good commercial practice and had no 
adverse impact upon matters of safety. This is illustrated in Table 12 below. 
Area of Potential 
Potential Company A Company B 
Economic Observed Observed 
Cost Saving Impact 
Impact Status Status 
Class Surveys Delayed· Up to date Up to date 
Flag State Surveys Delayed Up to date Up to date 
Voyage Repairs Postponed As required As required 
Dry-dockings Postponed Up to date Up to date 
Vessel Appearance Corrosion Well Painted Well Painted 
Safety Audits Postponed Done when due Done when due 
Safety Training Not Done As required As required 
Safety Equipment Bare Minimum Above minimum Above minimum 
Spare Parts Delayed Delivery Prompt delivery Prompt delivery 
Consumable Items Not Supplied As requested As requested 
TABLE 12: OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS 
Relational conversations did reveal one area relating to corporate and economic 
governance where both companies were under pressure to observe certain 
strictures imposed by American law. Following the introduction of the Sarbanes 
Oxley legislation in the USA in 2004 as a consequence of large corporate financial 
scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, Globa! Crossing and Arthur Andersen, all 
publicly traded U.S. companies and non-U.S. companies with a U.s. presence are 
required to submit an annual report of the effectiveness of their internal accounting 
controls to the Securities Exchange Committee. Both Company A and Company 
B were required by their respective corporate head offices to comply with the 
provisions of the Act, which is concerned with corporate governance and 
increased financial disclosure. 
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12.6 ORGANISATIONAL AND CULTURAL NORMS 
Because Company A was formed from the amalgamation of a number of 
companies operating in the offshore sector of the shipping industry, there was no 
long-established organisational culture associated with the company. The feeling 
within the head office in Dubai was one of goals and achievements and even 
though many of the staff employed in the head office had originally been 
employees of the former companies, most identified with their new employer. 
All employees were intent on helping the company to achieve its stated goals and 
that was quite understandable considering that failure of such a heavily leveraged 
company to achieve its goals would probably result in financial ruin, dissolution of 
the company and employees losing their livelihoods. 
As noted previously, Company A had a multinational shore management and 
primarily Filipino seafarers with a sprinkling of Hondurans and East Europeans. 
Consequently, sound cross-cultural management was a necessity to achieve 
positive results. 
The Managing Director of Company A was well practiced in cross-cultural 
management. A former Master Mariner, he had spent nearly twenty years in 
shore-based ship management with a major oil company, several of those years in 
South East Asia and a number in the USA, prior to joining Company A. 
Company B was the antithesis of Company A. Many of the Company B staff 
tended to identify with their former company (pre take-over) rather than with 
Company B and the prevailing corporate culture was that of a long-established 
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company undergoing a process of change management driven from corporate 
level. This was to some extent compounded by the manner in which Corporation 
B Holdings Inc operated internationally. Each separate sub-division of the 
corporation had its own Area General Manager, Area Safety Manager, operations 
and technical staff, and support staff with each separate division and sub-division 
operating independently. Therefore, in the event of an established company 
becoming a part of the Corporation B Holdings Inc conglomerate its continuing 
autonomy would tend to lead to the existent corporate culture continuing rather 
than adapting to the Corporation B Holdings Inc culture. 
The fact that Company B had an all British shore staff and employed 
predominantly British seafarers with a sprinkling of East Europeans lent a degree 
of homogeneity to the company that was quite evident in the similarity of the 
attitudes of the respondents during formal interviews and relational discussions. 
12.7 MANAGEMENT STYLE AND COMPETENCE 
In Chapter VI, three important points were developed: 
• 	 At section 6.5.5, it was noted that of the four risk factors considered 
important in the development and implementation of an SMS, two, 
leadership style and end user involvement, are also particularly subject to 
the influence of Power- Distance and Individualism I Collectivism. 
• 	 At section 6.5, the importance of leadership style and the direction it gives 
to organisational culture (Schein, 1992) was discussed and it was argued 
that without senior management commitment there will be only token 
commitment to safety within any organisation (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; 
Cox & Flin, 1998; Cheyne et aI, 1998). 
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• 	 At section 6.5.2 it was further argued that unless end users of a safety 
system are given a sense of ownership through participation and 
involvement in the development and operation of the system, then safety 
procedures may not be followed with any degree of enthusiasm, if at all 
(Schein, 1992; p.134), and authoritarian measures may need to be 
employed in order to achieve corporate safety goals (Etzioni, 1975). 
In a high power-distance culture there is a high degree of stratification and each 
layer of management distances itself from the layer below, leading potentially to 
management by command rather than management by consultation. This does 
not lend itself to feedback analysis nor to a climate of user involvement or 
empowerment. 
A high power-distance index therefore tends to increase the risk of lack of user 
involvement or commitment whilst a lower power distance index tends to have a 
positive effect and decrease the risk. 
With regard to national culture it can be seen from the matrix of prevailing cultural 
norms shown in Table 6, that whilst Company B was not culturally challenged, 
Company A was located and operating in an environment where the prevailing 
cultural norms of the local people and of the staff employed by the company 
exhibited a high power-distance index and a strong collectivist tendency. 
The two cultural dimensions identified in the literature review as being most 
influential upon leadership style and hence end user involvement were power­
distance and collectivism. The negative tendencies of those prevailing cultural 
norms are autocratic management with a rigid hierarchy and an organisational 
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culture wherein subordinates do not question their superiors, and managers do not 
get involved in matters they have delegated to their staff. 
From relational conversations with senior managers it was evident that such a 
leadership style and corporate culture had in fact existed in Company A under the 
previous management. That was a major reason why, as discussed in Chapter XI 
section 11.2.1, the original SMS was ineffective resulting in the company's original 
DOC being withdrawn. 
However, from relational conversations and the personnel profiles obtained during 
the Key Informant Interviews (see Annex C for interview responses analysis) it 
was apparent that Company A's new Managing Director and new HSE Manager 
both had backgrounds that prepared them for cross-cultural management. Both 
men had: 
• Spent several years living and working in Asia and the Middle East; 
• Spent their working lives in a marine and/or offshore environment; 
• Always worked in a multi-cultural environment. 
Because of their backgrounds both men would have been well aware of the 
potential negative effects of the prevailing cultural dimensions and would have 
been instinctively prompted to take appropriate steps to ensure that the potential 
pitfalls were avoided. 
The effectiveness of their cross-cultural management skills was evidenced by the 
fact that in less than two years they had been able to develop and implement an 
entirely new and ultimately effective SMS in a company with a multi-ethnic, multi­
cultural workforce. 
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The twelve key informants were requested to complete the Questionnaire (Annex 
D) used in the survey to measure the locus of control of seafarers as described in 
Chapter X, section 10.3, and Chapter XIV. The concept of locus of control 
orientation is discussed in more detail in Chapter VI section 6.2.1 of the thesis. 
Using Rotter's scale a high score indicates a strong external locus of control 
orientation and a low score indicates a strong internal locus of control orientation. 
M.D.! Ops HSE Ops. Super. HR Crew 
A.G.M. Man'gr Man'gr ! Tech M'gr Man'gr Super. 
Company A 52.2 % * 14.3% 21.7% 13.0 % 30.4 % 
Company B 43.5% 43.5% 17.4 % 39.1 % 13.0 % 56.5% 
* Declined to take part in the survey 
TABLE 13: KEY INFORMANTS' Locus OF CONTROL ORIENTATION 
Although the sample size was too small to draw any firm conclusions, the results 
are interesting insomuch as they do indicate that there may be a correlation 
between job function and locus of control orientation. That is an area which may 
benefit from further research. 
12.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter examined in turn each of the constraints and pressures identified at 
Safety Level 3 of the ISM Code model (Figure 10) as those potentially acting on 
the managements of the two companies being stUdied. 
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From the analysis of the Key Informant Interviews and also from the content of the 
previous chapter it is clear that there was a genuine commitment by the senior 
management of both case study companies to establish a genuine safety culture, 
while the similarity of respondents' views regarding safety reflected the influence 
of the similarity of the training undertaken by the respondents. 
It is also evident that the management teams of both companies recognised and 
understood their legal and moral obligations with regard to safety and in neither 
company were economic considerations allowed to dictate safety policy. 
What comes out very strongly from this part of the case study is that constraints 
and pressures resulting from legal and moral obligations, economic considerations 
and organisational and cultural norms not only impact upon organisational safety 
management but can also be suitably dealt with by good strategic and 
organisational management using standard management techniques which in a 
culturally homogenous company may be of an indigenous nature but in a culturally 
heterogeneous company require the addition of well developed cross-cultural 
management skills. 
Whether there is a correlation between locus of control and job function was 
identified as an area where future management research might usefully be 
undertaken. 
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CHAPTERxm 
CASE STUDY: PHASE TWO 

OPERATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT 

The second phase of the case study research involved a documentary review 
within each company. The four main areas of documentary review were: 
• The Documented SMS; 
• Accident reporting and follow~up procedures; 
• Accident statistics; 
• Training policies and procedures. 
13.1 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Both Company A and Company B had developed a closed cycle SMS as 
described in Chapter V section 5.3.2. Considering their completely separate 
development, the systems were remarkably similar, possibly because both 
companies were engaged in the same sector of the shipping industry. 
The comprehensive documented SMS of each company was available in both 
computerised and hard-copy format. There was some debate amongst seagoing 
staff about which was the preferred format and the arguments tended to hinge not 
00 a persoo's computer literacy but on their job function. Chief Engineers tended 
to prefer the computerised format for the simple reason that it tended to save 
space whilst ships' Masters tended to prefer the hard-copy format because it was 
easier to referenc·e than a computerised version whilst alone in the Wheelhouse 
handling the vessel. 
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The SMS of both companies comprised a comprehensive documented system in a 
tiered format under three heads: 
• Company Policies 
• Company Procedures 
• Company Forms 
Each of the three heads was further sub-divided so that specific areas could be 
referenced with comparative ease. 
Since in both companies the official language of communication was English, the 
SMS in each company was in English. Each SMS had controlled and uncontrolled 
copies, the controlled copies being updated on a regular basis, control of the 
documentation in each company being the responsibility of the Safety Department. 
13.2 PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS 
Although the ISM Code does not specifically require ship operating companies to 
develop and implement a Planned Maintenance System (PMS), the Code does 
require them to have in place a system for ensuring proper maintenance of the 
ships and their equipment. Many operators find that a PMS is the easiest way to 
address this particular provision of the Code and therefore, pedantically speaking 
the PMS forms part of the SMS. 
Each case study company had in place a self-contained PMS that could be 
reviewed separately from the rest of the SMS. Each company's PMS was 
completely different from that of the other but both required a great deal of back-up 
from their respective company's Technical Department. 
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13.2.1 Company A 
Some months before the study took place in Company A, the company had 
changed from a paper-based to a computer-based PMS. The computer program 
used a Microsoft Windows operating platform and the system was designed to be 
as straightforward as possible whilst covering all shipboard machinery 
maintenance except major machinery overhaul, the latter being scheduled by 
shore-based engineering staff. In addition to the computer hardware and software 
the system comprised three manuals: 
1. 	 Administrators Guide with program installation instructions (14 pages). 
2. 	 User's Manual (25 pages) with instructions covering inter alia: 
- Computer program operating instructions; 
- Data transfer and back-up systems; 
- PMS description; 
- PMS schedule; 
- Job cards for each machinery item; 
- Vessel survey status; 
- Ship information system. 
3. 	 Defect System User's Guide (9 pages) designed to record and manage 
defects that occur during operation of the vessel and which are not covered 
in the Planned Maintenance System. 
Since a large percentage of the Filipino seagoing staff was not computer literate, 
implementation of the system was certainly not straightforward and a great deal of 
back-up from the company's shore-based technical staff was required before even 
a semblance of operational success was evident. That was not due to cultural 
factors: senior managers had simply overestimated the educational standards and 
computer literacy of the Filipino seafarers. 
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13.2.2 Company B 
The PMS used by Company B was designed to be as simple and easy to operate 
as possible. The paper-based system comprised: 
1. 	 An Engine Room Maintenance Sheet listing some 105 items, each with 
a unique reference number. 
2. 	 The items were divided into sections showing which items had to be 
carried out daily, weekly, fortnightly and monthly. 
3. 	 Each page of the Engine Room Log Book had on it four maintenance 
related sections: 
ao 	 One listing the reference numbers of the dally maintenance items 
with space for a signature against each item when completed; 
b. 	 One for noting any maintenance or repairs carried out; 
c. 	 One for spare gear used (including filters); 
d. 	 One for recording the running hours of the principal machinery: 
main engines, generators, bow thruster engine, Aqua Master and 
fire pumps. 
4. 	 A summary page at the back of the log book with two maintenance 
related sections: 
ao One listing the reference numbers of all 105 maintenance items 
with space for a signature against each item when completed; 
b. 	 One listing all main machinery with an adjacent space against each 
item for comments and a check box to indicate its condition (A ­
Good running order, B - Running but needs maintenance, C - Not 
running awaiting opportunity to repair, 0 - Not running require 
assistance to repair). 
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Mechanical maintenance of principal machinery required to be undertaken on a 
regular or periodic basis was scheduled by shore-based staff in the company's 
Technical Department and carried out either in the company's own workshops or 
by independent contractors. The work was carried out during port turnarounds 
whenever possible or during scheduled dry-dockings when necessary. 
Only simple maintenance tasks were entrusted to seagoing staff. Company S's 
PMS system placed the main onus for repair and mechanical maintenance on the 
shore-based technical staff. This was not a culturally related factor but indicated 
either: 
• 	 Senior shore management's lack of trust in the ability or conscientiousness 
of the seagoing staff; or 
• 	 Continuance of a system introduced when the company operated fishing 
vessels and the seagoing staff was of a much lower technical calibre. 
13.2.3 Socio-Culturallnferences 
Vessels operating in the offshore sector of the shipping industry are usually 
crewed by seafarers with Certificates of Competency that are limited by 
horsepower for Engineers and by tonnage for Masters and Mates. Such 
certificates are of a lower academic and professional standard than those held by 
officers on vessels employed in the deep sea trades. 
It would therefore not be surprising to find that a company operating vessels in the 
offshore sector of the industry had a PMS that was somewhat basic in nature such 
as that used by Company S. However, with the growing familiarity that people 
have with computers and the wide availability of computer training courses in the 
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United Kingdom one might have expected the introduction of a simple 
computerised system in Company B. 
What was surprising in the instant case was that Company A had implemented a 
relatively sophisticated system even though many of the Filipino seafarers were 
not computer literate. Company A took steps to address that problem, firstly by 
advising crewing agencies that officers they supplied must be computer literate, 
and secondly by providing senior seagoing personnel with the requisite computer 
training where appropriate. It was evident that the training worked because in a 
short space of time the computerised PMS was fully operational. 
There do not appear to be any cultural inferences to be drawn from this, only a 
difference of approach by senior management of the two case study companies. 
What is significant however is that the vocational training provided by Company A 
to overcome a specific problem was successful. 
13.3 ACCIDENT REPORTING AND FOLLOW-UP PROCEDURES 
In both companies accidents and hazardous occurrences were immediately 
reported by the vessel to the OPA, by means of the appropriate report form in the 
case of minor incidents and by means of telecommunications followed up with the 
appropriate report form in the case of major incidents. 
The reports included the Master's or ship-board Safety Officer's evaluation of the 
cause of the incident, extent of the damage, pollution or injury, and steps taken or 
to been taken to redress the problem and to avoid a recurrence of the incident. 
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If the incident was of a serious nature a safety alert would be sent out to all 
vessels in the fleet to avoid a similar accident occurring on another vessel. 
Meanwhile, the incident would be included in the DPA's weekly (Company B) or 
monthly (Company A) safety report which was sent to the Corporate HSE 
Manager and copied to all vessels. 
By these means, important experiences were shared immediately they happened 
and less important experiences were shared soon after they occurred. 
In both Corporation A International Inc and Corporation B Holdings Inc there were 
a number of divisions or sub-divisions, each with its own Safety Manager. In order 
to ensure that all Safety Managers were working in harmony Corporation A 
International Inc had a system of monthly safety conference calls and quarterly 
safety meetings. In Corporation B Holdings Inc however, there were no formal 
discussions between Safety Managers although it was reported that there were 
plans to start a system of having meetings twice per year in order to standardise 
divisional Safety Management Systems and divisional safety regulations. 
The differences between the two companies were due mainly to differences in 
their organisational cultures and partly to the different managerial and 
occupational backgrounds of the senior managers of the two companies. 
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13.4 RECORDING ACCIDENT STATISTICS 
As noted in Chapter V section 5.4, the most common method of evaluating the 
effectiveness of an organisation's SMS is the recording of accidents, lost time 
incidents and hazardous occurrences (near misses) (ACNSI, 1993). 
But when using such data to measure the effectiveness of a company's SMS or as 
a means of comparing a company's safety performance with that of other 
companies, it is important that each company uses the same criteria for 
categorising accidents and the same mathematical procedures for preparing the 
datasets used in calculating the statistics that are to be presented. 
The Marine Injuries Reporting Guidelines (OCIMF, 1997) developed by the Oil 
Companies Marine Forum and used by Company A are widely used throughout 
the shipping industry, particularly those sections of the industry associated with the 
production, storage and carriage of crude oil and petroleum products. 
The Occupational Safety & Health (OSHA) guidelines used by Company Bare 
very similar to the OCIMF guidelines so direct comparisons between the accident 
statistics of the two companies can readily be made. 
The two principal variables most commonly measured on an on-going basis and 
presented as a monthly or annual statistic are Lost Time Injury Frequency (LTIF) 
and Total Recordable Case Frequency (TRCF). Each of these figures is a 
composite, calculation of which is carried out using the formulae contained in the 
Appendices at Annex D. 
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13.5 COMPARISON OF ACCIDENT STATISTICS 
Accident statistics are by definition quantitative in nature and therefore present a 
convenient method of assessing the effectiveness of a company's SMS. Trends 
can be analysed, comparisons can be made with other companies and 
benchmarking can be achieved by comparing a company's statistics with those of 
the industry sector overall 
Charts of the accident statistics per 200,000 exposure hours for a three year 
period in Company A and in Company B are given in Figure 11 and Figure 12 
below. 
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COMPANY B 
Personnel Incident Rates - 42 Months 
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Figure 12 Company B Accident Statistics - January 2002 to June 2005 
From Figures 11 and 12 it is quite evident that during the periods covered: 
• 	 Company A has been extremely successful in lowering the frequency of 
both Lost Time Incidents (L Tis) and Total Recordable Cases (TRCs) with 
zero L Tis and TRCs in some months; 
• 	 Company B has maintained a low frequency of L Tis but has experienced a 
rise in the frequency of TRCs; and 
• 	 By 2004, both companies had achieved similar LTI frequencies but 
Company B had a much higher frequency of TRCs than Company A 
Figure 13 below shows the overall Lost Time Accident Frequency Rates for the 
offshore sector of the shipping industry as recorded by the International Support 
Vessel Owners' Association (ISOA) for the years 1998 to 2003 inclusive The data 
was extracted from the Associations' annual Personnel Accident Survey 2003 
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(lSOA, 2004) and converted so as to be expressed in the same units as those 
used by Company A and Company B. 
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Figure 13 Industry Sector L TI F from January 2000 to December 2003 
From figure 13 it is evident that 
• 	 The overa ll trend of L Tis in the Offshore sector of the shipping industry is 
one of decreasing frequency; and 
• 	 The L TI frequency of both case-study companies is approximately half of 
that for the industry sector in general 
From this quantitative examination of both companies' accident statistics no 
significant cultural inferences could be drawn . However, it is significant that since 
the introduction of the ISM Code and the STCW Convention the seagoing and 
shore-based personnel in both case-study companies have undergone similar 
training and safety indoctrination which infers that the training provided may well 
be the reason for the good and improving safety statistics in both companies , thus 
lending support to the argument for more emphaSIS on education and trai ning in 
preference to stricter enforcement of safety regulations in order to improve 
maritime safety standards. 
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13.6 TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT POLICIES 
There were differences between the training philosophies of Company A and 
Company B. In Company A training was provided on an ad hoc basis whilst in 
Company B training was provided on a planned basis monitored by a Training 
Officer. The main reason for the difference was because of the different 
employment philosophies of the two companies. 
13.6.1 Company A 
Crewing agents were the principal source of ships' officers and ratings, although 
some senior officers were directly employed by the company. But in either case, 
the personnel were employed on a single voyage contract basis. No seagoing 
personnel were employed using long-term or 'rolling' contracts of employment. As 
a consequence of this employment philosophy, seagoing personnel were free to 
move on to another employer after completing a single voyage with the company. 
Senior management had put forward to corporate management a proposal to 
employ a Human Resources Manager at a senior level to develop a personnel 
management system that would encourage the most capable and promising 
seagoing staff to stay with the company. This would have ensured that finite 
resources spent on training would not be expended on people who did only one or 
two voyages with the company and then moved on to another company. 
The Corporate HSE Manager supported the proposal noting that employing 
personnel on a casual basis to crew company ships made continual improvement 
of safety standards particularly difficult. However, senior commercial managers at 
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corporate level resisted the proposal, seeing the employment of a senior Marine 
HR Manager as unnecessary and a potential drain on corporate resources. 
The proposal was therefore not advanced any further, which resulted in a lack of 
direction in the HR Department and reliance on crewing agencies to provide 
personnel with only basic safety training. Company training was not methodical 
and provided only on an ad hoc basis as illustrated by the following examples. 
Two new vessels fitted with Azimuth thrusters rather than conventional propellers 
and rudders were to be delivered to Company A, and Operations staff realised that 
it would be necessary to train the Masters being appointed to the vessels in the 
requisite ship-handling techniques which are quite different from those used on 
conventional vessels. A five-day course for three Masters and two Operations 
Superintendents was arranged with the Singapore Port Authority and the vessels 
went into service without mishap as far as ship-handling was concerned. 
Similarly, both new vessels had Wartsila main engines, and because no other 
vessels in the fleet were equipped with Wartsila engines Company A sent three 
selected Chief Engineers on familiarisation courses at the manufacturer's factory. 
In contrast to the foregoing, each of the two new vessels was equipped with a fast 
rescue craft (FRC) the handling of which also requires specialist training. None of 
the crew appointed to the first vessel to be delivered had the requisite training and 
when the FRC was launched for testing during vessel acceptance trials, it was 
only by good fortune that the ship's Bo'sun in charge of the operation narrowly 
escaped severe physical injury. The subsequent hazardous incident report was 
sufficient to identify the need for FRC training and this was subsequently provided. 
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13.6.2 Company B 
Because Company B operated in the British sector of the North Sea from a UK 
port, its vessels were British registered and regulations imposed by the Marine and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA) and by seafarers' trade unions were a strong incentive 
for Company B to employ British seafarers in preference to foreign nationals. 
The parent company minimised the impact of this constraint by using its own 
employment agency to oversee and administer not only the supply of seafarers to 
Company B but also their training. The agency had a full-time Training Officer 
responsible for sending seafarers on mandatory and elective training courses 
including the following: 
• One week mandatory MCA approved basic training course for new 
entrants to the shipping industry covering Fire Fighting, First Aid, Sea 
Survival and Personal Safety & Social Responsibility; 
• 	 One week obligatory course approved by the Offshore Petroleum Industry 
Training Industry (OPITO) covering First Aid and Casualty Recovery by 
Fast Rescue Craft (FRC); 
• 	 Five-day Advanced Medical Course (AMA). To attend this course the 
candidate must first have passed a Company B multiple-choice test and 
have been recommended by the college. 
• 	 All deck crew were obliged by Company B to attend a two-day FRC course 
for the award of Boatman Certificate. 
• 	 Selected deck crew attended an additional five-day course for the award of 
FRC Coxswain Certificate. 
• 	 After at least three months experience, selected FRC Coxswains could 
attend a five-day Daughter Craft Coxswain Certificate course qualifying 
them to cox an enclosed rescue boat steering by compass and GPS only. 
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With the exception of the AMA course, the foregoing courses were refreshed by 
periodic training on board carried out by North Sea Training Services Ltd (NSTS). 
AMA refresher courses were carried out ashore. An on-going training programme 
was also in place, validated by OPITO, with exercises covering six modules set by 
NSTS. Each module had questions for selected crew members and the 
responses together with the record sheet were returned to NSTS for marking and 
identifying any areas of concern. All the relevant information was then entered 
into an agency database. 
During a relational discussion, Company 8's Training Officer affirmed the 
effectiveness of the training by means of an illustration. Throughout the basic first 
aid course a deckhand complained for the entire week about having to attend the 
course. The Training Officer told him that once he had successfully completed the 
course it might one day prove useful. About three months later the deckhand told 
the Training Officer that his newly gained knowledge had indeed proved useful. 
Whilst the deckhand was on leave his father had suffered a heart attack and he 
had been able to keep his father alive until the paramedics arrived. 
13.6.3 Cultural Factors 
Of interest and important to note in the context of this study is that whilst both 
companies sourced their seagoing personnel through crewing agencies, seagoing 
personnel in Company 8 were virtually company employees because Company 
8's parent company owned the agency. Seagoing personnel in Company A on the 
other hand were effectively contract labour hired on a per voyage basis. 
Attempts made by Company A to engage Filipino officers on long-term contracts 
were abandoned without success after two years of negotiation. The Filipino 
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officers preferred to be employed on short-term contracts and remain free to join 
another company at the end of each voyage. This was the case even with officers 
who had worked for the company for a number of years and were considered 
more as permanent employees than casual employees. 
From relational conversations it is apparent that similar situations have been 
observed in other companies employing both British and Indian seafarers, such as 
Mobil Shipping Company Ltd. Whilst the British seafarers were content to sign 
long-term employment contracts the Indian seafarers preferred to be employed on 
a per voyage basis. This tends to show either an independence of thought on the 
part of Asian seafarers in general or a general distrust by Asian seafarers of 
shipping companies as employers. 
13.7 COMPETENCIES, UNDERSTANDING & REGULATION 
From the ISM Code model (fig. 10), three of the four constraints and pressures to 
be found at the level of Operational safety are the cultural norms and heuristics of 
the operational staff, their competencies and understanding, and how they 
perceive the degree of regulation that currently exists with regard to implementing 
the ISM Code in accordance with the guidelines. 
During Phase I of the empirical study, all twelve of the key informants interviewed 
were asked three definitive questions regarding operational safety relevant to 
those particular constraints and pressures. From the detailed questions and 
responses (contained in Annexes A and B and summarised below), the general 
consensus of opinion was as follows: 
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• Question G.G: 
From your experience, what do you believe is the most effective way of 
improving overall ship operating standards? 
Summary of responses: 
a. More emphasis on professional training 
b. More emphasis on safety training and quality control; and 
c. Stricter enforcement of existing regulations. 
• Question G.7: 
How do you perceive the degree of regulation of the shipping industry? 
Summary of responses: 
a. 	 Eleven of the twelve respondents thought the shipping industry was 
already sufficiently regulated 
b. 	 One respondent thought the industry was over regulated; and 
c. 	 One respondent thought the industry was under regulated. 
• Question H.1. 
What do you believe are the two most significant potential hazards to safety 
in the shipping industry? 
Summary of responses: 
Although couched in different terms, one theme was common to the 
responses of all interviewees: too Iowa standard of education and training. 
From the forgoing it is apparent that the respondents across both the cultural and 
managerial divides in each company were of the opinion that the shipping industry 
is already sufficiently regulated and what is required to improve overall safety 
standards in the industry is greater emphasis on education and training. 
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13.8 SUMMARY 
In this chapter operational safety was examined, firstly from a quantitative aspect 
by examining the accident statistics of both companies, and secondly from a 
qualitative aspect by examining each company's: 
• Documented systems of management; and 
• Salient human aspects, particularly employees' perceptions regarding safety 
and company training and employment policies. 
The chapter commenced with a review of each company's safety management 
system. Both had elected to use a closed cycle SMS as described in Chapter V 
section 5.3.2 and the SMS of both companies comprised a comprehensive 
documented system in a tiered format under three heads: 
• Company Policies 
• Company Procedures 
• Company Forms 
Where the two company's systems were completely different was in their 
approach to maintenance of the vessels. Although each company had a Planned 
Maintenance System, Company A operated a computer based system that put the 
onus of all operational maintenance on ships' staff whereas Company B had a 
documentary system that charged shore-based staff with the responsibility for all 
maintenance other than routine checks. 
An examination of each company's accident reporting and follow-up procedures 
was followed by a comparison of their accident statistics, which were seen to be 
somewhat similar and much better than the average for the industry sector. 
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Finally, the training and employment policies of both companies were reviewed '! 
and a connection between the two policies was established. Although the 
differences between the training policies employed by the two companies was 
quite distinct, the key interview responses indicated that all interviewees were 
agreed that raising the standards of education and training was the key to 
improving standards of safety in the shipping industry world wide. 
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CHAPTER XIV 
CASE STUDY: PHASE THREE 

BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY 

14.1 THE APPROACH 

Analysis of behavioural safety at level 5 of the safety hierarchy involved 
comparison of the psychological and cultural dimensions of the seafarers engaged 
to crew the vessels in the fleets of the two case study companies. 
Both quantitative and qualitative techniques were used to gather the information 
necessary to make the comparison. The former involved distribution of a two-part 
questionnaire-style survey amongst representative samples of British and Filipino 
seafarers to measure the locus of control orientation, rank, experience, and 
professional and academic qualifications of the respondents. The latter involved 
visiting ships, observing their overall condition and holding relational conversations 
with crewmembers to gain an impression of how they viewed the introduction of 
the ISM Code. 
The results of these two modes of enquiry are examined in this chapter. Firstly, 
the responses to the questionnaires are examined statistically to identify any 
significant differences or correlations between the two samples. Secondly, an 
illustrative account is given of the salient points noted during the relational 
conversations and observations carried out on board the ships 
200 
- .... 
14.2 THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questionnaire. a copy of which is appended as Annex E, comprised two parts. 
The first part contained several questions of fact used to establish each 
respondent's rank, experience, professional qualifications and academic 
qualifications. 
The second part consisted of a psychometric test designed to establish each 
respondent's locus of control orientation (LOC). This part of the questionnaire 
contained twenty-nine pairs of statements based on Rotter's inventory with the 
wording slightly modified to lend an overall maritime flavour to the questionnaire. 
Respondents were asked to select the one statement in each pair that best 
described their feelings. Of the twenty-nine pairs of statements twenty-three 
contained choices with an internal/external bias and the other six were filler 
statements, one of which was used to gauge each respondent's feelings about the 
increasingly high degree of safety regulation now in force in the shipping industry. 
14.3 QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE ANAL YSfS 
? 
The questionnaire responses were first tabulated using Microsoft Excel software 
and the datasets produced (see Annex F) were then subjected to statistical 
analysis with the analytical platform provided by an integrated SAS computer 
package. 
The output of each test was entered into a new data file creating a new dataset 
that was refreshed by adding the probabilities for each test. A final test was then 
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run and the resulting dataset exported to an Excel file for presentation in the 
format used for the statistical tables below. 
Because the population distribution of the samples could not be assumed to be 
normal and the data produced by the questionnaire responses involved 
predominantly category data and ranked data, the statistical analysis involved the 
use of non-parametric tests. The tests fell into three categories: 
• Tests of differences between groups (independent samples); 
• Tests of differences between variables (dependent samples); 
• Tests of relationships between variables. 
In each category the following non-parametric methods were used for computer 
modelling and subsequent analysis: 
• 	 Tests of differences between groups: 
Mann-Whitney U Test for independent samples; 
Kruskal-Wallis analysis of ranks for multiple groups. 
• 	 Tests of differences between dependent groups: 
Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test to compare two variables 
measured in the same sample; 
Chi-square test for variables of a dichotomous nature 
• Tests 	 for relationships between variables that were categorical in 
nature: 
Chi-square test for the relationships between the variables; 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients to express those 
relationships. 
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The analysis enabled a picture to be built up of how the samples of Filipino and 
British seafarers differed. Firstly, correlations were examined, both overall and 
then for each nationality. Secondly, the two samples were compared to see if 
there were any significant differences between the nationalities using the 
measured variables. Thirdly, analysis was carried out on the component parts of 
the questionnaire to detect any unusual differences between the groups. 
14.4 BASIC STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
Basic statistics and correlation matrices are presented below together with 
descriptive analysis of the results. 
14.4.1 Statistics and Correlations (Combined Samples) 
StdVariable N Mean Median Minimum MaximumDev 
LOC Index 60 34.06 17.37 30.43 4.35 82.61 
Rank 60 2.75 1.27 3.00 1.00 5.00 
Experience 60 4.52 1.17 5.00 2.00 6.00 
Professional 60 4.12 2.18 3.00 1.00 9.00Qualifications 
Academic 60 3.85 0.88 4.00 1.00 5.00Qualifications 
TABLE 14: BASIC STATISTICS (COMBINED SAMPLES) 
Table 14 above provides a picture of the measured variables of the combined 
samples overall. 
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Spearman Correlation Coefficients, N =60 

Prob> Irl under HO: Rho=O 

LOC 
Index Rank Experience 
Professional 
Qualifications 
Academic 
Qualifications 
LOC Index 1 -0.06325 0.03799 -0.08815 -0.18662 
p 0.6312 0.7732 0.503 0.1534 
Rank -0.06325 0.35927 0.92981 0.48028 
1 
P 0.6312 0.0048 <.0001 0.0001 
Experience 0.03799 0.35927 
1 
0.29615 -0.19434 
P 0.7732 0.0048 0.0216 0.1368 
Professional 
Qualifications -0.08815 0.92981 0.29615 1 
0.49258 
p 0.503 <.0001 0.0216 <.0001 
Academic 
Qualifications -0.18662 0.48028 -0.19434 0.49258 1 
p 0.1534 0.0001 0.1368 <.0001 
TABLE 15: STATISTICAL CORRELATIONS (COMBINED SAMPLES) 
Table 15 presents the results of analysis of the basic statistics contained in Table 
14. From Table 15 none of the variables is significantly correlated with the LOC 
Index. However, rank is significantly correlated with: 
• experience (p =.0048); 
• professional qualifications (p < .0001); and 
• academic qualifications (p = .0001). 
Also, experience is significantly correlated with professional qualifications (p = 
.0216) and academic qualifications are significantly correlated with professional 
qualifications (p < .0001). However, academic qualifications are not correlated 
with experience (p = .1368). 
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14.4.2 Statistics and Correlations (British Seafarers) 
StdVariable N Mean Median Minimum MaximumDev 
LOC Index 30 39.28 19.32 41.31 4.35 82.61 
Rank 30 3.03 1.38 3.00 1.00 5.00 
Experience 30 4.90 1.09 5.00 3.00 6.00 
Professional 30 4.83 2.35 6.00 2.00 9.00Qualifications 
Academic 30 3.60 1.10 4.00 1.00 5.00Qualifications 
TABLE 16: BASIC STATISTICS (BRITISH SAMPLE) 
Table 16 above gives a picture of the measured variables of the samples of British 
seafarers. 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients, N =30 

Prob > IrJ under HO: Rho=O 

LOC Professional AcademicRank ExperienceIndex Qualifications Qualifications 
LOC Index -0.22687 -0.12186 -0.26845 -0.215091 
P 0.228 0.5212 0.1515 0.2537 
Rank -0.22687 0.06318 0.92568 0.78709 
1 
P 0.228 0.7401 <.0001 <.0001 
Experience -0.12186 0.06318 -0.02066 -0.255811 
P 0.5212 0.7401 0.9137 0.1724 
Professional 
-0.26845 0.92568 -0.02066 0.76217Qualifications 1 

p 
 0.1515 <.0001 0.9137 <.0001 
Academic 
-0.21509 0.78709 -0.25581 0.76217Qualifications 1 
p 0.2537 <.0001 0.1724 <.0001 
TABLE 17: STATISTICAL CORRELATIONS (BRITISH SAMPLE) 
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From Table 17 it is evident that, as with the combined sample, none of the 
variables in the sample of British seafarers is significantly correlated with the LOC 
Index. 
However, unlike the overall sample, rank and experience are also not significantly 
correlated although academic qualifications are significantly correlated with 
professional qualifications. This may be indicative of the practice in the British 
Merchant Navy of training school leavers as officer cadets rather than ratings 
working their way up from the lower ranks to become officers. 
In the British system, young people entering the shipping industry as officer cadets 
must have attained a stipulated minimum academic standard. They then undergo 
training for further academic awards as well as professional certificates. 
14.4.3 Statistics and Correlations (Filipino Seafarers) 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
LOC Index 30 28.84 13.57 30.43 4.35 60.87 
Rank 30 2.47 1.11 2.50 1.00 5.00 
Experience 30 4.13 1.14 4.00 2.00 6.00 
Professional 30 3.40 1.75 3.00 1.00 8.00Qualifications 
Academic 5.0030 4.10 0.48 4.00 3.00Qualifications 
TABLE 18: BASIC STATISTICS (FILIPINO SAMPLE) 
Table 18 above provides a picture of the measured variables of the samples of 
Filipino seafarers. 
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Spearman Correlation Coefficients, N = 30 
Prob> Irl under HO: Rho=O 
LOC Professional AcademicRank ExperienceIndex 	 Qualifications Qualifications 
1 LOC Index -0.06163 0.05314 -0.07789 -0.11635 
1 
P 0.7463 0.7803 0.6824 0.5404 
Rank -0.06163 	 0.69438 0.87957 0.09921 
1 
P 0.7463 <.0001 <.0001 0.6019 
Experience 0.05314 0.69438 0.57151 -0.03765 
1 
0.7803 <.0001 0.001 0.8434P 
Professional 
-0.07789 0.87957 0.57151 	 0.25087Qualifications 1 
p 0.6824 <.0001 0.001 0.1812 
Academic 
-0.11635 0.09921 -0.03765 0.25087Qualifications 1 
p 0.5404 0.6019 0.8434 0.1812 
TABLE 19: STATISTICAL CORRELATIONS (FILIPINO SAMPLE) 
In Table 19, as with the previous two samples, none of the variables is significantly 
correlated with the LOC Index. 
However, unlike the sample of British seafarers, rank and experience are highly 
,/ 	
correlated (p < .0001) amongst the sample of Filipino seafarers. Also of note is 
that there is no significant link between the attainment of professional 
qualifications and academic qualifications (p =.1812). 
This may be a reflection of a culture of moving up the ranks. Contrary to the 
practice in the British Merchant Navy, it is quite usual for Filipino seafarers 
employed in the Offshore sector of the shipping industry to work their way up the 
ranks over the years they are employed. 
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14.5 MANN-WHITNEY U TEST 
To test the differences between the samples of British and Filipino seafarers the 
Mann-Whitney U Test was used rather than its parametric counterpart for reasons 
listed earlier in section 14.3. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 20: 
Observed Variable British Mean 
Filipino 
Mean 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
Rank 3.03 2.47 0.0804 
Experience 4.90 4.13 0.0146 
Professional 4.83 3.40 0.0284 
Qualifications 
Academic 3.60 4.10 0.0776 
Qualifications 
Loc Index 39.28 28.84 0.0452 
TABLE 20: SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SAMPLES 
All the comparisons are either significant or close to being statistically significant, 
but the most surprising fact is that British seafarers have a significantly higher 
Locus of Control Index than Filipino seafarers (39.28 vs. 28.84) (p =.0452). The 
greater the LOC Index the more external the LOC orientation and the lower the 
LOC Index the more internal the LOC orientation. From the analysis therefore, 
Filipino seafarers are significantly more internally oriented than British seafarers. 
This finding is contrary to that anticipated from the literature review, specifically 
Chapter VI section 6.3.1 where it was argued the general consensus of opinion 
was that a significant positive correlation exists between individualism and internal 
locus of control, from which it could be assumed that British seafarers would have 
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a more internal LOC orientation than Filipino seafarers, the former belonging to a t 
! 
more individualistic society than the latter. 
With regard to the other observed variables in Table 20, although Filipino 
seafarers have higher levels of academic qualifications than British seafarers the 
r 
difference is not statistically significant (p = .0776). Similarly, although British 
seafarers have a slightly higher mean rank than the Filipino seafarers, the 
difference is not statistically significant (p =.0804). These differences may simply 
reflect the make-up of the two samples, the populations of which were randomly 
I. 
f selected. This may also account for British seafarers having a higher level of 
l 
l professional qualifications than Filipino seafarers (p = .0284), higher ranksl ( 
requiring higher levels of professional qualifications. 
Although random selection of the sample populations may have a bearing on the 
fact that the British seafarers are more experienced than Filipino seafarers (p = 
.0146), this difference may also reflect a demographic difference between the two 
groups, British seafarers having a high age profile (NUMAST 2004). 
l 
14.6 COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
To detect any unusual differences between the two groups of seafarers at the level 
of the individual components that comprise the LOC questionnaire, the responses 
to the individual alternatives were tested. A Chi-square analysis was made of the
,f 
cross tabulated frequencies of each selected altemative compared to the expected 
freq uencies. The cumulative difference over all the cells in the cross tabulation 
was then used to identify whether there were any significant differences. 
",
I 
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To compensate for the increased probability of making Type I errors due to the 
r sheer number of repeated comparisons, a Bonferroni adjustment (Hsu, 1996) was 
f applied. To keep the overall error rate to an acceptable level of 5% the 0.- level of 
l 0.05 was divided by the number of measured responses (twenty three) so that for 
anyone comparison to be considered significant the obtained p-value would have r 
1 to be less than 0.002174. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 21. 
BonferroniChi- Test AdjustedTable Square SignificanceProbability SignificanceValue 
r 
Level 
Table a2 * Nationality 3.930567 0.04742 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a3 * Nationality 0.111317 0.73865 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a4 * Nationality 1.066667 0.30170 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table as * Nationality 8.07564 0.00449 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a6 * Nationality 0.130719 0.71769 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a7 * Nationality 0.826967 0.36315 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a9 * Nationality 2.013932 0.15586 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a10 * Nationality 4.285714 0.03843 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a11 * Nationality 1.490683 0.22211 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a12 * Nationality 5.454545 0.01952 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a13 * Nationality 0.218182 0.64043 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a15 * Nationality 0 1.00000 0.002174 Not Significant 
r Table a16 * Nationality 6.444444 0.01113 0.002174 Not Significant 
r Table a17 * Nationality 4.419048 0.03554 0.002174 Not Significant 
r Table a18 * Nationality 1.380952 0.23994 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a20 * Nationality 0.174212 0.67640 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a21 * Nationality 0.953841 0.32874 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a22 * Nationality 22.5 <0.00001 0.002174 Significant 
Table a23 * Nationality 1.023479 0.31170 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a25 * Nationality 0.74359 0.38851 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a26 * Nationality 0.066741 0.79614 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a28 * Nationality 1.001855 0.31686 0.002174 Not Significant 
Table a29 * Nationality 0.296182 0.58629 0.002174 Not Significant 
TABLE 21: COMPONENT QUESTIONS RESPONSE ANALYSIS BY NATIONALITY 
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The only difference found at the Bonferroni adjusted significance level of 0.002174 
was in the responses to alternative 22 where the choice of responses was 
between: 
With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption; and 
It is difficult for people to have much control over things politicians do in 
office. 
The response frequencies are shown in Table 22 below, from which it is evident 
that there is a striking difference between the number of Filipinos that think they 
can work together to wipe out political corruption and the few British seafarers of 
like mind. 
Table of responses to a.22 by Nationality 
Nationality
a22(a22) 
British Filipino 
Total 
With enough effort we 
can wipe out political 9 27 36 
corruption 
It is difficult for people 
to have much control 
over the things 21 3 24 
politicians do in office 
Total 30 30 60 
TABLE 22: RESPONSES TO ALTERNATIVE CHOICE 22 
Also of interest was the perfect correlation between the samples in the responses 
to alternative 15 which, as shown in Table 23, indicated there was absolutely no 
difference between the sample groups in the belief that luck has nothing to do with 
getting what they want. 
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Table of responses to a.15 by Nationality 
Nationality
a15(a15) 
British Filipino 
Total 
In my case, getting what 
I want has little or 26 26 52 
nothing to do with luck 
Many times we might 
just as well decide what 
to do by flipping a coin 4 4 8 
Total 30 30 60 
TABLE 23: RESPONSES TO ALTERNATIVE CHOICE 15 
This may be an area where, due to their occupation, seafarers hold common 
beliefs and values regardless of their national cultures. 
14.7 CHRONOLOGICAL CORRELATION 
In Chapter VI section 6.3.1 it was deliberated whether or not by measuring the 
locus of control of individuals and comparing it with their educational attainments, 
cultural backgrounds and work roles it might be possible to discern whether or not 
locus of control has situational and chronological aspects, moving from external to 
internal as people gain knowledge and experience or gain promotion, i.e. as they 
gain greater control over their lives. 
From the foregoing analysis it does at first appear that such a connection might be 
made from taking the correlation of rank and experience of the two samples and 
comparing that with the LOC index. 
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For British seafarers the overall correlations of rank and experience are not 
significantly correlated: [/p=/ 0.7401] and the mean LOC index is 39.28. 
For Filipino seafarers rank and experience are highly correlated: [/p/<.0001] and 
the mean LOC index is 28.84. 
The LOC Index scale is such that the higher the Index score the more external the 
orientation and the lower the Index score the more internal the orientation. 
It is tempting to infer therefore that the greater the correlation of rank and 
experience the lower will be the LOC index and correspondingly more internal the 
locus of control orientation, thus confirming the hypothesis that locus of control has 
situational and chronological aspects. Intuitively it seems logical that as people 
progress through life and gain increased knowledge, more skills and greater 
control over their lives then their locus of control orientation would tend to move 
from external to internal. 
However, this is an area of some uncertainty. Whilst there is a statistically 
significant difference between the LOC scores of Filipino and British seafarers, this 
difference cannot be definitely attributed to rank or experience. There is a 
possibility that it is, but there is insufficient data to support that theory. 
In terms of correlation, variable A can be correlated to variable B and variable A 
can be correlated to variable C. However, without very strong correlations or lots 
of observations it is perfectly possible that variables Band C may not be 
Significantly correlated. 
This is generally a feature of small datasets due to the fact that a few unusual 
observations have a much larger influence on a statistical test. With a large 
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dataset the background noise loses its influence. A much larger sample normally 
removes all these inconsistencies. However, even then correlation should not be 
mistaken for causation. 
On reflection, without completing a large empirical study it would not be possible to 
say that a higher rank or greater level of experience would cause a lower LOC. 
Even then, if there was a significant correlation some additional testing in the field 
would need to be carried out to establish a positive link determining cause and 
effect. This would be a fruitful field for further research. 
Meanwhile, the most positive assumption that can be made from the present 
statistical analysis is that it provides tenuous evidence of a link between LOC and 
experience thus providing some weight to the argument for greater emphasis on 
education and training as a means of developing internal motivational cognition in 
emergency situations. 
14.8 RELATIONAL DISCUSSIONS AND OBSERVATION 
Statistical analysis of the responses to the questionnaire-style survey of two 
samples of seafarers, one from each cultural group, was one of two methods used 
in the third stage of the empirical research. The other method was qualitative, 
comprising documentary review, relational discussions and observation. 
Considering that the seafarers employed by the two case study companies were 
t from two completely different cultural backgrounds, it is surprising how similar their 
f attitudes were to various operational matters as illustrated in the following
I vignettes. 
t 
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14.8.1 Customer Satisfaction 
Both the Filipino seafarers and the British seafarers felt that it was their duty to 
ensure that the end-user of their vessels' services, whether a time charterer, 
voyage charterer or, cargo receiver, was satisfied with the performance of the 
vessel and its crew. Sometimes the desire to keep the customer happy was so 
strong that safety became a secondary consideration. Two examples will help to 
illustrate this point. 
The first example concerns a Company A offshore supply vessel with a Filipino 
Master and Chief Mate. The remainder of the crew comprised Filipinos and 
Indonesians. The vessel loaded a cargo of diesel oil, fresh water and pipes in a 
port on the east coast of Malaysia to take to an oil rig 150 miles offshore. The 
voyage from the port to the oil rig would take approximately 14 hours. 
Just before the vessel reached the rig however, instructions were received to 
return to port and offload the cargo. The Master turned the vessel around and 
started to return to port. The weather was moderate to rough and seas were 
breaking over the vessel's decks. Two hours later the vessel lost all power and 
was floundering with no motive power at night, in a shipping lane for several hours 
before the Chief Engineer managed to restart the generators and engines. 
Subsequent investigation showed that having first loaded a part cargo of diesel oil 
and fresh water in designated tanks, the vessel then began taking on board a deck 
cargo of pipes. Charterers wanted to load as many pipes as possible for delivery 
to the oil rig and in order to please the charterers the Master took on board so 
many pipes that his vessel was in fact overloaded, considerably reducing the 
freeboard. As a result, when the vessel left port and encountered choppy seas, 
f 
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water entered the vessel's bunker 'fuel tanks through vents on deck and eventually 
the water in the fuel caused the generators and main engine to splutter to a halt. 
In reviewing the case with the Master it became apparent that he believed he had 
acted reasonably in allowing his vessel to be overloaded because in his opinion it 
was of the utmost importance both to avoid confrontation and to please the clients 
in their dual role of charterer and customer. 
The second example concerns a number of potential collisions by Company B 
vessels with oil rigs and production platforms in the North Sea. Reports of such 
hazardous occurrences were not infrequently submitted by British Masters of 
North Sea vessels and subsequent investigation found that in many cases the root 
cause of the incidents was the Master's desire to please the charterer by loading 
or offloading cargo in circumstances such as bad weather when he should in fact 
have refused to work cargo at all. 
It could be argued that the first incident was an example of two of Hofstede's 
(1991) cultural dimensions, power-distance and uncertainty avoidance, influencing 
the Master's judgement. However, that would not account for the reported 
hazardous occurrences in the North Sea. It is more likely that in both cases the 
Masters were either overconfident in their abilities or lacked sufficient knowledge 
or experience to recognise the hazards confronting them. 
I, 
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I 14.8.2 Exercising a Master's Overriding Authority 
The ISM Code makes it very clear, as does the SMS of each case study company, 
that in circumstances where a decision has to be made concerning the safety of a 
, vessel or her crew the Master has overriding authority. But the exercise of 
t 
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authority is invariably accompanied by responsibility and exercising overriding ! 

! 
r authority implies taking ultimate responsibility for one's decisions. 

~ 
I 
, Therefore, whilst cultural factors may to some extent influence decisions made 
concerning the safety of a vessel and her crew, it is more likely that pragmatic 
considerations and public reaction will playa greater part in the decision-making 
process, as illustrated by the following further two examples. 
The first concerns a production platform located offshore Vietnam, a developing 
I country where public pressure to raise safety standards is not significant. The j physical location of the particular production platform and the position of its crane 
f
, 	 used for transferring cargoes to and from supply boats were such that the supply 
boats had to work against the current and, dependant upon the time of day, 
sometimes against the tide also. Several hazardous occurrences were reported 
and two actual collisions with the platform were recorded. 
Several Filipino Masters had discussed with various European Offshore 
! 	 Installation Managers (aiMs) on the platform the dangers posed by the current, 
the tide and the crane location but were told that there was nothing that could be 
done. Reluctance on the part of the Filipino Masters to argue the case was 
understandable not only because of their cultural preference to avoid confrontation 
but also because of a perceived lack of support from shore-based management 
coupled with public indifference. The Masters knew that such operations had 
previously been carried out without mishap and realised that refusal on their part 
to service the platform would very quickly have led to cancellation of the vessel's 
contract and another company taking it over with subsequent loss of their jobs. 
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They knew also that in the event of an accident there would be no public outcry in 
a country with a centrally controlled economy and a government controlled media. 
The second example concerns a supply boat operation to a production platform in 
the North Sea, and serves to illustrate how in Northern Europe public perception of 
the hazards of oil and gas production, heightened by the Piper Alpha disaster, 
requires operators of offshore installations to take into consideration public 
reaction should an accident occur due to unacceptable risk-taking. 
During a relational discussion, the British Master of a 3,860 horsepower supply 
boat was asked whether he felt his vessel was sufficiently powered for North Sea 
operations, especially if he were to find himself in a difficult situation. His 
response was that his vessel was sufficiently powered because one should not 
allow oneself to get into a difficult situation in the first place. By way of support for 
his argument he pointed out that Parenco (the company now operating many of 
the former BP marginal platforms in the North Sea) had agreed that as a measure 
to reduce the risk of accidents supply boats would not be required to do up-tide or 
weather-side operations. 
Most OIMs and many other staff on offshore installations have worked in various 
different areas of the world and ultimately the safety criteria are similar wherever 
the offshore installations are located. It is arguable therefore that the difference 
between the attitudes of the Masters of the supply boats in the South China Sea 
and the North Sea, and also the difference between the attitudes of the OIMs on 
platforms in the South China Sea offshore Vietnam and the OIMs on platforms in 
the North Sea offshore UK, was due not to the influence of the prevailing cultures 
but to the influence of the media and public pressure. 
L. 
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14.8.3 Condition of Vessels 
: . 	 Several vessels of each case study company were visited on a completely random 
basis dependent upon their availability. Some were visited in shipyards whilst 
undergoing repairs and others were visited during operational port turnarounds. 
The majority of vessels operated by both companies and all of the vessels visited 
were between twenty and thirty years of age, which is quite old in shipping terms. 
However, from observation it was apparent that the vessels visited were all well 
maintained. This was substantiated by inspection of documentary records which 
showed that all the vessels were in Class with reputable Classification Societies 
and had current trading certificates including Safety Management Certificates. 
From observation and relational conversations it was also established that all of 
the vessels had at least the required minimum safety equipment and many of the 
vessels actually carried safety equipment over and above the required minimum. 
The standard of operational maintenance and overall appearance of the vessels 
depended upon a number of considerations: e.g. whether the vessel was in a 
shipyard or in port at the time of the inspection; whether it had been operating on 
safety stand-by or carrying out anchor handling duties; whether the vessel had 
been operating in heavy seas which precluded painting and similar maintenance 
work or whether it had been sailing in calm water. Overall however, the vessels 
were all found in an acceptable condition and there was no significant difference 
between the observed standards of operational maintenance or overall 
appearance of either company's vessels. The different economic circumstances 
of the case study companies were not reflected in the standard of vessel 
maintenance. 
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14.8.4 Response to Increased Emphasis on Safety 
In relational discussions with seagoing staff most expressed the view that 
improving safety at sea was a laudable objective and this feeling was 
substantiated by a response to one of the alternate choice statements in the 
questionnaire distributed to both sample groups of seafarers. 
The questionnaire contained six pairs of alternate choice statements that were not 
relevant to the main objective of measuring each respondent's locus of control. 
However, one of them was relevant to the general perception of seafarers to the 
increasing emphasis on safety in shipping operations. Alternate choice statement 
number 27 asked respondents to choose between the following options: 
a. There is too much emphasis on safety on board ships nowadays; 
b. Emphasising safety on board ship helps to develop a team spirit. 
Of the sixty respondents a total of four declined to respond, eight selected option 
(a) and forty-eight, Le. 80%, selected option (b). 
The general feeling expressed during relational conversations with Masters and 
Chief Engineers was summed up by the Master of a North Sea supply boat who 
said that the introduction of the ISM Code was a good thing insofar as it requires 
not only procedures but also authorities to be documented, that it has undoubtedly 
helped to improve safety standards, but the system needs to be refined to reduce 
paperwork. 
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14.9 SUMMARY 
The research format described in this chapter was both quantitative and qualitative 
in nature and focused on the seafarers employed by the two case study 
companies. 
14.9.1 Findings of Quantitative Research 
Statistical analysis of the responses to a questionnaire distributed amongst two 
representative samples of the seagoing personnel employed in each company 
found that: 
• 	 LOC index was not significantly correlated to any of the variables; 
• 	 Rank and experience were not significantly correlated in the case of 
British seafarers but were highly correlated in the case of Filipino 
seafarers. This may be a reflection of the difference between the 
traditional officer training methods between the two sample groups. 
• 	 Filipino seafarers had a lower LOC index (Le. greater internal 
orientation) than the British seafarers, who had a greater external 
orientation. This finding together with the correlations of rank and 
experience in each sample group may indicate that locus of control has 
chronological aspects such that as people progress through life and 
gain increased knowledge, more skills and greater control over their 
lives then their locus of control would tend to move from external to 
internal. However, there is insufficient data to confirm the theory and 
more research would need to be done in this area to establish a 
positive link. 
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• 	 A Chi-square analysis of the cross-tabulation frequencies of each pair 
of selected alternative responses to the questionnaire compared to the 
expected frequencies detected only two unusual results: 
Firstly, the Filipino seafarers were more certain than the British that 
they could work together to wipe out political corruption, which may 
reflect the difference between their LOC indices or simply the 
different political systems in their home countries. 
Secondly, both groups were strongly convinced that luck had little 
or nothing to do with getting what they want. This may indicate that 
due to their occupation seafarers hold some common beliefs and 
values regardless of their national cultures. 
14.9.2 Findings of Qualitative Research 
From documentary review and key informant interviews supplemented by 
relational conversations and observation, some vignettes were used to illustrate 
that what could be interpreted on one hand as the influence of cultural dimensions 
could also be interpreted on the other hand as a lack of knowledge or experience 
Vignettes were also used to illustrate that a Master's willingness to exercise his 
over-riding authority in cases where the safety of a vessel or its crew might be 
compromised could be interpreted as being culturally influenced on the one hand 
or pragmatically driven on the other hand. 
'Ii 
,
, Vessels of both companies were visited and seen to be well maintained and well 
equipped. The vessels were all in Class and showed no signs of suffering from a 
lack of maintenance or equipment as a result of economic restrictions. 
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The crews generally expressed their approval and acceptance of the increasing 
emphasis on improving safety standards at sea and this was supported by the 
'filler' alternative choice No.2? in the LOC Questionnaire. 
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CHAPTER XV 
CASE STUDY: A REVIEW AND SUMMARY 
This chapter comprises a brief synopsis of the findings from each area in which 
research was undertaken, firstly into the structure of the two case study companies 
(section 15.1 below) followed by safety management at levels 3, 4 and 5 of the 
safety hierarchy (sections 15.2, 15.3 and 15.4 below). The information from each 
area of research is then used to construct a table showing the strengths and 
weakness of the safety culture components of each case study company and hence 
provide a comparative measure of the safety climate of the two companies. 
15.1 THE COMPANIES 
Chapter XI compared and contrasted the two companies in which the empirical 
research was carried out. The companies had similar corporate structures but 
operated in culturally different contexts and with different financial pressures. 
Company A was a financially heavily leveraged company that operated offshore 
support vessels in the Middle East and South East Asia, whilst Company B was a 
cash-rich company that operated offshore support vessels in the North Sea. 
The corporate safety culture of each company had developed differently due to 
their different corporate histories. Company A had consciously developed the 
strong points of the safety cultures of companies it had taken over whilst Company 
B retained a safety culture that reflected the values of the company taken over by 
Corporation B Holdings Inc and now operating as Company B. 
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15.2 ORGANISATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
Chapter XII examined in turn each of the constraints and pressures identified at 
Safety Level 3 of the ISM Code model (fig. 10). 
Research at this phase of the case study determined that whilst constraints and 
pressures resulting from legal and moral obligations, economic considerations and 
organisational and cultural norms impact upon organisational safety management, 
they can be suitably dealt with by good strategic and organisational management 
using standard management techniques, which in a culturally homogenous 
company may be of an indigenous nature but in a culturally heterogeneous 
company require the addition of well developed cross-cultural management skills. 
The possibility of correlation between an individual's locus of control and job 
function was identified as an area where future management research might 
usefully be undertaken. 
15.3 OPERATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
Chapter XIII examined operational safety, firstly from a quantitative aspect by 
examining the accident statistics of both companies, and secondly from a 
qualitative aspect by examining each company's: 
• Documented systems of management; and 
• Salient human aspects, particularly employees' perceptions regarding safety 
and company training and employment policies. 
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Comparison of each company's accident statistics showed them to be somewhat 
similar and much better than the average for the industry sector. 
Both companies had elected to develop and implement a closed-cycle SMS and 
the two systems were similar in format and content. Where the systems differed 
was in their approach to maintenance of the vessels. Although each company had 
a Planned Maintenance System, Company A operated a computer based system 
that put the onus of all operational maintenance on ships' staff whereas Company 
B had a documentary system that charged shore-based staff with the responsibility 
for all maintenance other than routine checks. 
Finally, a review of both companies' training and employment policies established 
that the former was dependant upon the latter. Whilst the differences between the 
policies employed by the two companies were quite distinct, the importance of 
those policies was not lost upon senior management. Analysis of the key 
interview responses indicated that all interviewees were agreed that raising the 
standards of education and training was the key to improving standards of safety 
in the shipping industry world wide. 
15.4 BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY 
The research format described in Chapter XIV was both quantitative and 
qualitative in nature and aimed at the seafarers employed by the two case study 
companies. 
226 
15.4.1 Results of Quantitative Research 
Firstly, a statistical analysis of the responses to a questionnaire distributed 
amongst two representative samples of the seagoing personnel employed in each 
company found that: 
• 	 LOC index was not significantly correlated to any of the variables; 
• 	 Rank and experience were not significantly correlated in the case of 
British seafarers but were highly correlated in the case of Filipino 
seafarers. This may be a reflection of the difference between the 
traditional officer training methods of the two sample groups. 
• 	 Filipino seafarers had a lower LOC index (Le. greater internal 
orientation) than the British seafarers, who had a greater external 
orientation. This finding together with correlations of rank and 
experience in each sample group may indicate that locus of control has 
chronological aspects such that as people progress through life and 
gain increased knowledge, more skills and greater control over their 
lives then their locus of control orientation would tend to move from 
external to internal. However, there is insufficient data to confirm the 
theory and more research would need to be done in this area to 
establish a. positive link. 
• 	 A Chi-square analysis was made of the cross-tabulation frequencies of 
each pair of selected alternative responses to the questionnaire 
compared to the expected frequencies. This detected only two unusual 
results. 
Firstly the Filipino seafarers were more certain than the British 
seafarers that they could work together to wipe out political 
corruption. This may be a reflection of the difference between 
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the groups' LOC indices or of the different political systems in 
their home countries. 
Secondly, both groups were strongly convinced that luck had 
little or nothing to do with getting what they want. This may be 
an indication that due to their occupation seafarers hold some 
common beliefs and values regardless of their national cultures. 
15.4.2 Results of Qualitative Research 
From documentary review and key informant interviews supplemented by 
relational conversations and observation, some vignettes were used to illustrate 
that what could be interpreted on one the hand as the influence of cultural 
dimensions could also be interpreted on the other hand as a lack of knowledge or 
experience. 
Vignettes were also used to illustrate that the Master's willingness to exercise his 
over-riding authority in cases where the safety of a vessel or its crew might be 
compromised could be interpreted as culturally influenced on the one hand or 
pragmatically driven on the other hand. 
Vessels of both companies were visited and seen to be well maintained and well 
equipped. The vessels were all in Class and showed no signs of suffering from a 
lack of maintenance or equipment as a result of economic restrictions. 
The crews generally expressed their approval and acceptance of the increasing 
emphasis on improving safety standards at sea. This was supported by the 'filler' 
alternative choice response to option No.27 in the LOC Questionnaire. 
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15.5 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CLIMATE 
As noted in Chapter V section 5.4, the most common method of evaluating the 
effectiveness of an organisation's SMS is recording accidents, lost time incidents 
and hazardous occurrences (ACNS', 1993). However, due to the quantitative 
nature of statistics they do not readily reflect either the maturity of a company's 
SMS or the effects of human influences on the application of the SMS. Other 
performance indicators must be selected to determine such qualitative issues. 
In Chapter V section 5.2.3, it was noted that safety climate is best measured by 
perceptual audit (Cooper, 2000) and in Chapter X Section 10.4.6 the following 
factors were identified as being necessary for the development of an organisational 
safety culture (Fleming 2001, ACSNI1993): 
• Senior Management Commitment; 
• Line Management Commitment; 
• Commercial Management Involvement; 

.. Operational Pressures versus Safety; 

.. Ship I Shore Safety Communications; 

.. Provision of Safety Resources; 

.. Employment Philosophy; 

.. Training Programmes; 

• Mutual Trust Between Seagoing and Shore Staff; 
• Shared Perceptions about Safety. 
These essential factors, most of which are highly value laden and hence potentially 
subject to cultural influences, were therefore examined during the empirical study 
and can be used to determine a company's relative safety maturity. Each factor is 
briefly summarised below. 
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15.5.1 Senior Management Commitment 
From the Key Informant Interviews, relational conversations, observation and 
document reviews, it was evident that the main strength of each company's safety 
profile was a sincere commitment by senior management to ensuring safe 
operation of its vessels. This was confirmed in relational conversations with the 
Corporate CEO of Corporation A International Inc (CEO A 2004) and the 
Corporate CEO of Corporation B Holdings Inc (CEO B, 2005). 
15.5.2 Line Management Commitment 
Whilst line management in both companies acknowledged the benefits of good 
safety management, their enthusiasm was tempered by the realities of 
implementing safety policies and ensuring that safe operating procedures were not 
only documented but also followed. 
From a review of Company A's accident statistics and analysis of the key 
informant interview responses it was evident that a new SMS had been effective in 
reducing accidents and that near-miss reporting was being carried out by sea staff. 
It was also clear from the key interview analysis and from relational conversations 
with a wide spectrum of Company A staff that the vast majority of employees felt 
that the industry was already sufficiently regulated and that whilst there should be 
stricter enforcement of the existing regulations the first priority was to place greater 
emphasis on both professional education and safety training. 
One discordant note was an initial perception, later reinforced from documentary 
review, that Company A's Operations Manager, although saying that he fully 
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supported the company's safety policies, was in reality less committed to 
improving the overall safety performance of the fleet by implementation of an 
effective SMS, preferring instead to deal with problems as they arose rather than 
take proactive measures to obviate the problems in the first place. He recognised 
perhaps that to develop and put in place preventative measures to decrease the 
possibility of hazards eventuating or to minimise the effects of their occurrence 
requires a substantial amount of hard and disciplined work in the first instance. 
Line management in Company B appeared to be fully supportive of the company's 
attempts to develop a safety culture within the organisation. It was evident 
however that line managers tended to identify with the corporate ethos that was 
formerly present in the company taken over by Corporation B Holdings Inc and 
now operating as Company B rather than with the corporate identity of the new 
parent company. 
However, training in ISM Code familiarity and internal auditing had resulted in line 
management having a common understanding of the need to not only develop and 
implement an effective SMS but also to ensure its acceptance by ships' staff and 
ensure continued improvement of the system. 
15.5.3 Commercial Management Commitment 
In the commercial departments of both case study companies the lack of safety 
training and only a passing acquaintance with operational risks was identified as a 
weakness in developing an overall safety culture. 
None of Company A's commercial managers had a seafaring background or 
specific training in marine chartering. This occasionally led to sUbstantial 
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expenditure being necessary to retrieve a situation that chartering managers had 
not foreseen. Absence of safety training and lack of operational awareness also 
led to a policy differential between the company's marine personnel department 
and the desire of senior operations personnel to improve the standard of ship's 
crews. 
During relational conversations two points of view were expressed that indicated 
an overall weakness in Company B's commercial management commitment to 
safety. 
The first was that although overall management commitment to safety was good 
there was a disconnect at local level insofar as the Area General Manager did not 
have a marine background and had greater concern for commercial matters than 
for safety matters. 
The second was that whilst interdepartmental and ship-shore safety 
communications were generally very good, the commercial department were 
'always ready to sell more than they have got' thus bringing additional pressures to 
bear on the operations staff. 
15.5.4 Operational Safety 
The difference in employment philosophies and consequently training programmes 
of the two companies had little effect on the accident statistics in the short term but 
might ultimately be expected to favour Company B in the longer term. 
The computerised Planned Maintenance System introduced by Company A 
initially met a lot of resistance from middle management and supervisory staff and 
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there were many hurdles to be overcome before the system could be fully 
implemented. By dint of perseverance and the application of suitable education 
and training programmes however, the system was eventually implemented and 
its effectiveness was reflected in a significant reduction in the number of days that 
vessels in the fleet were out of service for repair. 
The manual documentary Planned Maintenance System used by Company B was 
very basic and straightforward. It assumed little competence on the part of the 
seagoing personnel and required them to operate rather than maintain the 
vessels. All maintenance other than that of a simple nature was scheduled and 
undertaken by shore-based staff. The reason for this approach may have been 
due to the origins of the fleet, the background of which was the fishing industry. 
One area of interest noted during relational conversations with some Company B 
staff, both seagoing and shore-based, concerned flag State inspections. The SMS 
in Company B was audited by the Marine and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and one 
particular inspector whose cultural background was Pakistani was reportedly very 
difficult to deal with. It was felt by Company B staff, all of whom had British 
cultural backgrounds, that because of his cultural heritage the MCA inspector: 
" Lacked both discretion and flexibility in dealing with non-conformities; 
• Was unable to make a decision that might later be shown to be wrong. 
This is a classic example of Uncertainty Avoidance displayed by a person from a 
cultural environment with a high UAI (70 on Hofstede's scale) dealing with people 
from a cultural environment with a low UAI (35 on Hofstede's scale). 
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15.5.5 Safety Communications 
Both companies operated similar systems of reporting accidents and 
disseminating the information. There was a strong desire by senior management 
in both companies to ensure that accident reports were submitted as soon as 
possible after the occurrence of an incident. This was partly driven by a desire to 
receive the information from the vessel before hearing it from the client. 
Inspection of reports from vessels during the documentary review gave no 
indication of any reluctance on the part of either British or Filipino seafarers to 
report either accidents or hazardous occurrences. This supported the assurances 
given by shore-based management and supervisory staff during the key informant 
interviews. 
15.5.6 Safety Resources 
In both Company A and Company B the commitment of senior management to 
safety was reflected in the provision of resources. The budgets for safety items 
were both generous and extensive, covering all areas of the safety spectrum, 
including: 
• Provision of safety equipment on board vessels 
• Personal protective equipment for all personnel 
• Safety training 
• Monitoring and analysing accidents and near misses 
• Upgrading vessels to meet new industry regulations and standards. 
Nowhere was any evidence found in either company of economic considerations 
impacting upon the provision of safety resources 
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15.5.7 Employment Policy 
Whilst both companies sourced seagoing personnel through crewing agencies, 
those employed by Company B were virtually company employees because the 
parent company owned the crewing agency. Company A seagoing personnel on 
the other hand were effectively contract labour hired on a per voyage basis. 
Attempts made by Company A to engage Filipino officers on long-term contracts 
were unsuccessful. Ostensibly the Filipino officers preferred to work on short-term 
per voyage contracts so they were free to join another company at the end of each 
voyage. This may have been due to cultural factors, it may have demonstrated an 
independence of thought on the part of the Filipino seafarers or it may have been 
the result of an inherent distrust of shipping companies as employers. 
15.5.8 Training Programmes 
The difference in employment policies between the two companies was reflected 
in their training programmes. Whilst Company B had in place a structured training 
programme under the direction of a Training Officer, Company A carried out 
training on an ad hoc basis initiated by perceived needs. Although Company A 
had a generous training budget, the company was understandably reluctant to 
provide more than minimum training for staff who were reluctant to give long-term 
commitment to the company. 
15.5.9 Mutual Trust 
Generally speaking there was a high standard of mutual trust between the 
seafarers and shore-based staff in both companies, evidenced by the forthright 
reporting of hazardous incidents. 
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But that mutual trust was qualified in some areas, particularly with regard to 
machinery and vessel maintenance. In both companies the shore-based staff felt 
that the seafarers were not sufficiently knowledgeable or experienced to carry out 
more than basic maintenance. 
This was reflected in responses received during the key informant interviews when 
respondents were asked what they believed were the two most significant 
potential hazards to safety in the shipping industry. Although couched in different 
terms, one theme was common to the responses of all interviewees across both 
the cultural and managerial divides: too Iowa standard of education and training. 
15.5.10 Shared Perceptions of Safety 
Personnel who had attended training courses and seminars on the introduction 
and working of the ISM Code had very similar views concerning safety. Seafarers 
also had mandatory safety training and were therefore well versed in the 
objectives of the modern safety environment. 
Accidents still happen however, and a review of the incident reports in both case 
study companies determined that many of the incidents were due not to a lack of 
safety training but to a lack of either forethought or knowledge. This indicates the 
need for more extensive vocational and professional training to establish 
heightened safety awareness and correspondingly improved perceptions of safety. 
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15.6 RELATIVE SAFETY CLIMATE 

The foregoing summary of the findings of the empirical study carried out in the two 
case study companies provides a synopsis of what may be termed a perceptual 
audit of the two companies. 
As a means of measuring the safety climate of each company, and of each 
company relative to the other, the results of the perceptual audit have been used to 
construct a table indicating the strengths and weaknesses of each company in the 
various safety related areas of research. The tabulated results of the analysis 
provide: 
• 	 An indication of where each company needs to concentrate efforts to raise 
levels organisational safety; 
• 	 A comparison of the relative maturity of each safety culture element in both 
companies. 
A perceptual audit is a somewhat subjective means of measurement and hence is 
itself open to cultural influences. Therefore, to be as objective as possible in 
establishing the safety climate of both case study companies, each of the essential 
factors was examined in turn with evidence drawn from the four research techniques 
utilised in the study, interview, documentary review, relational discussion and 
observation, noting whether any culturally influenced risk factors prevailed and if so 
whether they exercised a positive or negative influence on safety organisation and 
performance. A strengths and weaknesses analysis was then carried out, each 
essential factor being reviewed and given a low, medium or high rating in 
accordance with the perceived efficacy of organisational safety in that area of 
research as shown in the Safety Climate Comparator at Table 24 below. 
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COMPANVA COMPANVB 
Rating Rating 
Essential Factor Low Med High Low I Med High 
Senior Management ~ ~ Commitment 
Line Management ~ ~ Commitment 
Commercial Management ~ ~ Involvement 
Operational ~ ~ Safety 
Ship/Shore Safety ~ ~ Communications 
Provision of Safety ~ ~ Resources 
Employment ~ ~ Philosophy 
Training ~ ~ Proqrammes 
Mutual Trust Between ~ ~ Seaqoinq and Shore Staff 
Shared Perceptions about ~ ~ Safety 
TABLE 24: SAFETY CLIMATE COMPARATOR 
Where an essential aspect has been given a high rating, then the applicable 
constraints and pressures identified in the ISM Code model as impacting upon that 
element have been suitably dealt with by standard management techniques, 
combined with suitable education and training and the application where necessary 
of good cross-cultural management skills. 
Conversely, where an essential aspect has been given a low rating then the 
applicable constraints and pressures identified in the ISM Code model have had a 
notable influence and remain to be suitably dealt with. 
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As noted in Chapter VII section 7.1, safety is a relative concept and the Safety 
Climate Comparator illustrated in Table 24 could be used to monitor improvements 
in a company's own safety climate by comparing periodic perceptual audits. 
Alternatively, by establishing a benchmark standard against which to measure a 
company's safety climate, the comparator could be used as a Relative Safety 
Culture Maturity Model (RSCMM) to measure the safety climate of other shipping 
companies. Unlike Fleming's draft Safety Culture Maturity Model examined in 
Chapter V section 5.4, the proposed model does not rely on organisations 
progressing through iterative stages, moving from one stage to the next only when 
the strengths and weakness of each stage have been built upon or removed 
respectively. The proposed model involves identifying by means of perceptual 
audit any areas of weakness in safety management relative to a benchmark 
standard so that appropriate remedial action can be taken. 
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CHAPTER XVI 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
In this final chapter, the aims and objectives of the study are restated and the 
means by which they were addressed and the extent to which they were achieved 
are summarised and reviewed. A discussion of the main findings of the study 
ensues, followed by a synopsis of the contribution the study has made to 
professional knowledge, the limitations of the study and areas identified in which 
further research might usefully be conducted 
16.1 ADDRESSING THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The aims and objectives of this study were: 
1. 	 To identify how the diversity of cultures impacts upon the implementation of 
safety regulations in the shipping industry; 
2. 	 To determine what obstacles that impact may present to the development 
of safe practices and attitudes within the industry; 
3. 	 To ascertain whether stricter enforcement of existing regulations or more 
emphasis on education and training is the better way to overcome those 
obstacles. 
The first two objectives were addressed by developing a model of the working of 
the ISM Code (Chapter IX, Figure 10) from which it was possible to focus the 
findings of the literature review to discover how various constraints and pressures 
impact upon the development and implementation of safety regulations at various 
levels throughout the shipping industry from governmental level to shipboard level. 
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Using the model in conjunction with the literature review it was possible to identify: 
• 	 Those constraints and pressures that are susceptible to cultural influences; 
• 	 The organisational level of safety management at which the constraints 
and pressures are to be found; and 
• 	 The effects of the cultural influences upon the constraints and pressures. 
Finally, during the empirical study evidence of the actual impact of the culturally 
influenced constraints and pressures were monitored in the case study companies 
and the organisational methods used to deal with the impact were identified. 
The third objective gave rise to the following alternative hypotheses: 
Hypothesis A: Cultural norms influence an individual's perceptions of safety. 
However, culture is learned and is not a static dimension. 
Therefore, by means of suitable education and training a common 
standard of safety can be achieved across a spectrum of individuals 
having diverse cultural norms. 
Hypothesis 8: Cultural norms influence an individual's perception of safety. 
Therefore, rigorous enforcement of common rules and regulations 
is necessary to achieve a common standard of safety across a 
spectrum of individuals having diverse cultural norms. 
The hypotheses were tested by means of an empirical study of two structurally 
similar but financially and culturally different shipping companies. Using Bayesian 
principles rather than a classical 'null hypothesis' approach, the study determined 
that the key to overcoming both cultural and economic obstacles, which might 
otherwise impede the development of a true safety culture in an organisation, is 
three-fold: 
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• Constraints and pressures resulting from legal and moral obligations, 
economic considerations and organisational and cultural norms that 
impact upon organisational safety management can be suitably dealt 
with by good strategic and organisational management using standard 
management techniques which in a culturally heterogeneous 
organisation require in addition the application of good cross-cultural 
management skills (Chapter XII section 12.9); 
.. 	 Training can be used effectively to develop a common understanding of 
safety and safety systems (Chapter XII section 12.5). However, safety 
training alone is not sufficient to develop a true safety culture and 
reduce accidents: that requires additional vocational and professional 
training (Chapter XIII section 13.8). 
• 	 A company's training policies cannot be considered in isolation since 
they are to a large extent dictated by the company's employment 
philosophy (Chapter XIII section 13.7). 
" 
16.2 DISCUSSION 
The study examined in depth the working of the ISM Code and the constraints and 
pressures that impact upon the development and implementation of a Safety 
Management System, in particular those constraints and pressures that may be 
influenced by cultural values and attitudes. 
Such constraints and pressures exist at all levels of safety management, but from 
the model developed of the working of the ISM Code it was evident that for the 
purposes of the current study the most benefit could be gained from carrying out 
empirical research at levels 3, 4 and 5 of the safety management hierarchy. 
,rr' 
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The empirical study highlighted the relevance and importance of effective education 
and training in raising safety standards. In particular: 
lID In Chapter XII, section 12.5, it was noted that of the twelve key informants 
Eight had attended identical training courses covering ISM 
familiarisation and auditor training, 
Two had attended in-house ISM introductory seminars, and 
Two were qualified lead auditors of management systems. 
The training had resulted in harmonisation of their safety perspectives. 
• 	 In Chapter XIII, section 13.2 computer training of seagoing personnel in 
Company A provided an example of how vocational training can be used to 
successfully overcome a specific safety-related problem. 
• 	 In Chapter XIII, section 13.7, a connection was established between training 
and employment policies, and it was noted that all twelve key interviewees 
were agreed that raising the standards of education and training was the key 
to improving standards of safety throughout the shipping industry. 
• 	 In Chapter XIV section 14.7, statistical analysis of seafarers' responses to 
the LOC questionnaire provided some evidence, albeit tenuous of a link 
between LOC and experience, thus lending some weight to the argument for 
greater emphasis on continuing education and training as a means of 
developing internal motivational cognition in emergency situations. 
The obligation to develop personnel by means of suitable education and training is 
supported by a series of actions brought in English courts of law (Trafford, 
November 2005) that have done much to identify and clarify the duty both of 
organisations and of individuals: 
• 	 To act in a safe manner and with an acceptable and predictable level of 
both competence and competency; and 
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• To not only hire competent staff and competent contractors but also to 
identify training needs and ensure that staff receive continuing 
developmental instruction in order to meet changing organisational needs 
and advances in technology. 
The 	duty includes a requirement for continuing instruction for all personnel
, 
including managers so that they understand the risks associated with existing 
r practices, keep abreast of risks in light of developing knowledge, and acquire the 
t' 
ability to raise safety standards by the application of the highest standards of 
safety management. Indeed, the requirement for continuing instruction is included 
in the ISM Code itself, the two most relevant Clauses of the Code in this respect 
being: 
CI.1.2.2 Safety management objectives of the Company should, inter alia: 
" 
.3 	 continuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore 
and aboard ships, including preparing for emergencies related both 
to safety and environmental protection. 
C1.6.5 	 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for 
identifying any training which may be required in support of the 
safety management system and ensure that such training is 
provided for all personnel concerned. 
Shipping companies that interpret Clause 6 as merely a lega! requirement to 
ensure that the seafarers it employs are properly qualified and in possession of the 
requisite certificates may have fulfilled their legal obligations. It is arguable 
however, that they have not fulfilled their moral obligation to interpret the Clause 
not only to the letter but within the spirit of the Code as argued in the thesis, 
particularly Chapters III, Vi and VII, sections 3.4, 6.8, 7.1 and 7.2 respectively. 
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Regulations and standards are by definition minimum requirements and must be 
adhered to. As evidenced in the case of the MN Eurasian Dream (Papera 
Traders v Hyundai Merchant Marine, 2002) if those minimum standards are not 
complied with then a ship may be rendered unseaworthy. In that particular case 
the judge found the ship to be unseaworthy and held that 'Lack of due diligence is 
negligence and in this case there were numerous failures and errors of judgement 
that amounted to professional negligence in respect of the provision of equipment, 
competent master and crew and adequate documentation'. 
But the spirit of the ISM Code is to introduce a genuine safety culture within the 
shipping industry and this implies training staff beyond the minimum stipulated 
requirements. Education and training provide the requisite knowledge and skills to 
undertake a particular task whilst experience guides the individual in the 
application of that knowledge and those skills. Without sufficient skills and 
experience individuals may be unable to correctly tackle tasks that should be 
within their capability. Simply to try and plug gaps in knowledge or skills on an 
industry wide basis by safety training alone is unlikely to achieve positive results. 
If when developing their corporate training programmes senior managers observe 
only the minimum requirements of the STCW and ISM Codes and also misguidedly 
substitute safety training for vocational training and professional development, that 
may cause the decision making of employees to be influenced by cognitive biases 
based upon outdated information or false premises, possibly leading to unsound 
judgements and subsequent unsafe actions or inactions. 
In order to make a sound deciSion, to be able to balance risk against reward, 
individuals must be in possession of appropriate knowledge, requisite skills and 
r' 
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sufficient experience to be able to evaluate a situation, understand the 
consequences of their actions or inactions, and subsequently exercise suitable 
judgement. Without the knowledge, skills and experience to undertake a particular 
task, potential hazards associated with that task may not be identified or the correct 
course of action may not be apparent to the individual concerned and the 
consequences of a wrong decision may be far reaching. 
For shipping companies to operate safely, their employees must be suitably 
educated, adequately trained and given sufficient opportunity to gain experience. 
This requires companies to ensure that people they employ are competent people 
and that continuing education and training are undertaken to keep them abreast of 
developments within their areas of expertise. It also requires the companies to 
provide employees with the opportunity to exercise newly acquired knowledge and 
skills in order to gain experience, for instance by developmental assignments. 
However, although localised decisions about providing training to address failures in 
operational safety can be made at level 3 of the safety management hierarchy, it is 
clear from the ISM Code model (figure 10) developed in Chapter IX, that even­
handed application and enforcement of the provisions of both the ISM Code and the 
STeW Code to achieve an industry wide safety culture and subsequent 
improvement in overall safety standards throughout the shipping industry, require 
international cooperation at levels 1 and 2 of the hierarchy. But as noted in Chapter 
VI section 6.8, historically there has been a large disparity between flag States with 
regard to their stipulated minimum standards of education and training. 
The implementation by IMO of the 1995 revision of the 1978 STCW Convention, 
which entered fully into force in 2002 and contains provisions for an internationally 
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agreed basic minimum standard of training for the award of certificates of 
competency to seagoing personnel, may go some way to correcting this disparity. 
But a competence-based approach that simply provides an individual with basic 
training and the correct tools for the job would be insufficient (Trafford, November 
2005). It is necessary also to teach people the underlying principles behind the 
work that they are expected to do and how the tools may be used to the best 
effect. Individuals must be provided with continuing professional education, 
vocational training and the opportunity to gain experience (Munro-Faure, 1992, 
p.91), otherwise they will not only be unable to carry out their work effectively, but 
may also become a liability to the safety of themselves, others, company property 
and the environment. 
Chomsky (1991) noted that in a totalitarian society the executive need not worry 
about what people think because the executive controls what people do, but in a 
democracy to control what people do the executive needs to control what people 
think. Applying this argument to raiSing safety standards throughout a worldwide, 
fragmented industry it is clearly not possible to control everything people do on a 
ship or offshore structure, and therefore it is essential to ensure that they have the 
requisite knowledge, skills, training and experience to be able to think and act 
safely, to recognise hazards, take appropriate action to prevent hazards 
eventuating, to do their work effectively and hence to operate safely. 
This cannot be achieved by safety training alone or simply by developing 
competences. It can however, be achieved by suitable vocational training together 
with continuing professional development of which safety training forms an integral 
part, and then providing individuals with developmental assignments to gain 
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experience in accordance with their needs. But to ensure that such education and 
training are actually being provided and that they are of a suitable standard, it is 
necessary to audit the organisations responsible for its provision. To this end, the 
establishment of an international accreditation body, either as a singular body or as 
a network of institutions, is considered essential. 
The authority to do this already rests with IMO because, as noted by Lord 
Donaldson (2001), an important administrative difference exists between the ISM 
Convention and the STCW Convention. Flag States signatory to the ISM 
Convention operate within a self-regulatory system under which the ·nag States 
certify to IMO that they are fully discharging their obligations under the Convention. 
The STCW Convention on the other hand, contains a provision under which the 
signatory States delegate to IMO the authority to assess whether or not a signatory 
State is complying with its obligations under the Convention. How rigorously and 
with what ardour IMO monitor and enforce the provisions of the revised STCW 
Convention may well decide the effectiveness of the Convention in practice. 
16.3 CONTRIBUTION TO PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
The contributions made by this study to professional knowledge emanate from the 
style and approach of the study and from the empirical research itself. 
Previous enquiries into the introduction of the ISM Code have tended to 
concentrate upon the change elements involved (Anderson, 2002) and whether 
the Code is actually achieving its objectives (Marine Engineers Review, October 
2001). The current study adopted a completely different approach and developed 
a model of the working of the ISM Code that made it possible to identify: 
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• 	 The various levels of safety management at which specific steps are taken 
to develop and implement an effective SMS in individual shipping 
companies, which is the essence of the ISM Code; 
• 	 The corresponding levels of safety management at which specific 
constraints and pressures susceptible to cultural influence operate and 
militate against SMS development and implementation; 
• 	 The levels of safety management at which cooperation is necessary to 
I' 	 achieve an industry wide safety culture and subsequent improvement in 
overall safety standards throughout the shipping industry; 
• 	 The corresponding, specific, culturally influenced constraints and pressures 
militating against such cooperation. 
" 	
Using a case study methodology for the empirical research provided a richness of 
detail, analysis of which: 
• 	 Determined that in order to improve industry-wide maritime safety 
standards more emphasis on education and training would be more 
productive than concentrating on stricter enforcement of existing 
regulations or the introduction of further regulations; 
• 	 Demonstrated that individual shipping companies can not only improve 
their safety standards by providing for the educational and training needs 
of their employees but have a legal duty and moral obligation to do so; 
• 	 Provided a model for determining a company's safety culture maturity 
relative to previous audits or in comparison with a benchmark standard. 
,'1' 
249 
p 
16.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study explored the impact of culturally influenced constraints and pressures at 
levels 3, 4 and 5 of the safety hierarchy because that is where safety management 
systems are developed and implemented. However, from the ISM Code model 
developed in Chapter IX (figure 10) it is evident that culturally influenced 
constraints and pressures also operate at levels 1 and 2 of the safety hierarchy 
and it is those that influence the rigour with which nation States ensure that the 
provisions of the ISM Code are implemented by ships entered on their registers. 
Investigation of the effects of the constraints and pressures operating at levels 1 
and 2 of the safety hierarchy was beyond the scope of the empirical phase of the 
present study. 
Whilst the literature review indicates that constraints and pressures operating at 
levels 3, 4 and 5 of the safety hierarchy are similar throughout the shipping 
industry, only one sector of the industry was examined in the current study. To 
demonstrate industry-wide commonality of the constraints and pressures, research 
encompassing other sectors of the shipping industry would be necessary 
16.5 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During the current study, the following were identified as areas that might usefully 
be researched in the future. 
• 	 Empirical research at levels 1 and 2 of the safety hierarchy to determine 
how best to persuade nation State Administrations and industry bodies to 
more evenly enforce existing regulations throughout the shipping industry. 
( 
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• Empirical research in other sectors of the shipping industry to demonstrate 
industry-wide commonality of the constraints and pressures shown in the 
present study to be operating at levels 3, 4 and 5 of the safety hierarchy 
within the offshore sector of the industry. 
• Analysis of the responses of the key informants to the LOC questionnaire 
(Chapter 12, section 12.8) indicated a possible correlation between job 
function and locus of control orientation. However, the sample size was too 
small to draw firm conclusions and to do so would require additional 
empirical research. 
• Analysis of the responses of the two samples of seafarers to the LOC 
questionnaire (Chapter XIV, section 14.7) indicated the possibility of a 
chronological aspect to locus of control orientation. However, on reflection, 
it was decided further empirical research would be necessary to establish a 
positive link determining cause and effect to demonstrate that a higher rank 
or greater level of experience result in a more internal lOC orientation. 
r 
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KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW RESPONSES 
COMPANY A 
RESPONDENT PROFILES 
Six people in the Company head operations office in Dubai were interviewed. The 
respondents were selected on the basis of two criteria: 
1. 	 All had a responsibility for ensuring safe operation of the vessels by the 
people on board; 
2. 	 Their divergent cultural backgrounds. 
The Respondents 
1 : 	 Managing Director 
2. 	 Operations Manager 
3. 	 HSE Manager (& OPA) 
4. 	 Operations Superintendent 
5. 	 HR Manager 
6. 	 Crewing Supervisor 
Commonalities 
1. 	 All had worked for the company for between one and five years 
2. All were living in Dubai 
I 3. Four of the six respondents were ex-seafarers and a fifth had worked on 
I offshore oilrigs and production platforms. The sixth had worked as a shore 
I 	 based Radio Operator communicating with vessels. 
, 
! 	 Ethnic Origins 
~ Two (Managing Director and HSE Manager) were British of Caucasian-Celtic origins! 
Two (Operations Manager and HR Manager) were Indian 
One (Operations Superintendent) was Filipino 
One (Crewing Supervisor) was Sri Lankan 
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Cultural Backgrounds 
There were a number of differing cultural influences bearing upon the 
respondents: 
1. 	 The Managing Director felt that his cultural background was North 
European although he regarded his country of domicile as U.K. and U.AE. 
2. 	 The Operations Manager felt that his cultural background was lndian­
Western; English was the language used in his home and he regarded his 
country of residence as India. 
! 	 3. The HSE Manager considered his cultural background as Western I 
I Oriental - he was of Scottish descent and his country of domicile asI 	 Malaysia. 
I 
j 4. The Operations Superintendent was sure that he was both ethnically and 
culturally Filipino and his home was in the Philippines. 
I 	 5. The HR Manager had lived in the U.AE. together with his family for 25 years. He is what is known in the UAE as a Non-Resident Indian or NRI 
I 
6. 	 The Crewing Supervisor had lived in the U.AE. for 14 years and although f 
I he stated that his country of domicile was the U.AE. his family lives in Sri 
!, Lanka. 
Occupational & Educational Background 
1. 	 The Managing Director, Operations Manager and Operations 
Superintendent were all ex-seafarers and had Class I (Master Foreign 
Going) Certificates of Competency. In addition, the Managing Director had 
worked for approximately 20 years in a major oil company and had a 
Diploma in Surveying from the Nautical Institute. 
2. 	 The HSE Manager had completed secondary school but had not attended 
a full-time tertiary education course. However, practical safety training and 
experience enabled him to become a member of the Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH). He had also trained as a Lead 
Auditor (I RCA) 
3. 	 Both the HR Manager and Crewing Supervisor had finished secondary 
school but had no formal academic or professional qualifications. 
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INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE & RESPONSES 
A semi-structured interview technique was utilised. A list of questions was drawn 
up and used as an aide-memoire by the researcher to ensure that each 
respondent was asked the same questions regarding their cultural background 
and: 
A The Company Profile; 
B. Vessel reporting Procedures; 
C. Ship Manning Policies; 
I D. Safety, Education and Training Perceptions; 

I 
 E. Interpretation of the Company's SMS; 
F. Maturity Level of the Company Safety Climate; I G. Perception of the ISM Code; and 
I H. Overall Safety Perceptions 
f The list of questions was not however, a check box document. It was not given to , 
the respondents to fill out, the respondents were interviewed individually and there 
i was sufficient latitude for them to answer the questions in their own words. 
Analysis of the Responses 
For purposes of analysis it would have been possible to group the respondents in 
a number of different ways, such as their level of managerial responsibility, their 
direct involvement with seafarers, or their own seagoing experience, and then 
analyse their responses by groupings. However, the objective of the interviews I was to determine whether: 
1. Significant heuristics or biases emanating from different cultural 
I backgrounds influenced the way in which the respondents viewed 
I 
I safety, particularly with reference to the ISM Code and its 
implementation; 
r 2. Whether education and training or better policing and enforcement of 
r existing regulations is the better path to follow in ensuring the 
r objectives of the ISM Code are achieved. 
Therefore, matrices of the responses against a combination of ethnic origins and 
cultural backgrounds on the one hand and formal education together with 
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managerial responsibility on the other hand have been developed for each of the 
question areas. And in order to more readily present the results of the interviews 
in a tabular format it was found useful to assign nominal values to the ethnic and 
educational categories (Blaxter et a/ 2000) as follows: 
VARIABLE CODE VARIABLE CODE 
Tertiary education and 
North European 1 structured managerial A 
development. 
Tertiary education and 
Indian 2 informal managerial B 
development. 
Secondary education and Sri lankan 3 C
structured training. 
Secondary education and Filipino 4 D
no structured training 
COLLATED REPONSES 
A. COMPANY PROFILE 
All Respondents agreed that the Company was an independent ship owner with 
more than forty vessels. This was a matter of simple fact, but there was some 
difference of opinion as to whether the company had a QA System and, if so, 
whether it was accredited as meeting the ISO 9000 Standard. 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Su~ Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
f Educational! 
I Managerial A B C B D D Group 
Q. Doesther YES &Company have a YES NO YES UNSURE UNSURENO 
r QASystem
I 
Q. If so, is it ISO NO NO N/A NO N/A N/A\ 9000 accredited 
~ 
i 
r 
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Further analysis of the answers to this question revealed the following: 
1. 	 There seemed to be some confusion in the minds of the majority of the 
respondents as to the difference between a Quality Assured, 
documented system of working, which is a purely voluntary system used 
by many companies for purposes of efficiency, and an approved SMS, 
which is a legal requirement under the ISM code for a ship operating 
company. 
2. 	 The company has another office in Europe which is concerned with two 
functions, commercial activities and manning of the fleet in West Africa. 
The office in Europe is a separate company from the one in Dubai and it 
has a Quality Assured, documented system of working but it is not 
accredited as being ISO 9000 compUant. 
3. 	 The company in Dubai does not have a Quality Assured, documented 
system ofworking. 
B. VESSEL REPORTING PROCEDURES 
All respondents were asked a series of questions relating to the submission of 
condition reports by the ships to the company. The questions were: 
Q.B.1 Are vessels required to submit to the Company condition reports 
concerning: 
Vessel structure Yes I No 
Machinery Yes / No 
Radio & Navigation Equipment Yes / No 
General Operating Condition Yes / No 
Accommodation Yes I No 
Overall appearance of vessel Yes I No 
Voyage Repairs Carried Out Yes I No 
Voyage Repairs Required Yes I No 
Dry-docking Repairs Required Yes I No 
Classification Certificate Status Yes / No 
Flag State Certificate Status Yes / No 
ir 
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Q.B.2 Are the reports submitted on a regular, periodic basis or on an ad hoc 
basis? 
Q.B.3 What is the frequency of reporting? 
Q.B.4 Who receives the reports? 
I Q.B.S How often are vessels usually inspected by technical and operational staff 
! from the Company? 
I Q.B.6 What is the status of Planned Maintenance in the Company? 
I 
I The answers from all respondents to the above questions were very closely 
I correlated and no significant deviation was noted. Everyone was agreed that there were condition reports that had to be submitted by vessels to the company 
, 
on a regular basis, that there were differing frequencies for different reports, that 
the reports were sent to designated departments and that vessels were inspected ~ 
on an ad hoc basis but there was a requirement for every vessel to be inspected at 
least once per annum. 
All respondents were a/so aware that there was an existing Planned Maintenance 
System and that it was in the process ofbeing rep/aced by a new, computer based 
Planned Maintenance System. 
I 
I
, 
r 
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C. SHIP MANNING POLICIES 
A series of questions regarding the manning policies of the company elicited some 
quite different answers from the respondents. 
Q.C.1 Are ships' Masters Company employees or contract employees? 
Ops HSE 	 Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mqr Mgr 	 Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational f 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Contract Company Contract Contract Contract Contract 
From discussion, the difference between the Managing Director and the 
Operations Manager on this somewhat crucial question would from discussion 
appear to be the meaning of the term 'Companyemployee'. 
To the Managing Director it means somebody who is directly employed by the 
Company on an open-ended basis, who receives a salary both at sea and also 
whilst he is home on leave. 
To the Operations Manager it means someone who is on contract to the company 
for a fixed term and who has worked several such contracts in succession so that 
by virtue of long term service he is regarded as a 'Company employee'. 
This difference most likely stems from the different managerial backgrounds of the 
I 	 two people, the former having served with a major international oil company for 
nearly thirty years and the latter having worked mainly for commercial ship\ 
operators. 
,
f 
Q.C.2 Are ships' senior officers Company employees or contract employees? I All respondents agreed that they are all Contract Employees. 
I 
Q.C.3 Are ships' junior officers Company employees or contract employees? 
f 
I 	 All respondents agreed that they are all Contract Employees. 
Q.C.4 Are ships' ratings Company employees or contract employees? 
All respondents agreed that they are all Contract Employees 
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Q.C.S Does the company use an established crewing agency for contract 
sea staff? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mqr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 
Educational 
IManagerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Partially. Yes, 3 in the 3 in theAgencies 	 2 in theOnly agencies Philippines Philippines
used for 	 Philippine
selected have one of (1 to beWest 	 s,1 in
agencies facilities to which is discontinued)Africans 	 India, 1 in
after vet validity used purely 1 in India,and UK 	 U.K. andbackground of for West I in U.K. &
seafarers. 	 1 inchecks seafarers Africa 1 inRest are 	 Singaporedocuments crewing. Singapore
'walk-ins'. 
Surprisingly, this seemingly straightforward question elicited quite different 
responses with the most marked differences being across Educational I 
Managerial Groups. This tends to indicate a difference of opinion about 
what constitutes an 'established crewing agency' rather than a lack of 
knowledge of the Company's crewing procedures. 
Q.C.G Does the company have a policy regarding the nationality of the crew or 
are crewmembers of mixed nationalities. 
All respondents were agreed that the crews of the vessels were best described as: 
• 	 Mainly Filipino ratings and junior officers; 
• 	 Multinational senior officers of whom 50% are Filipino; 
• 	 The company had no specific crewing policy regarding the number 
of different nationals employed on a vessel nor any exclusive 
policies regarding employment of any particular nationality. 
Q.C.7 What is the official language of communication on board Company vessels 
and between the operations office and vessels? 
All respondents were agreed that the official language on board the 
vessels and between the vessels and the shore was English. 
Q.C.8 Who, if anybody, ensures that crewmembers have an adequate command 
of the official language of communication? 
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Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. 
MQr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Captains, 
Interviews, Chief Captainsboth EngineersNot sure and senior personal Operations and Chief how new officers
and Dept for Officersintakes are cometelephonic officers routedPersonnel checked. through the by crewing and throughDept. Agency office or 
agency, crewing office. If not
should are
verify the dept for possible
check interviewed
ratings' ratings. then at them. onlanguage least will telephone.
capability talk on 
telephone 
All respondents were quite sure that somebody checked that new employees 
had an adequate command of English but there were quite different views 
about who was responsible for carrying out the checks. The Operations 
Manager did not even mention Of{;cers in this context, only ratings. 
,;' 
Q.C.9 What background checks does the Company make on new (or potential) 
seagoing employees? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 
Educational 
!Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Certificates Company has 
checked a very strict 
through the and efficient Validity of Validity offlag state. system for All Seafarers Seafarers SeafarersNo other checking Seafarer Certificates Certificates Certificatesdocuments validity of Certificates and 
checked, and 
are certificates, and validity documents
references documents
checked. documents of all checked 
taken up checkedReferences and Seamen's and former 
,- from former and are not references. In book. employers
employers referencestaken up: 2000 it was References asked for 
and taken updischarge discovered taken up references 
candidates from former entries in that 93% of for Officers. for officers. interviewed employers.Seamen's officers had 
books are false 
inspected . certificates. 
.. 

Annex A - Page 9 of 30 
Q.C.10 Who makes the checks referred to in Question.9 above? 
Everyone was agreed that the Personnel Department were responsible for 
checking the validity of Seafarers' Certificates. In addition, the Operations 
Superintendent, HR Manager and Crewing Supervisor al/ noted that for Filipino 
seafarers the Philippines Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) checked all 
Seafarers' Certificates and Documents before going on contract. 
D. SAFETY, EDUCATION & TRAINING PERCEPTIONS 
Q.D.1 Briefly describe in your own words what you understand by the following: 
Hazard: 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
SuP 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational / 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
An event 
likely to 
cause the 
company 
loss of 
time or 
money or 
to create 
bad 
publicity. 
Any 
potentially 
dangerous 
situation 
that could 
result in 
an 
incident or 
accident. 
A situation 
that could 
cause 
harm. 
Anything 
that you 
can identify 
that can 
later cause 
accidents if 
not 
rectified. 
Danger. Danger. 
Risk: 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup MJlr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 2 3 4Group 
Educational 
I Managerial A B C D D B 
Group 
Something 
that is Anything 
outside that could Chance of Anything
normal lead to a person that can 
operating potential and the Taking a Emergency actuallyprocedures liabilities potential 
chance. become 
or day- to- for the for harm 
aday events of person, coming hazard.the vessel or vessel or together. 

the people on company. 

board. I 
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Safety: 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. MQr Mgr Sup Mqr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 
Educational 
I Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Awareness of 

the working 

environment 
 Takingfrom both a Doing a To try and Protecting preventivephysical and job right avoidFree from yourself actiona place the first accidents,harm. and the beforeperception of time with bodily
environment. doing
what the no risk. harm, etc. anything.person is 

doing or 

where he is. 

Safety Culture: 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. MQr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3 
. Group, 
Educational 
I Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
A 

programme 
 How you
adopted in have been the indoctrinated Everybody
company The way in safety works in aby Implementing you think and how safe Working
employees the attitude generally you have manner in a safe throughout amongst staff 
about observed and safe placethe of doing Ibeing free safety environment I and a 
company things from harm throughout and safefrom top to correctly the in an your life. policies are manner. bottom that first time. 
organisation available to is A mindset aiL 
manifested of an 
in every act individual.
that is 
performed. 
, 
! 
, " 
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Safety Management System: 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic 
Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational 
I Managerial A B C B 0 D 
Group 
An SMS is 
A system 
that 
enables the 
to prove that 
you are 
using the 
company to 
prescribe 
their 
system 
onto the 
individuals 
working 
within the 
company 
and on the 
AnSMS 
incorporates 
and 
documents 
the way of 
doing 
things 
correctly 
the first 
time. 
A 
documented 
system that 
communicates 
the system 
to and from 
the people 
using it. 
A procedure 
developed by 
a company to 
comply with 
ISM code 
requirements. 
company 
system. The 
chain of 
command is 
in the 
company 
system. 
Management 
can prove 
from records 
that the 
An SMS is 
a system 
to comply 
with the 
ISM code. 
company 
as a whole. 
system is in 
place and in 
use. 
Analysis of the above responses to Question 1 of this section is most interesting 
because it does show a divide, albeit minimal, between Western and Eastern 
thinking with regard to safety management. 
The Western approach has a tendency to be internally oriented, the respondents 
seeing people being involved in their actions and being involved with the 
implementation of safe working practices. 
The Eastern approach is more externally oriented with respondents indicating that 
the system is imposed upon individuals so that, if they follow the rules laid down 
by the company, they wilf avoid accidents. 
However, the divide is minimal and far from conclusive. 
f 
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Q.D.2 Do you think Safety Training is effective? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 
Educational 
I Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
I believe it Yes if is effective. 
conducted in When in the right Yes, command,
atmosphere ­ provided if you give Yes, very 
which means Yes. It is a that continuous important.giving 'must'
motivation safety It works Yes ownership and because it 
and training to and it is 
understanding providesdelivery the crew required by to the experience.
are they clients.participants 
correct. become
not just telling 
morethem what 
safetythey must do. 
conscious. 
Q.D.3 Describe briefly whether you consider there is any connection between 
professional training and safety training: 
Respondent Ops HSE Ops HR Crew
" M.D. 
MQr MQr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational 
/ Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Yes. Safety is 
a continuous 
process, a 
mindset, and Yes. The the individual is professional his own safety training Yes: any officer. No oneteaches Yes. It
vocational can enforce Yes,you whatto refers to training safety if the specialistdo and the specialised
should individual does training ­Marginal safety training,include the not have the electronics,training e.g.inherent right attitude etc - is a teaches slinging,
safety and knowledge help.you how to rigging, etc. training. of the danger, do it 
e.g. ratings
without 
wearing safety 
risk. harnesses 
when working 
overside or up 
a mast. 
,", 
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Q.D.4 Does the Company provide training for office-based staff? If 'Yes', please 
specify: 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Yes. ISM Yes, by
auditor 
request.training, Courses
safety Yes. 
are Yes. ISO 
courses, Internal Yes,
advertised 14000,
computer and auditor safety
on the computers,IT literacy, training Not sure. training.
notice safety and 
environmenta for computersboard. tap root I training, everyone etc.There is training.
safety required. 
also some training, in-house
recycling training.training. 
Q.D.5 Does the Company provide training for seagoing staff? If 'Yes', please 
specify: 
Responden Ops HSE Ops HR Crew M.D.t Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 
Educational 
! Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Financial 
support is 
given for 
mandatoryOn-board training as FormerlytrainingYes. Fire motivation. Only where there wasby means Yes.fighting, Opportunity the client has in-house
of video Preliminary
safety, for specialist training but 
.,
, cassettes on-boardISM, vocational requirements. not now 
and training by H2S, Fast training has Otherwise becausebriefings CaptainRescue been offered rely on theby the and senior Craft, but so far STCW facilities no Master officers.first aid. during the certificates. longer
and Chief past six exist.Engineer. 
months 
there has 
been no 
response . 
.' 
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Q.D.S Who in the Company is responsible for training? 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational I 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
The DPA. 
He does 
some of the 
training 
himself and 
some is 
The HSE 
Manger. 
The HR 
Manager 
and the 
DPA 
QA-HSE 
Manger. 
Department 
heads in 
consultation 
with HR 
Manager 
Department 
heads. 
outsourced 
Q.D.7 How aware are you of the provisions of the STCW 95 Convention, Fully 
Aware, Reasonably Aware, Slightly Aware or Not Aware? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational / 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Fully 
Fully Fully aware. In Reasonably Reasonably Reasonably 
aware. aware. top 20% aware. aware aware. 
world wide 
Q.D.S Has the Company made any changes or administrative provisions 
specifically to cater for the implementation of STCW 95? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr MQr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational 
/Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Yes: Yes: we don't 
screening Yes: e.g. log employ crew Yes: lots of 
of crew book entries without the 
checking of Yes:
members' of watch- correctlicences, document
certificates keeping documentation Don't
certificates, checking
and hours; all . Multiple really
crewing andprovision employees applications know.levels and ensuring
of early must have for flag state 
working compliancedocumentationbreaks to STCW95hours. 
complete certificates 
certification 
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Q.D.9 Which Convention do you think will have the most effect on raising safety 
standards in shipping: The ISM Code, STCW 95, Neither, or they will have 
Equal Effect? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
The ISM 
Code. It 
gives you 
more detail of The ISMThe ISM what you STCWisaCode is to Code. must do on The ISM 'must'.
ensure that People board. Code ISMEqual the 
are STCWto 20%, provides
effect. company is getting most people STCW95 guidelinesfollowing
around just means 80%. to follow anIMOSTCW95 you need an SMS.guidelines.
extra bit of 
paper to be 
able to work 
on board. 
Q.D.10 Have you any safety related qualifications? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
Yes. 
Officer's 
Yes, ISM STCWYes. First lead qualifications
aid, fire auditor. In-house fighting, But most safety Yes. Yes. tap root Yes. of my training Basic Pre-seatraining, Internal safety courses, auditor's training
survival at auditor. knowledge Singapore course. course. 
sea, is Polytechnichelicopter experience training,
evacuation. 
related. and internal 
» 
auditor 
course. 
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Q.O.11 Was any of your safety training provided by the Company? 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
SUQ 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
I Educationall 
Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Grou[)_ 
Not really. 
All my 
training was Yes. The 
provided by company 
previous provided the 
employers. Yes. The in-house Yes. The 
However, company training and company 
we do 
conduct 
sent me on 
the Internal No. 
provided for 
me to attend 
sent me on 
the Basic No. 
emergency Auditor's Singapore Auditor's 
response course. Polytechnic course. 
drills on a and the ISM 
six monthly Auditor'S 
basis, which course. 
adds to my 
experience. 
Q.O.12 Are you a mem ber of a professional body or learned society? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 
Educational I 
Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
Yes: 
Nautical 
Institute, 
Honourable 
Company 
of Master 
Mariners. No, not at Yes: IOSH No. No. No. present.The 
company is 
a member 
of the 
Association 
of 
Contractors 
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Q.D.13 Have you received any training specifically related to ISM? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 

Managerial A B C B D 
 0 
Group 
Yes: 
ISM internal 
Yes: auditorYes; Yes: Yes: Yes:ISM course,two-day Internal In-house, in-house,Lead conducted by Auditor Auditor two-hour two-hourAuditor Ferriby
course. training. seminar. seminar.training. Marine 
Consultants 
in SinQapore. 
E. ISM SYSTEM PROFilE 
Q.E.1 Has the Company got a valid DOC? If so, who issued the DOC: Flag State 
Administration, Classification Society on behalf of Flag State, or another 
organisation on behalf of Flag State? 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup
'­Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
-
Yes. 
Class on 
behalf of 
Flag State. 
Yes, 5: The 
1 issued company 
Yes. Yes. bySVG has 
Class on Class on 4 issued vessels Yes Yes 
behalf of behalf of by Class registered B.Y. B.Y. 
Flag State Flag State on behalf in several 
of Flag different 
State countries 
and 
therefore 
-
several 
DOCs. I 
<~"---'-~""" .J 
Annex A - Page 18 of 30 
I 
Q.E.2 How long has the Company had a valid DOC: 
Less than 1 year; 1 - 2 years; More than 2 years? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Originally 
issued in 
1999 but Not sure.About 2 More than later Don't know3 years About two years 2 years withdrawn. precisely.years.Got it back 
about 2 
years ago 
Q.E.3 Have all the vessels in the fleet got a valid SMC? Yes I No 
All respondents were agreed that al/ vessels in the fleet had a valid SMC even 
though, as pointed out by the HSE Manager, only eleven of the vessels in the 
entire fleet actually required one under the regulations. 
Q.E.4. If answer to previous question is 'No', what percentage of fleet vessels 
has a valid SMC: 
Less than 10% 30% - 60% 
10% - 30% r! More than 60% 
Question not applicable (see previous question and response) 
Q.E.5 Who issued the SMC: 
" rFlag State Administration 
Classification Society on behalf of Flag State 
Other organisation on behalf of Flag State (Please specify) __ 
All respondents agreed that Class issued the SMCs on behalf of the Flag State . 
. f" 
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Q.E.6 Who prepared the ISM documentation: 

External Consultant; Member of Shore Staff; Member of Sea Staff; Shore 

Staff &Sea Staff jointly; or other agency? 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
External 
consultant The first 
together with SMSwas 
members of the developed 
shore staff. by the QA- Safety 
American 
partner 
company 
Member 
of shore 
staff 
80% was later 
revised by the 
OPA with ships' 
staff 
HSE 
Manager. 
Now we 
are trying 
department 
with 
assistance 
from other 
Not sure. 
assistance. to develop people 
The a jOint 
documentation system 
is still under with Nyon 
review. 
Q.E.7 Who in the Company is the DPA: 
The Managing Director; Technical Manager; Operations Manager; a 
Superintendent; the Safety Manager or another person? 
All respondents agreed that the QA- HSE Manager (i.e. the Safety Manager) was 
also the DPA. 
Q.E.8 Who conducts the internal audits of the Company ISM System? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup M~r Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 
Educational 
{Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
HSE 14 internal 
Manager auditors (trained The QA-HSE 
together company staff) ManagerInternal
with four of whom appointsauditors HSE SafetyMaster are lead internaland HSE Department Departmentand Chief auditors. auditors. TheydepartmentEngineer External include 
on shore auditors on an Superintendents 
assignment ad hoc basis 
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F. 	 SAFETY CLIMATE 
Q.F.1 	 Do you believe the Company has a genuine Safety Culture? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. MQr MQr SUD Mgr Su~ 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational / 
Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
Yes - just 
No Yes Yes getting Yes Yes 
goinq 
Q.F.2 	 Where do you believe the Company Safety Culture stands on a scale of 0 
to 10, where Q =low priority and 10 =high priority? 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
MQr I 
Ops 
SUD 
HR 
MQr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
3 6 7 7 6.5 7 
Q.F.3 	 What do you believe is prime motivation behind the Company's Safety 
Management policies? For example, do you believe that it is to comply 
with regulatory requirements or to enhance safety performance, to avoid 
legal actions or to shift responsibility for safety from shore to ship? Or do 
you think there are other reasons? 
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Respondent M.D. Ops 
Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic 
Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational 
I Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
To comply with 
regulatory 
requirements, 
enhance safety 
Top performance and 
management avoid legal 
drive it to To enhance actions. 
ensure safety safety However, the 
on board the 
vessels but 
middle 
management 
To enhance 
safety 
performance 
performanc 
e and in 
order to 
comply with 
prime reason is 
for commercial 
considerations, 
e.g. boats under 
To comply 
with 
regulatory 
requirements 
To comply 
with 
regulatory 
requirements 
drive it to safety 500 grt do not 
comply with requirements require ISM but 
regulatory Company Ado it 
requirements anyway for 
marketing 
reasons ­ safety 
is an added 
bonus. 
Q.F.4 	 In your experience, what accidents that occur on Company ships are 
reported to the Company ashore? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational I 
Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
All lost time 
incidents 
and every 
All lost 	 accident 
time because 
incidents. the 
If the ship Every company Most Every Every 
does not accident operates a accidents accident accident 
report it no-blame 
the Client culture 
does. instigated 
by the M.D. 
and the 
O.PA 
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Q.F.S In your experience, are 'near misses' reported to the Company ashore? 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational I 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Q.F.S 	 When the Company receives and accident report from a ship would a 
corrective action be raised and sent to the ship? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Su~ 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B 0 D 
Group 
All accident 
reports are 
analysed by 
the Safety 
Department 
and a 
Always Always Always memo is No Never 
sent to the 
fleet to 
avoid e 
repetition of 
the incident 
elsewhere 
Q.F.7 	 If a corrective action is raised is a follow-up audit carried out? 
Ops HSE Ops HR Crew Respondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational I 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Depends upon 
the type of 
Normally accident. Yes, if Most of theNever 	 Yes Yes 
not necessary; if the time. 
causal factors 
identify a need. 
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a.F.8 Approximately how many accidents are reported in one year for the whole 
fleet? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sl!.Q

Ethnic 
 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 
Educational 
I Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
The 
information 
was 
immediately 
available from About 300 
the computer: in one year More Not sure but 20 in 1998 which isthan 50 the data is 	 Don't23 in 1999 well below including collated by 	 Not sure know17 in 2000 the 1,000 near the Safety 	 offhand27 in 2001 expected in 
misses. Department Note: 2001 a fleet of 
was the year this size. 
in which the 
no-blame 
policy was 
introduced. 
a.F.g 	 How often does the Company carry out drills to test its emergency 

response systems? 

Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mqr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational I 
Managerial A B C B D 0 
_GrouQ 
Twice per Twice per 
year plus: year. Also, 
Ship to there is a 
shore ship to Twice per Twice per I Twice per Twice per monthly shore drill year year 	 year year
and by each 
shipboard vessel 
drills once per 
weekly. year. 
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Q.F.10 	 Do you believe that ships' staff can report all accidents and near misses 
without fear of retribution? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
! Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
Ships' staff Yes, thanks to 
are hesitant the new to report all 
management.Yes, accidents but 	 Yes,For example, inbecause of it has been 	 becausethe Company Yes the Yes emphasised 	 of theADuke incident 
no-blame that if they 	 no-blamethe master was 
culture. report 	 policy.
not sacked but truthfully transferred to there will be 
another vessel. 
no retribution. 
Q.F.11 	 In your OpiniOn, why is there reluctance on the part of ships' staff to 
report accidents and I or near misses to the Company ashore? If you 
feel there is more than one reason, please prioritise the causes 
[1] ... [2]. .. [3] where [1] is the most important Please do not choose more 
than three causes. 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic 1 2 1 4 2 3Group 

Educational 

IManagerial A B C B 0 0 

Group 

Since the 
introduction of Hesitancythe no-blame to reportpolicy, there is accidents 
no reluctance is probablyto report due to (1)There is no 	 accidents or fear of
reluctance. 	 near misses. losing job However, 	 Prior to that (2) fear of 
some 	 there was a adverse
accidents 	 reluctance effect on
and I or near There is no because (1) of There is no There is no career
misses are reluctance fear of losing 	 reluctance reluctancecoupled
not reported 	 job, with a fear due to sheer 	 (2) fear of oflaziness on 	 adverse effect prosecutiothe part of 	 on career, and n, and (3)
ships' staff. 	 (3) a feeling reporting isthat the considered 
company was to be a
not interested waste of 
and didn't time.
really want 
reports. 
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G. 	 PERCEPTION OF ISM CODE 
Q.G.1 	 From your experience, to what degree do you believe that the ISM Code is 
achieving its three specific objectives of ensuring: 
G.1.1 	 Safety at sea 
G.1.2 	 Prevention of human injury or loss of life 
G.1.3 	 Avoidance of damage to the marine environment 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
G.1.1 30% Slight Significant Slight Significant Significant 
Training & 
drills have 
G.1.2 30% Significant Significant Significantly 
reduced Significant Significant 
injuries to 
the crew 
Significant 
effect 
because 
G.1.3 30% Significant Significant MARPOL Significant Significant 
is enforced 
by the ISM 
Code 
Q.G.2 From your experience, to what degree do you believe that the ISM Code is 
achieving its purpose of providing an international standard for the safe 
management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention? 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B 0 0 
Group 
80% 
It boils 
Not 
noticeably Significant 
down to 
the Significant Significant Significant 
policing of 
the system 
-­
r 
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Q.G.3 Have you personally noticed a reduction of accidents or near misses in your 
fleet since the introduction of the ISM Code? 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
SUI=> 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
SUj:2 
Ethnic 
Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational 
/ Managerial A B C B D D 
Group_ 
Significant 
reduction 
but this 
coincides 
with the 
introduction 
of other 
regulations. Slight 
There has 
been a 
noticeable 
reduction 
in 
accidents 
There has 
been an 
increase in 
reported 
accidents Significant Significant 
Too many 
managers 
see ISM as 
a hurdle to 
jump rather 
than a 
reduction but the 
reported 
near 
misses 
have 
increased 
because of 
the new 
open 
management 
system 
reduction reduction 
system to 
implement. 
Q.G.4 Have you personally noticed an improvement in the overall condition of the 
vessels in your fleet since the introduction of the ISM Code? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational/ 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Yes. There 
has been a 
significant 
improvement 
Significant Significant in both the Significant N/A N/Aimprovement improvement physical 
condition of 
vessels and 
in their safe 
operation. 
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Q.G.5 Have you personally noticed an improvement in the operating standards of 
the vessels in your fleet since the introduction of the ISM Code? 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
There has 
been a 
noticeable 
improvement 
with more 
discipline in 
operating 
There has 
been a 
significant 
improvement 
in operating 
standards 
I have noticed 
a slight 
improvement 
in operating 
standards 
I have 
noticed a 
slight 
improvement 
in operating 
standards 
N/A N/A 
standards 
Comparing the responses to Questions G3, G4 and G5 it is quite evident that those 
people who are closest to the vessels, those who most frequently go on board and 
carry out safety audits, i. e. the HSE Manager and the Operations Superintendent, 
have similar views regarding whether or not the introduction of the ISM Code has 
had any appreciable effect on the safety of vessels, reduction in accidents and 
improvement in operating standards. 
The response from the Operations Manager appeared to be in line with what he 
thought he ought to say as a senior manager in the Company. 
The response of the Managing Director was revealing in so far as ;t demonstrated 
a better degree of understanding of what could be expected from the 
implementation of an SMS. His responses were in some instances quite at 
variance with those ofhis managers. 
I 
r 
I 
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Q.G.6 	From your experience what do you believe is the most effective way of 
improving overall ship operating standards? Please prioritise your 
responses [1] ... [2] ... [3] where [1] is the most important. Please do not offer 
more than three propositions. 
Respondent M.D. Ops Mgr 
HSE 
Mgr 
Ops 
Sup 
HR 
Mgr 
Crew 
Sup 
Ethnic 
Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational 
/ Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
1. More 
emphasis 
on 
professional 
training 
2. More 
emphasis 
1. More 
emphasis 
on 
professiona 
I training 
1. More 
emphasis 
on both 
professional 
and safety 
training 
1. More 
emphasis 
on 
professional 
training 
1. More 
emphasis 
on Quality 
Control 
2. More 
1. More 
emphasis 
on 
professional 
training 
on safety 
training 
and 
Quality 
Control 
2. More 
emphasis 
on safety 
training 
2. Stricter 
enforcement 
of existing 
regulations 
2. Stricter 
enforcement 
of existing 
regulations 
emphasis 
on safety 
training 
3. More 
2. More 
emphasis 
on safety 
training 
3. Stricter 
enforcement 
of existing 
regulations 
3. More 
emphasis 
on quality 
control 
3. Greater 
regulation 
of the 
industry 
3. More 
emphasis 
on safety 
training 
emphasis 
on 
professional 
training 
3. More 
emphasis 
on Quality 
Control 
Q.G.7 	How do you perceive the degree of regulation of the shipping industry? 
Ops HSE Ops HR CrewRespondent M.D. Mgr Mgr Sup Mgr Sup 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
Over Sufficiently Under SuffiCiently Sufficiently SuffiCiently 
regulated regulated regulated regulated regulated regulated 
I '. 
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H. 	 OVERALL SAFETY PERCEPTIONS 
a.H.i 	What do you believe are the two most significant potential hazards to 
safety in the shipping industry? 
Managing Director 
1. 	 Poor communications due to both cultural and linguistic differences. 
2. 	 Different levels of training internationally. 
Operations Manager 
Most potential hazards to safety are mainly leadership issues. It is really 
only one point with two facets. 
1. 	 Insufficient knowledge or commitment from Superintendents inspecting / 
visiting vessels. (They do not give the ships' staff the drive to implement 
the Company's policy or are too lax or incompetent to notice deficiencies). 
2. 	 Safety leadership from the Master and Chief Engineer on board. (They do 
not enforce safety and so the crew are quite lax in their application of what 
is really required). 
The other issues of supply of safety gear, written instructions, posting 
of notices are generally displayed for all to see, but the will to follow is 
what really counts. We need people to enforce safety when nobody is 
looking, that ;s the only way it will work. 
Companies are all talking the talk, but we need to help and motivate the 
people on board to walk the walk. 
HSEManager 
1. 	 Lack of competency. 
2. 	 Failure ofpersonnel to take responsibility for their actions. 
Operations Superintendent 
1. 	 We have to change the attitude of our seafarers and to do this we have to 
give them more professional training. 
2. 	 We have to give ships' crews a sense of ownership ofsafety systems. The 
Fleet Officers Conferences are excellent in this respect. 
HRManager 
1. 	 Gross negligence. 
2. 	 Lack of safety training. 
Crewing Supervisor 
4. 	 Pressure put on seafarers by clients. 
5. 	 Low minimum standard of training requirement by the flag state 
.' 
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Annex B 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW RESPONSES 

COMPANYB 

RESPONDENT PROFILES 
Six people in the Company head operations office in England were interviewed. 
The respondents were selected on the basis of two criteria: 
1. 	 All had a responsibility for ensuring safe operation of the vessels by the 
people on board; 
2. 	 Their common cultural backgrounds. 
The Respondents 
1. 	 Area General Manager 
2. 	 Operations Manager 
3. 	 Area Safety Manager (& DPA) 
4. 	 Technical Director 
5. 	 Personnel Manager 
6. 	 Senior Crewing Coordinator 
Commonalities 
1 	 All six respondents were British and of Anglo-Saxon I Celtic origins. 
2. 	 The Area Safety Manager and the Personnel Manager had worked for the 
company for 4 years and 5 years respectively. The other four respondents 
had each worked for the company for between thirteen and nineteen years. 
3. 	 All respondents had successfully completed a course in "ISM Code 
Familiarisation & Internal Auditor Training". 
4. 	 All were living in England. 
5. 	 Two respondents were ex-seafarers, a further two had been closely 
connected with ship operations throughout their careers and two became 
involved with shipping only when they joined Company B. 
Occupational & Educational Backgrounds 
1. 	 The Area General Manager was the son of a ship owner and after 
completing his education had been systematically exposed to ship 
operations, maintenance and management in various companies over a 
number of years before taking up a position in his father's company. 
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2. 	 The Operations Manager started his career working on the fish quays and 
later joined the shore staff of a trawler company that moved from fishing 
into the Offshore industry. 
3. 	 The Area Safety Manager went to sea in the Catering Department of BP oil 
tanker company and later transferred to oil rigs and production platforms as 
a Camp Boss. That gave him a general grounding in HSE with emphasis 
on hygiene and stimulated his interest in other areas of HSE. He 
transferred from Catering to the Safety Department on offshore structures 
and finally came ashore into the Safety Department of Company B. 
4. 	 The Technical Director had served at sea as an Engineer on cargo ships, 
cruise ships and offshore supply vessels. He has a First Class Engineer's 
Certificate of Competency (Steam and Motor). 
5 	 The Personnel Manager has a degree in Business Management majoring 
in Human Resources. Prior to joining Company B she was employed in 
contracts engineering. 
6. 	 The Senior Crewing Coordinator had worked in pensions administration 
with Norwich Union prior to joining Company B HR Department 17 years 
ago. 
INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE & RESPONSES 
A semi-structured interview technique was utilised. A list of questions was drawn 
up and used as an aide memoir by the researcher to ensure that each respondent 
was asked the same questions regarding: 
A. 	 The Company Profile; 
B. 	 Vessel Reporting Procedures 
C. 	 Ship Manning Policies; 
D. 	 Safety, Education and Training Perceptions; 
E. 	 Interpretation of the Company's SMS 
F. 	 Maturity Level of the Company Safety Climate 
G. 	 Perception of the ISM Code 
H. 	 Overall Safety Perceptions 
The list of questions was not however, a check box document and was not given 
to respondents to fill out. Respondents were interviewed individually and there 
was sufficient latitude for them to answer the questions in their own words. 
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Analysis of the Responses 
For purposes of analysis it would be possible to group the respondents in a 
number of different ways, such as their level of managerial responsibility, their 
direct involvement with seafarers, or their own seagoing experience, and then 
analyse their responses by groupings. However, the objective of the interviews 
was to determine whether: 
3. 	 Significant heuristics or biases emanating from different cultural 
backgrounds influenced the way in which the respondents viewed safety, 
particularly with reference to the ISM Code and its implementation; 
4. 	 Whether education and training or better policing and enforcement of 
eXisting regulations is the better path to follow in ensuring the objectives 
of the ISM Code are achieved. 
For the above reasons and for sake of uniformity with the manner in which the 
Company A responses were analysed, matrices of the responses against a 
combination of ethnic origins and cultural backgrounds on the one hand and 
formal education together with managerial responsibility on the other hand were 
developed for each of the question areas. 
Also, to more readily present the results of the interviews in a tabular format that 
was directly comparable to those of the Company A interviews, it was useful to 
assign the same nominal values to the ethnic and educational categories (Bfaxter 
et al 2000) as those used for the Company A responses as follows: 
VARIABLE CODE VARIABLE 	 CODE 
Tertiary education and 

North European 1 structured managerial A 

development. 

Tertiary education and 
Indian 2 informal managerial B 
development 
Secondary education and Sri Lankan 3 C
structured training 
Secondary education and Filipino 4 	 D 
no structured training 
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COLLATED REPONSES 

A. COMPANY PROFilE 
All respondents agreed that the Company was an independent ship owner with 
twenty-seven vessels. All respondents stated this as a matter of simple fact, and 
all similarly understood the difference between an SMS meeting the ISM 
requirements and a QA System accredited as meeting the ISO 9000 Standard. 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE 
Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
I Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Does the 
Company 
have a QA NO NO NO NO NO NO 
System 
If so, is it 
ISO 9000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
accredited 
The company in England does not have a Quality Assured, documented 
system of working. All staff were aware of this and there was no confusion 
between the documentation required to fulfil ISM requirements and the 
documentation that would be required to meet the requirements of an 
approved QA system. 
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B. VESSEL REPORTING PROFILE 

All respondents were asked a series of questions relating to the 
submission of condition reports by the ships to the company. The 
questions were: 
Q.B.1 	 Are vessels required to submit condition reports concerning: 
Vessel structure; Machinery; Radio &Navigation Equipment; 
General Operating Condition; Accommodation; 
Overall appearance of vessel; Voyage Repairs Carried Out; 
Voyage Repairs Required; Dry-docking Repairs Required; 
Status of Classification and flag State Certificates? 
Q.B.2 Are the reports submitted on a regular, periodic basis or on an ad hoc 
basis? 
Q.B.3 	What is the frequency of reporting? 
Q.B.4 Who receives the reports? 
Q.B.5 	How often are vessels usually inspected by technical and operational staff 
from the Company? 
Q.B.6 What is the status of Planned Maintenance in the Company? 
All respondents' answers were closely correlated and no significant deviation was 
noted. All were agreed that there were condition reports that had to be submitted 
by vessels to the company on a regular basis, mostly on a monthly basis although 
there were differing frequencies for some reports, that the reports were sent to the 
Operations Department from where they were distributed and that vessels were 
inspected on a monthly basis when they returned from safety strand-by duties. 
All respondents were also aware that there was an existing Planned Maintenance 
System (PMS) administered by the Technical Department but only the Technical 
Director and his staff seemed to know that the PMS comprised two parts: 
1. 	 A check-box system in the back of the Engine Room logbook. This 
covered basic maintenance. 
2. 	 Shore based tracking and monitoring of the more complex maintenance 
such as engine overhauls. 
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C. 	 SHIP MANNING POLICIES 
A series of questions regarding the manning policies of the company elicited very 
similar from the respondents. 
Q.C.1 	 Are ships' Masters Company employees or contract employees? 
All respondents agreed that they are all Company employees. 
Q.C.2 Are ships' senior officers Company employees or contract employees? 
All respondents agreed that they are all Company employees 
Q.C.3 Are ships' junior officers Company employees or contract employees? 
All respondents agreed that they are al/ Company employees. 
Q.C.4 Are ships' ratings Company employees or contract employees? 
All respondents agreed that they are aI/ Company employees 
Q.C.S 	 Does the company use an established crewing agency for contract sea 
staff? 
All respondents were aware that Company B seagoing staff is employed 
via Southern Crewing, a wholly owned subsidiary of Company B Marine 
(International) Ltd. 
Q.C.6 	 Does the company have a policy regarding the nationality of the crew or 
are crewmembers of mixed nationalities. 
All respondents were agreed that the Company has a policy of employing 
British crews on the vessels as far as practicable but due to a worldwide 
shortage of seafarers a number of West African and East European 
Engineers were also employed. 
Q.C.7 	What is the official language of communication on board Company vessels 
and between the operations office and vessels? 
All respondents were agreed that the official language on board the 
vessels and between the vessels and the shore was English. 
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Q.C.S Who, if anybody, ensures that crewmembers have an adequate command 
of the official language of communication? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mar 
Sm Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational! 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Foreigners 
have to sit an 
Personnel 
Dept. 
Personnel 
Dept. 
Personnel 
Dept. 
Personnel 
Dept 
MeA test in 
English 
proficiency to 
The 
interviewer 
obtain a British 
certificate. 
All respondents were quite sure that somebody checked that new entrants to the 
company had an adequate command of English. However, apparently only the 
Personnel Manager was aware that a/l foreign nationals who wish to sail on British 
ships not only have to have a Certificate of Competency from their home country 
but also have to sit a Marine & Coastguard Agency examination to demonstrate 
proficiency in English before they will be granted an equivalent British Certificate of 
Competency enabling them to sail on British ships. 
Q.C.9 	What background checks does the Company make on new (or potential) 
seagoing employees? 
All respondents were agreed that the Company routinely validated the 
validity of Seafarers' Certificates of Competency and other documentation 
ofnew employees. 
Q.C.10 Who makes the checks referred to in Question.9 above? 
Everyone was agreed that the Personnel Department were responsible for 
checking the validity of Seafarers' Certificates. The Technical Director 
added that not only were references from former employers taken up but 
that additional background checks were made by Heads ofDepartments or 
their deputies when employing senior officers. 
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D. SAFETY, EDUCATION & TRAINING PERCEPTIONS 

Q.D.1 Briefly describe in your own words what you understand by the following: 
Hazard: 
Area Ops Area Tech HR I Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational I 
Managerial A D C B A C 
GroUl>.. 
Something A danger: 
that you somethingSomething SomethingA potential have not got 	 that couldthat can A potential that couldrisk. much control 	 cause an cause you danger. cause anover waiting 	 accident or harm. 	 accidentto trip you injury. 
up. 
Risk: 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr Crew Respondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational I 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Always 
there but Whether it How much LikelihoodHow likely not 	 is safe to Possibility of of that (a 	 danger
something is always 	 do a hazard hazard) 	 there is in a to happen aware of 	 something eventuatinghappening. 	 procedure.the or not. 
problem. 
Safety: 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr Crew Respondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 	 1 1Group 
Educational 
/ Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Working so 
Overall that no oneEverything
management 	 gets hurt or to do with
approach. 	 Personal that the ensuring noEverybody is 	 Being protection environmentProtecting 	 harminvolved in 	 more of yourself does not get
others. 	 comes to 
safety. 	 careful. and damaged.people or Ourselves and 	 others. You aredamage to
others. More 	 responsible
equipment.
empowerment. 	 for yourself 
and others. 
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Safety Culture: 
Respondent 
Ethnic 
Group 
Area 
G.M. 
1 
Ops 
Mgr 
1 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
1 
Tech 
Director 
1 
HR 
Mgr 
1 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
1 
Educational 
/ Managerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
A way of 
corporate 
thinking led 
from the top 
by example. 
The 
Corporate 
CEO is very 
keen on 
safety. 
Looking 
after other 
people's 
safety as 
well as 
your own. 
Beliefs of 
the 
organisation 
and the 
actions of 
the people 
in the 
organisation 
Training 
people to be 
more careful 
and look after 
each other. 
Emphasis on 
doing things 
property and 
doing that 
automatically. 
Building a 
culture in 
which 
safety is a 
priority, 
both your 
own safety 
and that of 
others. 
The 
procedures. 
methods of 
reporting, etc 
that the 
company 
works to, e.g. 
the PAUSE 
culture. 
Safety Management System: 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. MQr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational 
I Managerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
A system to 
ensure you A system in 
are Formalising Formal place
operating as The ISM 
company's system detailing
safely as system to
safe working used to procedurespossible: Formalising which we practices manage the of working in 
reducing proper work: the and normal way we do a safe way. impact on procedures. company's
routine our A laid down formalisedthe procedures. business. procedure of 
environment procedures.safe working 
and third practices. 
persons 
Analysis of the above responses shows markedly similar safety perceptions 
among the respondents. This may be due to the fact that all respondents are 
of the same ethnic origins and cultural background or, perhaps more likely, to 
the fact that all respondents had successfully completed a course in "ISM 
Code Familiarisation & Internal Auditor Training". 
Essentially an overall active response indicating an internaf orientation rather 
than a reactive response indicating an extemal orientation. 
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Q.D.2 Do you think Safety Training is effective? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
SnrCrew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
IManagerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Yes, but it 
Generally 
yes. 
Depending 
on course 
content. 
Raises 
awareness. 
depends 
upon the 
person's 
background 
and attitude. 
Some who 
are already 
well versed in 
safety will get 
Yes. 
Yes. An 
accident in 
a shipyard 
in which 
two men 
were killed 
brought it 
home to 
everyone. 
Yes, 
provided it 
is 
continuous. 
A one-off 
course is 
not 
effective. 
Yes, 
provided it 
is done on 
an ongoing 
basis. 
less out of it 
than others. 
The HSE Manager and the Technical Director responded both positively and 
unreseNedly to the above question. The other four respondents also responded 
positively but qualified their responses to some degree. 
Q.D.3 Describe briefly whether you consider there is any connection between 
professional training and safety training: 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational 
I Managerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
Yes: 
professional Yes. The 
training should better 
Yes. lead to trained a Yes. Yes,Teaches competence and person isThe link is Professionalthe correct competence the better Yes. competency. training
way to do should lead to he can doCompetency You must shows youthings. safety. his job and factor have the how to doReinforces However, not the less basics. thingsthe safety enough likely he issafely.
message emphasis is put to have an 
on safety in accident. 
professional 
training. 
The response to this question from all respondents is extremely positive. Each 
has indicated that profeSSional training leads to competency and that competency 
is the key to safety. 
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Q.D.4 Does the Company provide training for office-based staff? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational/ 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Yes, but not Yes. Yes. on aYes. If I have just Inductionstructuredthe need been on a course for basis. Yes.is there communications newTraining is I have just then the course and a employeesYes. provided completed thecompany PAUSE course plusad hoc communications
will (Prevent on-going
when seen course.support it. Accidents ad hocto be Using Safety courses.beneficial. Equipment) 
In light of the preceding question, it is interesting to note that all the specific 

courses referred to by the respondents were safety training courses and not 

continuing professional development (CPO) courses. 

Q.D.5 Does the Company provide training for seagoing staff? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 

Educational 

I Managerial A 0 C B A C 

Group 

Yes.Yes.Yes. SafetyYes. PrimarilyThe training awarenessThe Offshore safetyprogramme courses,Safety Stand- training but for safety 
I Yes. by industry has withseafarers is officer's Yes.its own occasionalfully course,
requirements technical
structured induction 
over and training onand coursesabove STeW. an ad hoc
managed. when joining basis 
vessels. 
The training provided for seagoing staff was safety orientated and primarily client 
driven. The focus on safety training seemed to overshadow any requirements that 
may have existed for job-related functional training. 
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Q.0.6 Who in the Company is responsible for training? 
Respondent Area 
G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
I Managerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
There is a 
HRand 
Safety 
Departments 
plus 
departmental 
Heads 
The 
Training 
Officer in 
the 
Personnel 
Department 
is 
responsible 
for Sea 
Training 
Officer within 
Personnel 
but some 
training is 
arranged by 
the Safety 
Department. 
It is a 
management 
Mainly the 
DPA and the 
Training 
Officer 
although I 
occasionally 
arrange 
specific 
The Training 
Officer 
tracks and 
administers 
the 
programme. 
Mainly HR 
and the 
Safety 
Department 
Staff 
training. 
function with 
no clear line 
of 
technical 
training 
demarcation. 
Again, from the responses, the emphasis is once again upon safety training 
courses although the existence of vocational training was evident from the 
references to training courses arranged by departmental heads. 
Q.0.7 How aware are you of the provisions of the STCW 95 Convention, Fully 
Aware, Reasonably Aware, Slightly Aware or Not Aware? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational! 
Managerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
Reasonably 
Slightly Reasonably aware Reasonably FullyFully aware. 
aware. aware. insofar as it aware aware. 
affects me 
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Q.D.8 Has the Company made any changes or administrative provisions 
specifically to cater for the implementation of STCW 95? If so, please 
specify: 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group_ 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational I 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Yes. 
Mostly the 
Yes. 
Transition 
courses 
and 
conversion 
courses. 
Yes. 
There is 
now more 
emphasis 
on 
training. 
AIISTCW 
mandatory 
training is 
offered as 
required by 
the staff. 
Yes. 
Training is 
offered in 
accordance 
with the 
STCW 
regulations. 
introduction 
of training 
courses to 
meet the 
STCW 
requirements 
and ensuring 
that 
seafarers' 
Certificates 
meet the 
STCW 
Yes. 
The legal 
requirements 
form an 
embedded 
part of the 
ISM Code and 
are therefore 
reflected in 
our Company 
requirements. 
requirements 
Q.D.9 Which Convention do you think will have the most effect on raising safety 
standards in shipping: the ISM Code, STCW 95, neither, or they will have 
equal effect? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director MQr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational I 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
From a 
Putford (Le. The ISM
company) 
codeThe ISM point of The ISMIt depends because it Code, view the Code is your how they is on-going provided ISM Code. every day The ISM are whilst the 
a good From an running.Code. applied STCW 
system is industry STCW is only
within a Codein place. point of examination 
company. operates
view the requirements.
on a one­STCW95 
off basis.Code. 
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Q.O.10 Have you any safety related qualifications? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational I 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
All respondents had completed an ISM Code Familiarisation & Internal Auditor 
Training Course. In addition, the following comments were noted: 
Yes. 

Numerous 

Yes. Safety 

Offshore Training
Yes.Survival courseOilCourse, Certificates,Company Yes.Various Lead Auditor, Yes. Yes.short Basic
specialist RYA Yacht Company STCW courses safety
courses, Master courses. familiarisation
and course.Oil Certificate,
experienceMajor's currently 

courses. studying for 

Diploma in 

Ship 

Management. 

Q.D.11 Was any of your safety training provided by the Company? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr Crew Respondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational I 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Yes and 
No.Yes. This Firstly at 
company UniversityYes. Yes. and Yes. Yes.andprevious 
subsequent
employer. in-house 
courses. 
Annex B - Page 14 of 27 
Q.D.12 Are you a member of a professional body or learned society? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational! 
Managerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
No. No. Yes: IOSH No. Yes. CIPD No. 
Q.D.13 Have you received any training specifically related to ISM? 
Respondent I Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
! Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Yes. 
ISM Code 
familiarisation 
and internal 
auditor 
training. 
Yes. 
ISM Code 
familiarisation 
and internal 
auditor 
training. 
Yes 
ISM Code 
familiarisation 
and internal 
auditor 
training. 
Yes. 
ISM Code 
familiarisation 
and internal 
auditor 
training. 
Yes. 
ISM Code 
familiarisation 
and internal 
auditor 
training. 
Yes. 
ISM Code 
familiarisation 
and internal 
auditor 
training. 
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E. ISM SYSTEM PROFilE 
Q.E.1 	 Has the Company got a valid DOC? If so, who issued the DOC: Flag State 
Administration, Classification Society on behalf of Flag State, or another 
organisation on behalf of Flag State? 
All respondents were aware that the Company had a valid DOC and that it was 
issued by the Flag State Administration. The Area Safety Manager noted that it 
had originally been issued by the DNV Classification Society, 
Q.E.2 	 How long has the Company had a valid DOC: 
Less than 1 year 
1 - 2 years r 
More than 2 years 
All respondents were aware that the Company had been in possession of a valid 
DOC for more than 2 years. The Area Safety Manager advised that the original 
DOC was awarded 7 years ago in 1998. 
Q.E.3 	 Have all the vessels in the fleet got a valid SMC? 
All respondents were aware that all the vessels in the fleet had a valid SMC. 
Q.E.4 If 'No', what percentage offleet vessels have a valid SMC: 
Less than 10% n 30% ­ 60% r 
10% - 30% n More than 60% n 
In light of the answer to QD4, this question was not applicable. 
Q.E.5 Who issued the SMC: 
rFlag State Administration 
rClassification Society on behalf of Flag State 

Other organisation on behalf of Flag State (Please specify) __ 

In light of the answer to QD.1, this question was not applicable. 
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Q.E.& Who prepared the ISM documentation? 
The Area General Manager advised that an External Consultant drew up the initial 
ISM documentation and involved all the shore staff and a large number of sea staff 
in designing the Safety Management System. The Area Safety Manager noted 
that documented systems were already in existence and the External Consultant 
had pulled them together into an integrated ISM system. 
Q.E.1 Who in the Company is the DPA? 
All respondents were aware that the Area Safety Manager was also the DPA 
Q.E.8 Who conducts the internal audits of the Company ISM System? 
All interviewees were aware that internal audits of the Company system are 
carried out by an audit team comprising: 
• The Area Safety Manager; 
• The Operations Manager; and 
• One other person 
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F. SAFETY CLIMATE 
Q.F.1 Do you believe the Company has a genuine Safety Culture? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational! 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Yes Yes Yes Yes. Definitely Yes Yes 
Q.F.2 	 Where do you believe the Company Safety Culture stands on a scale of 0 
to 10, where 0 =low priority and 10 =high priority? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr Crew Respondent G.M. Mgr HSE MQr Director MQr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational! 
Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
8 7 7 10 8 9 
The responses to the first two questions in this section indicate that all the 
respondents are quite positive that the company not only has a genuine safety 
culture but also that the culture is already well developed. This finding was 
supported by the responses received to the next question: see below. 
Q.F.3 	 What do you believe is prime motivation behind the Company's Safety 
Management policies? For example, do you believe that it is to comply 
with regulatory requirements or to enhance safety performance, to avoid 
legal actions or to shift responsibility for safety from shore to ship? Or do 
you think there are other reasons? 
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Respondent Area 
G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
! Managerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
A 
combination 
of factors: 
1. 
50% to 
comply with 
regulatory 
requirements 
and 50% to 
enhance 
safety 
performance. 
To enhance 
safety 
performance 
1st - to avoid 
legal actions 
2nd _to 
comply with 
regulatory 
requirements 
3rd -to 
enhance 
safety 
performance 
To enhance 
safety 
performance 
Primarily to 
enhance safety 
performance 
and as a 
secondary 
consideration 
to avoid legal 
actions. 
Commercial 
advantage; 
2. 
regulatory 
requirements 
3. 
To keep 
employees 
safe 
4. 
Less 
accidents 
means less 
expenditure 
Q.F.4 In your experience, what accidents that occur on Company ships are 
reported to the Company ashore? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational! 
Managerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
Most 
accidents. 
Reporting is 
Every 
accident 
-without 
a doubt. 
encouraged. 
If you can 
catch the 
minor 
Almost 
every 
accident. 
Every 
accident ­
emphatically 
Don't 
know. 
Every 
accident. 
incidents you 
can avoid the 
major. 
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Q.F.5 In your experience, are 'near misses' reported to the Company ashore? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 
Educational 
IManagerial A 0 
Group 
Yes. 
As mentioned 
in response 
Yes to the last 
question, 
reporting is 
encouraged. 
Area 

HSE Mgr 

1 
C 
Yes. 
The company 
promotes a 
Just Culture, 
i.e. a no-
blame culture 
but people 
must take 
responsibility 
for their 
actions. 
Tech HR Snr Crew 
Director Milr Coord. 
1 1 1 
B A C 
Yes - Don't Yes
emphatically know 
Q.F.& When the Company receives and accident report from a ship would a 
corrective action be raised and sent to the ship? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 
Educational 
IManagerial A 0 
Group 
Depends 
upon level of 
severity. 
Safety 
Department 
currently has 
Yes. responsibility 
for 
investigation 
although that 
is currently 
changing. 
Area 

HSE Mgr 

1 
C 
Levelled response. 
All accident reports 
are investigated at 
Level 1 (i.e. on board 
ship). Level 2 is a 
shore investigation 
by the Safety 
Department and if 
not happy then a 
corrective action is 
issued. 
Level 3 is a shore 
investigation of 
serious incidents 
such as a L TI and 
involves senior 
managers. 
Level 4 is an 
investigation at 
Corporate level of 
very serious 
incidents. 
NOTE: The levelled 
response system is 
based on the 
potential of the 
incident and not the 
actual outcome. 
Tech 
Director 
1 
B 
HR 
Mgr 
1 
A 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
1 
C 
Always N/A N/A 
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Q.F.7 If a corrective action is raised is a follow-up audit carried out? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mg_r 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
IManagerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Yes Normally yes Always As required N/A NfA. 
Q.F.8 Approximately how many accidents are reported in one year for the whole 
fleet? 
The answer to this question was immediately available from the company's 
computer files and the figures are used in Chapter X111 of the thesis. 
Q.F.9 How often does the Company carry out drills to test its emergency 
response systems? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational 
IManagerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Once per Once per Once per Twice per Once per Once per 
year year year. year year year. 
Q.F.10 	 Do you believe that ships, staff can report all accidents and near misses 
without fear of retribution? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR SnrCrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 	 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational 
fManagerial A D C B A C 
Group 
Yes, because Yes. Yes,there is more 	 Definitely. It's thanks to
chance of 	 when they the no-Yes 	 retribution if an don't report Yes. Yes.blameincident not 	 them that they culture.
reported. 	 should fear 
retribution. 
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Q.F.11 	 In your opinion, why is there reluctance on the part of ships' staff to 
report accidents and I or near misses to the Company ashore? If you 
feel there is more than one reason, please prioritise the causes 
[1]. .. [2]. .. [3] where [1] is the most important Please do not choose more 
than three causes. 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 
Educational! 
Managerial A 0 
Group 
There is no 
reluctance 
There is no 
'target zero' 
approach so 
people do not 
feel a need to 
hide 
There is no accidents. 
reluctance Justness and 
pragmatism. 
No-blame 
culture 
tempered 
with 
responsibility 
for one's own 
actions. 
Area 

HSE Mgr 

1 
C 
Fear of 
losing job. 
Ships' 
staff 
perceive 
the 
company 
to have a 
different 
culture 
from that 
which 
actually 
exists. 
Tech 

Director 

1 
B 
There is 
no 
reluctance 
HR Snr Crew 
Mgr Coord. 
1 1 
A C 
There is There is no 
no reluctancereluctance 
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G. PERCEPTION OF ISM CODE 

Q.G.1 	 From your experience, to what degree do you believe that the ISM Code is 
achieving its three specific objectives of ensuring: 
G.1.1 	 Safety at sea; 
G.1.2 	 Prevention of human injury or loss of life; and 
G.1.3 	 Avoidance of damage to the marine environment? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
I Managerial A D C B A C 
Group 
G.1.1 
G.1.2 
G.1.3 
Generally 
good but 
hampered 
by the fact 
that there 
are a few 
dodgy Flag 
States 
Very 
positive 
effect 
Significant 
degree 
when I if 
used 
correctly. 
Significant 
degree 
To a significant 
degree. Ships 
will frequently 
notify the office 
if they have 
concerns. 
There is a two-
way 
communication 
Definitely 
works very well 
in the company 
and probably 
in the industry 
as a whole. 
Written 
procedures 
leave less 
room for mis­
interpretation 
Q.G. 2 From your experience, to what degree do you believe that the ISM Code is 
achieving its purpose of providing an international standard for the safe 
management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director MQr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational 
I Managerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
Yes, butthe 
problem is that It is providing 
some Flag a standard You can beStates are not 	 but somecompliantAs per the as 	 Flag States As per the withoutprevious conscientious 	 Significant are not so previousachievingquestion. as the MeA in 	 enthusiastic questionimprovement
enforcing the 	 as others in s in safety.
rules. There is enforCing 
a lack of regulations 
consistency 
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Q.G.3 Have you personally noticed a reduction of accidents or near misses in 
your fleet since the introduction of the ISM Code? 
Respondent Area 
G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
IManagerial A D C B A C 
Group 
No. We 
were Yes, but 
heading in 
the right 
direction 
before the 
introduction 
of the ISM 
Code. Since 
its 
introduction 
more 
matters of a 
Slight 
reduction 
plus a 
definite 
increase in 
safety 
awareness. 
There has 
been an 
increase in 
reporting 
but the 
serious high 
potential 
accidents 
have 
reduced. 
Yes,butdue 
moreta 
company 
safety 
policies and 
priorities 
than 
anything to 
do with the 
ISM Code. 
Significant 
reduction. 
However, 
that could be 
due to the 
direction in 
which the 
company 
was already 
heading. 
there has 
been a 
change in 
the role of 
company 
vessels. 
The initial 
concept 
was safety 
stand-by: 
now there 
minor nature is a lot of 
are being cargo work. 
reported. 
Q.G.4 Have you personally noticed an improvement in the overall condition of the 
vessels in your fleet since the introduction of the ISM Code? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr Crew Respondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational 
IManagerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
The fleet Yes,has Yes, but due but that 
always more to could beYes, but not been well company duetoThe vessels due to the looked safety theare all well introduction of Yes. Thereafter. It is policies and directionmaintained. the ISM Code. has been a an old priorities in whichThe PMS has However, the significantfleet. It is thehelped Code than improvementanything to companbetter to considerably. reinforces the do with the ywasmaintenance. spend on ISM Code. alreadyrepair than 
headingcapital 
acquisition 
-.--~---
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Q.G.5 Have you personally noticed an improvement in the operating standards of 
the vessels in your fleet since the introduction of the ISM Code? 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE MQr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
MQr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
IManagerial A D C B A C 
Group 
The 
company 
has not 
changed its 
operating Yes but that 
Improvement 
in operating 
standards is 
mostly client 
driven. 
policies but 
the systems 
are now 
formalised 
and also 
act as a 
It is difficult 
to judge Slightly 
could be due 
to the 
direction in 
which the 
company 
was already 
Significantly 
tool for heading 
manageme 
ntto 
motivate 
the crew. 
Comparing the responses to Questions G3, G4 and G5 it is quite evident that all 
respondents felt that there had been a general overall improvement in operating 
and maintenance standards since the introduction of the ISM Code but not 
necessarily because of its introduction. Most felt that the company was already 
heading in the 'right direction' prior to the introduction of the Code, including the 
introduction of a Planned Maintenance System. 
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Q.G.6 	From your experience what do you believe is the most effective way of 
improving overall ship operating standards? Please prioritise your 
responses [1] ... [2] ... [3] where [1] is the most important. Please do not 
offer more than three propositions. 
Respondent Area G.M. 
Ops 
Mgr 
Area 
HSE Mgr 
Tech 
Director 
HR 
Mgr 
Snr Crew 
Coord. 
Ethnic 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Educational 
IManagerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
1. Greater 
regulation of 
the industry 
1. Stricter 
enforcement 
of existing 
regulations. 
1. More 
emphasis 
on safety 
training 
1. More 
emphasis on 
professional 
training 
1. More 
emphasis on 
safety training 
1. More 
emphasis on 
safety training 
2. Stricter 
enforcement 
of existing 
regulations 
3. More 
emphasis on 
quality 
control. 
2. More 
emphasis on 
safety 
training 
3. More 
emphasis on 
professional 
training 
2. More 
emphasis 
on 
professional 
training 
3. More 
emphasis 
on quality 
control 
2. More 
emphasis on 
safety 
training 
3. Stricter 
enforcement 
of eXisting 
regulations 
2. More 
emphasis on 
professional 
training 
3. Stricter 
enforcement 
of existing 
regulations 
2. More 
emphasis on 
quality control 
3. Stricter 
enforcement 
of existing 
regulations 
Q.G.7 	How do you perceive the degree of regulation of the shipping industry? 
Area Ops Area Tech HR Snr CrewRespondent G.M. Mgr HSE Mgr Director Mgr Coord. 
Ethnic 1 1 1 1 1 1Group 
Educational 
IManagerial A 0 C B A C 
Group 
Sufficiently 
regulated but 
there are times 
About right. when the 
Do not regulations can Sufficiently
require Sufficiently Sufficiently Sufficiently be overbearing. regulated.further regulated regulated regulated There are too About right. increase in 	 many companies 
regulations employing foreign 
crews who have 
a poor command 
of English. 
The Area General Manager's responses to questions QG.6 and QG.7 are 
contradictory. In the first response he thought greater regulation of the industry 
would improve safety standards but in the second he thought the industry was 
already suffiCiently regulated and no additional regulation was required. 
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H. OVERALL SAFETY PERCEPTIONS 

Q.H.1 What do you believe are the two most significant potential hazards 
to safety in the shipping industry? 
Area General Manager 
3. 	 People's competency. 
4. 	 Differing standards between Flag States. 
Operations Manager 
3. 	 Commercial pressures. 
4. 	 Shortage of qualified personnel. 
Area Safety Manager 
3. 	 People (behavioural). 
4. 	 The weather 
Technical Director 
6. 	 Professional competency. 
7. 	 Lack of basic training. 
Personnel Manager 
1. 	 Personnel are not properly qualified and trained. 
2. 	 Correct tools not provided to do the job properly. 
Senior Crewing Coordinator 
3. 	 Language barrier, particularly on Safety Stand-by vessels. 
4. 	 Reluctance of seafarers to change. This could be redressed by 
more training. 
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ANNEXC 

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 

INTERVIEW RESPONSES 

AnnexC 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 

COMPARATIVE RESPONSE ANALYSIS 

C.1 THE RESPONDENTS 
The respondents listed below were each interviewed regarding their personal views 
of the company's safety philosophy and safety record, particularly with regards to 
the implementation and effectiveness of the ISM Code: 
Company A 	 Company B 
7. 	 Managing Director Area General Manager 
8. 	 Operations Manager Operations Manager 
9. 	 Operations Superintendent Technical Director 
10. QA-HSE Manager 	 Area Safety Manager 
11. HR Manager 	 Personnel Manager 
12. Crewing Supervisor 	 Senior Crewing Coordinator 
During the empirical research, Company B did not have an Operations 
Superintendent: the duties being undertaken by the Technical Director. Therefore, 
the Operations Superintendent was interviewed in Company A and the Technical 
Director in Company B. 
The respondents were selected on the basis of two criteria: 
1. 	 All had a responsibility within the parameters of their job function for 
ensuring safe operation of the vessels by the people on board; 
2. 	 They represented the various tiers of management and supervision within 
the companies for which they worked. 
Transcripts of the interview questions and the respondents' answers in tabulated 
format are attached as Annexes A and B. 
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C.2 COMPANY A RESPONDENTS 

Utilising the coding system shown in Table 4 at section 10.4.3 of Chapter X, the 
following is an overall view of the respondents. 
Respondent Managing 
Operations 
DPA Operations H.R. 
Crewing 
Director Manager Superi ntendent Manager Supervisor 
Ethnic Group 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Educational! 
Managerial A B C B D D 
Group 
C.2.1 Ethnic Origins 
Two (the M.D. and the DPA) were British of Anglo Saxon-Celtic origins 
Two (the Operations Manager and the HR Manager) were North Indian 
One (the Operations Superintendent) was Filipino 
One (the Crewing Supervisor) was Sri Lankan 
C.2.2 Cultural Backgrounds 
There were a number of differing cultural influences bearing upon the 
respondents: 
1. 	 The Managing Director felt that his cultural background was North 
European although he regarded his country of domicile as U.K. and U.AE. 
2. 	 The Operations Manager felt that his cultural background was Indian­
Western; English was the language used in his home and he regarded his 
country of residence as India. 
3. 	 The DPA considered his cultural background as Western I Oriental and his 
country of domicile as Malaysia. 
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4. 	 The Operations Superintendent considered that he was both ethnically and 
culturally Filipino and his home was in the Philippines. 
5. 	 The HR Manager had lived in the U.A.E. for 25 years together with his 
family. Such people are known locally as Non-Resident Indian or NRI 
6. 	 The Crewing Supervisor had lived in the U.A.E. for 14 years and although 
he said his country of domicile was the U.A.E. his family lived in Sri Lanka. 
C.2.3 Commonalities 
1. 	 All had worked for the company for between one and five years 
2. 	 All were living in Dubai 
3. 	 Four of the six respondents were ex-seafarers and a fifth had worked on 
offshore oil rigs and production platforms. The sixth had worked as a 
shore based Radio Operator communicating with vessels. 
C.2.4 Experience & Educational Background 
1. 	 The Managing Director, Operations Manager and Operations 
Superintendent were all ex-seafarers and each had Class I (Master 
Foreign Going) Certificates of Competency. The Managing Director also 
had a Diploma in Surveying from the Nautical Institute and had spent 
over 20 years in senior positions with a major international oil company. 
2. 	 The DPA had completed secondary school but had no tertiary education. 
His practical safety training and experience however, enabled him to 
become a member of the Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. He 
had also trained as a Lead Auditor (I RCA) 
3. 	 The HR Manager and the Crewing Supervisor had finished secondary 
school but had no formal academic or professional qualifications. 
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C.3 COMPANY B RESPONDENTS 

Area 	 SeniorOperations Technical HR 
Respondent General DPA CrewingManager Director Manager 
Manager Coordinator 
Ethnic 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Group 
Educational 
I 
A D C B A C 
Managerial 
Group 
C.3.1 Ethnic Origins and Cultural Backgrounds 

All six respondents were British and of Anglo-Saxon I Celtic origins. 

C.3.2 Commonalities 
1. 	 The Area Safety Manager and the Personnel Manager had worked for the 
company for 4 years and 5 years respectively. The other four respondents 
had each worked for the company for between thirteen and nineteen years. 
2. 	 All of the respondents had successfully completed a course in "ISM Code 
Familiarisation & Internal Auditor Training". 
3. 	 All were living in England. 
4. 	 Two of the respondents were ex-seafarers and a further two had been 
closely connected with ships and shipping for most of their careers. The 
other two respondents became involved with shipping only when they 
joined the company. 
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C.3.3 Occupational & Educational Backgrounds 
1. 	 The Area General Manager was the son of a ship owner and after 
completing his education had undergone a management apprenticeship, 
with systematic exposure to the various aspects of ship operations, 
maintenance and management in various companies over a number of 
years before taking up a position in his father's company. 
2. 	 The Operations Manager started his career working on the fish quays and 
later joined the shore staff of a trawler company that moved from fishing 
into the offshore support boat industry. 
3. 	 The DPA (Area Safety Manager) sailed in the Catering Department of BP 
oil tanker company and later transferred to oil rigs and production platforms 
as a Camp Boss. The experience gave him a general grounding in HSE 
with emphasis on hygiene that stimulated his interest in other areas of 
HSE. He transferred from Catering to the Safety Department on offshore 
structures and finally came ashore into the Safety Department of Company 
B. 
4. 	 The Technical Director had served at sea as an Engineer on cargo ships, 
cruise ships and offshore supply vessels. He has a First Class Engineer's 
Certificate of Competency (Steam and Motor). 
5. 	 The Personnel Manager has a degree in Business Management majoring 
in Human Resources. Prior to joining Company B she was employed in 
contracts engineering. 
6. 	 The Senior Crewing Supervisor had a background in pensions' 
administration with the Norwich Union prior to joining the HR Department of 
Company B some 17 years ago. 
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C.4 COMPARISON OF INTERVIEWEE RESPONSES 

The tabulated transcripts of the key informant interviews which are attached as 
Annexes A and B were analysed for comparisons, contrasts and matching 
patterns. 
The following summary identifies salient comparisons, contrasts and emergent 
patterns on a topic by topic basis. 
C.4.1 Company Profile and Vessel Reporting Procedures 
The questions in this sector related primarily to matters of fact rather than matters 
of opinion and were asked primarily to assist in gaining a comprehensive overall 
picture of the company structure. Therefore, all respondents' answers were very 
closely correlated and no significant deviation was noted either across the cultural 
divide or between companies. 
With regard to vessel reporting and maintenance requirements, everyone was 
agreed that: 
• 	 There were condition reports that had to be submitted by vessels to the 
company on a regular basis; 
• 	 There were differing frequencies for different reports; 
• 	 The reports were sent to the Operations Department from where they 
were distributed to designated departments; 
• 	 Vessels were inspected both regularly and also on an ad hoc basis, and in 
addition there was also a requirement for every vessel to be inspected at 
least once per annum. 
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All respondents in both companies were aware that their respective company had 
a Planned Maintenance System (PMS). In Company A all respondents were 
aware that the PMS was in the process of being changed from a paper based 
system to a computerised system. In Company B only the Technical Department 
staff appeared to be aware that the PMS comprised two parts: a ship based 
system covering basic maintenance and a shore based system for tracking and 
monitoring of the more complex maintenance. 
C.4.2 Ship Manning Policies 
Once again, the questions asked related to matters of fact rather than opinion and 
there was little in the responses to identify any cultural influenced differences 
between the interviewees. However, the responses did reveal that the two 
companies had quite distinct employment philosophies. 
Company A employed predominantly Filipino seafarers and relied upon three 
outside crewing agencies to supply most of the seafaring personnel, although 
some were directly engaged. But whether supplied by an third party agency or 
directly engaged, all seagoing personnel were employed on short-term single­
voyage contracts. 
Company B on the other hand, employed predominantly British seafarers and 
engaged them exclusively through a single crewing agency, which was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Company 8 Holdings Inc, the parent company of Company 8. 
The personnel employed by Company 8 had annual rolling contracts of 
employment with the crewing agency and could therefore be considered as 
company employees. 
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The differences in employment philosophies are of some significance when 
consideration is being given to providing education and training for employees 
insofar as companies are more inclined to provide education and training for 
company employees than for casual labour or short-term employees unless 
required to do so by regulation. 
C.4.3 Safety, Education & Training 
Safety 
Analysis of the responses to the questions regarding safety reveals little overall 
difference between the respondents across the cultural spectrum. Indeed, there is 
a great deal of similarity between the responses of the six Company B 
respondents and two of the Company A respondents: the HSE Manager and the 
Operations Superintendent. It is considered significant that all eight had received 
ISM familiarisation and Lead Auditor training. 
The views of the other four Company A respondents were not far removed from 
those of the other respondents and it is noted that the Managing Director and the 
Operations Manager had both received Lead Auditor training and the HR Manager 
and Crewing Supervisor had both attended an in-house ISM Code seminar. 
Education and Training 
All respondents were agreed that safety training is effective although seven of the 
twelve respondents qualified their agreement with requirements for the training to 
be conducted in a manner that was motivational, provided the trainees with a 
sense of ownership, was on-going and had relevant content. 
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All twelve respondents thought that there was a connection between professional 
training and safety training. Whilst Company A Managing Director thought the 
connection was marginal the other eleven respondents thought the connection 
was fundamental to safety. The general consensus of opinion was summarised in 
the response of Company B Area Safety Manager who stated that 'Professional 
training should lead to competence and competence should lead to safety'. 
However, despite this consensus of opinion the training offered by both companies 
was mainly safety training with only a minimal amount of vocational training or 
continuing professional development being undertaken. None of the respondents 
referred to Clause 6.5 of the ISM Code which requires companies to establish and 
maintain procedures for identifying training requirements and ensuring that the 
requisite training is provided. 
When asked about any changes the company had made to provide for the training 
requirements stipulated by the revised STCW Code, the responses differed across 
company lines but not across cultural lines. Company A respondents all 
emphasised checking that seafarers had the correct, valid and current licences 
and certificates whilst Company B respondents all mentioned the training courses 
provided by the company to ensure that seafarers they employed received the 
requisite training. This reflects the different employment philosophies of the 
companies as outlined above. 
Eleven of the twelve respondents thought the ISM Code would be more effective 
than the STCW Code on raising safety standards in shipping and the twelfth 
respondent thought the two codes would have equal effect. 
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Of the twelve respondents only two in each company were members of a 
professional body or learned society: the HSE/Safety Managers of both companies 
were members of the Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH), the 
Personnel Manager in Company B was a member of the Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development (CIPD) and the Managing Director of Company A 
was a member of both the Nautical Institute (NI) and the Honourable Company of 
Master Mariners. 
Once again, no divisions of opinion were noted along cultural lines in this section 
of the interview. 
C.4.4 ISM System Profile 
All respondents were aware that their respective companies had developed and 
implemented Safety Management Systems compliant with the ISM Code well 
before the required date. It was also pointed out by Company A's HSE Manager 
that all vessels in the fleet had a valid SMC even though eleven of the vessels (Le. 
less than one third of the fleet) actually required an SMC under the regulations. 
In both companies the HSE/Safety Manager was responsible for arranging internal 
audits of the system. 
The questions related essentially to matters of fact rather than matters of opinion, 
no culturally influenced differences in the responses were discerned nor any 
differences of opinion due to varying managerial perspectives. 
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C.4.5 Safety Climate 
All respondents in Company B were quite sure that the company had a genuine 
safety culture and that it was well developed. 
The respondents in Company A were less positive, with the Managing Director 
stating that the company did not in fact have a genuine safety culture. 
The Managing Director of Company A and the Area General Manager of Company 
Both thought the prime motivation for their respective company's safety 
management policies was a drive by top management to improve safety 
performance coupled with a need to comply with regulatory requirements. By and 
large these views were shared by the other respondents and were reflected in 
their responses, there being no evidence of any cultural grouping of the views 
expressed. 
All respondents were quite sure that most, if not all accidents and all hazardous 
occurrences (Le. 'near misses') were reported. All expressed the opinion that 
there was no reluctance on the part of ships' staff to report accidents and 
hazardous occurrences because both companies promoted a no-blame culture, 
although the Area Safety Manager of Company B felt that ships' staff tended to 
perceive the company to have a different culture from that which actually existed. 
The respondents indicated that both companies had a tiered level of response to 
accident reports dependant upon the nature and severity of the incident. It was 
apparent though that the accident response in both companies was very much 
'top-down' driven rather than of a 'feed-back and discussion' nature as often 
shown in SMS schematic diagrams. 
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C.4.& Perceptions of the ISM Code. 
Respondents were asked whether or not the introduction of the ISM Code has had 
any appreciable effect on vessel safety, reduction in accidents and improvement in 
operating standards, and whether or not the ISM Code is achieving its purpose of 
providing an international standard for the safe management and operation of 
ships and for pollution prevention. The question elicited varying responses. 
Those people closest to the vessels, i.e. those who most frequently go on board 
and carry out safety audits, all agreed they had seen marked improvements and 
that the ISM Code was achieving both its objectives and its purpose. There was 
no division across cultural lines. Three of the respondents however, the Managing 
Director of Company A, the Area General Manager of Company 8 and the 
Operations Manager of Company 8, struck a dissonant note. The first felt that 
whilst the ISM Code was steadily achieving its objectives it had not noticeably 
made any headway in achieving its purpose of providing an international standard. 
The other two respondents both noted that the ISM Code was hampered in 
achieving its purpose because some flag States are not as conscientious as 
others in enforcing the rules. 
Most respondents said they had seen a significant reduction in accidents or 
hazardous occurrences and an improvement in the overall condition of the vessels 
since the introduction of the ISM Code. However, the Managing Director of 
Company A noted that this had coincided with the introduction of other regulations 
whilst the Area General Manager, Technical Director and Personnel Manager of 
Company 8 thought that the reduction was due primarily to new policies that the 
company had introduced prior to the introduction of the ISM Code. There was no 
evident division along cultural lines amongst the respondents. 
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The Company A respondents reported an improvement in operating standards but 
the Company B respondents were less convinced that there had been any 
improvement in operating standards in their fleet, at least as a result of the 
introduction of the ISM Code. Again, there was no evident division along cultural 
lines amongst the respondents. 
In response to the question "From your experience and in order of priority what do 
you believe are the three most effective ways of improving overall ship operating 
standards?" the general consensus was: 
a. More emphasis on professional training 
b. More emphasis on safety training and Quality Control 
c. Stricter enforcement of existing regulations. 
Two respondents thought that there should be greater regulation of the industry as 
a whole but when asked how they perceived the degree of regulation in the 
shipping industry al/ respondents with the exception of Company A's HSE 
Manager, thought that the industry was already either sufficiently regulated or over 
regulated. 
c.s OVERAll SAFETY PERCEPTIONS 
Finally, the respondents were asked what they believed were the two most 
significant potential hazards to safety in the shipping industry. Interestingly, 
although couched in different terms, one theme was common to all interviewees 
across both the cultural and managerial divides: a greater emphasis on education 
and training. This can be seen from the following responses. 
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C.5.1 Company A 
• 	 Managing Director: Different levels of training internationally; 
• 	 Operations Manager: Insufficient knowledge or commitment from 
Superintendents; 
• 	 DPA: Lack of competency; 
• 	 Operations Superintendent: We have to change the attitude of our 
seafarers and to do this we have to give them more professional training; 
• 	 HR Manager: Lack of safety training; 
• 	 Crewing Supervisor: Low minimum standard of training requirement by the 
flag State. 
C.5.2 Company 8 
• 	 Area General Manager: People's competence; 
• Operations Manager: Shortage of qualified personnel; 

.. Technical Director: Professional competency and lack of basic training; 

• 	 Personnel Manager: Personnel not properly qualified and trained. 
.. 	 Senior Crewing Coordinator: Reluctance of seafarers to change. This 
CQuid be redressed by more training. 
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ANNEXO 
CALCULATING ACCIDENT 
STATISTICS 
Annex D 
CALCULATING ACCIDENT STATISTICS 

The following definitions and formulae are used when calculating accident 
statistics in line with OCIMF and OSHA guidelines: 
DEFINITIONS 
Incident: 

An event that results in a fatality or injury to a seafarer onboard ship or whilst 

ashore on company business. 

lost Workday Case (LWC): 

An injury that results in an individual being able to carry out his duties or return to 

work on a scheduled shift on the day following the injury. 

Restricted Work Case (RWC): 

An injury that results in an individual being unable to perform all normally assigned 

work functions during a scheduled shift or being assigned to another job on a 

temporary or permanent basis on the day following the injury. 

Medical Treatment Case (MTC): 

Any work related work-related loss of consciousness, injury or illness requiring 

more than first aid treatment by a qualified medical practitioner. 

First Aid Case (FAC): 

Anyone-time treatment and subsequent observation or minor injuries such as 

bruises, scratches, cuts, burns, splinters, etc. 
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Permanent Total Disability (PTD): 
Any work injury that incapacitates an employee permanently and results in 
termination of employment on medical grounds. 
Permanent Partial Disability (PPD): 
Any work injury that results in the complete loss, or permanent loss of use, of any 
member or part of the body that partially restricts or limits an employee's basis to 
work on a permanent basis at sea. 
Exposure Hours: 
Total number of hours a vessel's crew is exposed to the possibility of suffering the 
consequences of an incident (24 hours per person per day whilst serving on 
board). 
FORMULAE 
Utilising the above outline definitions, the following formulae are used for 
calculating accident statistics. 
Lost Time Injuries (LTis) are the sum of Fatalities, Permanent Total Disabilities, 
Permanent Partial Disabilities and Lost Workday Cases, or: 
L Tis = Fatalities + PTD + PPD + lWC 
Total Recordable Cases (TRCs) are the sum of all work-related fatalities, lost time 
injuries, restricted work injuries and medical treatment injuries, or: 
TRCs = L Tis + RWCs + MTCs 
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Each of these indicators is turned into a frequency rate by dividing the indicator by 
the exposure hours and multiplying by the factor in terms of which the frequency is 
to be expressed. For example: 
L TIF =l Tis X 200,000 
Exposure Hours 
This will give a Lost Time Injury Frequency expressed as the number of lost time 
injuries per 200,000 man-hours. 
Similarly: 
TRCF =(LTls + RWCs + MTCs) x 200,000 
Exposure Hours 
This will provide a Total Recordable Case Frequency expressed as the number of 
total recordable cases per 200,000 man-hours. 
The frequencies may be expressed as a rate per any desired unit of exposure 
hours, but 200,000 is commonly used in the United States and was the unit used 
by both Company A and Company B. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED 

TO SEAFARERS 

Annex E 
Marine Research Questionnaire - Talaan ng mga Tanong sa Pagsasaliksik 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
TALAAN NG MGA TANONG 
A number of seafarers and shipping company shore-based staff in three countries 
are being asked to complete this questionnaire in order to provide statistical 
information for a research project. 
Ang pagsasaliksik na ito ay nakatuon sa mga marinero/mandaragat at mga 
manggagawa na nakabase sa opisina ng mga kompanyang pangka/aka/ang 
pandagat sa tat/ong bansang napiJing tumugon sa mga katanungan. Layunin nito 
na makapagbigay ng impormasyong pang-istatistika tungo sa /ubos na pang­
unawa sa pagsasaliksik na ito. 
The questionnaire is entirely confidential. You are not required to give your name 
and you are not required to sign the document 
Ang mga katanungan at inyong mga tugon 0 kasagutan ay mananatiling lihim. 
Malaya kayong isulat 0 hindi ang inyong panga/an at /agda/pirma. 
You are requested simply to answer each question with your own honest opinion 
so that the researchers will gain a better understanding of how seafarers and 
shore-based staff from different countries view the world in which they live and 
work. 
Maaari po lamang na sagutin ang bawat katanungan ayon sa inyong pansariling 
pananaw at matapat na opinion. Layunin ng mananafiksik ang magkaroon ng 
mabuting pang-unawa tungkol sa pananaw sa mundo ng mga mandaragat at 
manggagawa sa opisina sa ibat'ibang bansa ayon sa fugar na kanilang tinitirhan at 
pinagtatrabahuhan. 
The questionnaire is in two parts: 
Ang mga Katanungan ay nahahati sa dalawang bahagi: 
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Part 1 requests you to give some information about your background, such as 
your position on board ship or ashore, your qualifications and the length of time 
you have been a seafarer. 
Ang mga katanungan sa unang bahagi ay patungkol sa inyong sarili tu/ad ng 
inyong katayuan sa trabaho pang-opisina 0 sa barko, kwalipikasyon at kung gaano 
kataga/ na kayong nagtatrabaho bilang marinero. 
Part 2 comprises a number of alternative statements. In each case you are 
requested to select the statement that best describes how you feel. 
Ang ikalawang bahagi naman ay binubuo ng mga pangungusap kung saan kayo 
ay pipi/i ng pangungusap na pinakama/apit na naglalarawan sa inyong damdamin 
o pansariling opinion at pananaw. 
When filling out Part 2 of the questionnaire: 
• 	 Remember that there are no right or wrong answers; 
• 	 Do not spend too much time thinking about particular questions; just rely 
upon your first impression. 
Sa inyong pagpfJi ng kasagutan sa ikalawang bahagi ng pagsasa/iksik na ito, 
alalahanin ang mga sumusunod na gabay: 
• 	 Walang Tama 0 Maling kasagutan na maituturing 
• 	 Hindi kinakailangang pagbuhusan ng mahabang panahong pag-iisip 
para sagutin ang mga katanungan. Pagbasihan ang inyong unang 
impresyon 0 ang unang sagot na inyong napili ayon sa inyang 
palagay ay sapat na. 
Your help and cooperation in completing the questionnaire is greatly appreciated. 
Ang inyong tulong at kooperasyon sa pagpuno ng mga katanungan ay higit na 
pinapahalagahan. Maraming salam at sa inyong pagtugon. 
Sean Trafford 
G. 	Sean Trafford 
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PART 1 (Unang BahagiJ 
1. 	 Your position, rank or rating: 
Posisyon, Ranggo. 
2. 	 Your age last birthday: 
Idad nuong huling kaarawan. 
3. 	 Your nationality: 
Lahi / Bansang Kinabibilangan 
4. 	 Number of years at sea or in ship operations: ___ 
Bi/ang ng taon na nagtrabaho sa laot 0 sa kaugnay na trabahong / 
pamamahalang pang-barko. 
5. 	 Highest qualifications achieved. Place a cross in the brackets (X ) next to 
those items that best describe your qualifications: 
Pinakamataas na katangiang natamo: Lagyan ng ekis and loob ng 
panak/ong katabi ng inyong sagot. 
Academic Qualifications (Katangiang Pang-Akademya) 
(D) University Degree 
(D) College Diploma or Certificate 
(D) Higher School Certificate 
(D) lower School Certificate 
(D) Other (please specify) 
Professional Qualifications (Katangiang Pampropesyonal) 
(D) Master I Chief Engineer unlimited 
(D) Master / Chief Engineer restricted 
(0) Deck f Engineer Officer Class 2 
(0) Deck f Engineer Officer Class 3 
(0) Mechanic I Electrician f Cook I A.B. I EDH 
(0) Other (please specify) 
Safety Qualifications (Katangiang Pangkaligtasan) 
(0) STCW Certificates 
(D) lead Auditor 
(0) Other (please specify) 
6. 	 Are you a member of a professional body such as the Nautical Institute or 
the Society of Marine Engineers and Naval Architects: 
Yes I No (Circle as appropriate) 
If 'Yes' please specify ___ 
Ikaw ba ay kasapi ng mga samahang pang-propesyonal tulad ng "Nautical 
Institute or the Society ofMarine Engineers and Naval Architects" 
Do/Hindi (bilugan ang inyong sagot) 
Kung 00, aling sama:h.:.::a~n~?~===______ 
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PART 2 Okalawang Bahagi) 
For each set of alternative statements, put an X in the box next to the one 
statement that best describes how you feel. There are no right or wrong answers. 
it is your own views that we want. 
Sa bawat bilang, lagyan ng (X) ang loob ng kahon ng inyong napifing 
pangungusap. Tandaan na walang Tama 0 Maling kasagutan kundi piliin lamang 
kung aling pangungusap ang pinakamalapit na naglalarawan sa inyong damdamin 
at pananaw. 
1. 	 o People get into trouble because the law is too strict. 
Ang mga tao ay nasasangkot sa gulo dahil masyadong mahigpit 
ang batas. 
o People get into trouble because the law is not strict enough. 
Ang mga tao ay nasasangkot sa gulo dahil hindi masyadong 
mahigpit ang batas. 
2. o Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad 
luck. 
Maraming bagay na nagdulot sa mga tao ng kalungkutan ay dahil 
sa kamalasan. 
o People's misfortune's result from the mistake's they make. 
Ang kamalasan ang bunga ng mga kamaliang gawa ng tao. 
3. 	 o One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people do 
not take enough interest in politics. 
{sa sa mga pangunahing dahilan ng pagkakaroon digmaan ay 
sapagkat walang gaanong interes ang mga tao sa pulitika. 
o 	 There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to 
prevent them. 
Ang Digmaan ay hindi mawawala, kahit anupang pagsusumikap 
ang gawin ng mga tao upang maiwasan ito. 
4. o 	 In the long run, people get the respect they deserve in this world 
Darating din ang araw na matatanggap din ng mga tao ang respefo 
at paggalang na nararapat para sa kanila sa mundong ito. 
o 	 Unfortunately, a person's worth often passes unrecognised no 
matter how hard he tries. 
Kaya lang, ang ha/aga / kabuluhan ng tao ay kadalasang hindi 
napapansin a napapahalagan kahit ana pang pagsisikap and gawin 
niya. 
, 
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5. o The idea that teachers and lecturers are unfair to students is 
nonsense. 
Ang pananaw na ang mga guro at tagapagturo ay hindi 
makatarungan sa mga estudyante ay wa/ang kabuluhan. 
o 	 Most students do not realise the extent to which their grades are 
influenced by accidental happenings. 
Hindi nauunawaan ng karamihan sa mga estudyante na malaking 
bahagi ng kanilang marka sa pag-aaral ay maaring bunga ng mga 
di-inaasahang pangyayari. 
6. 	 o Without the right lucky breaks, one cannot be an effective leader. 
Ang isang pin uno ay hindi magiging epektibo kung walang 
swerteng natanggap sa tamang panahon, 
o 	 Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken 
advantage of their opportunities. 
Maraming mga may kakayahang tao ang hindi naging pin uno dahil 
sinayang nila ang mga pagkakataong dumating sa puhay. 
7. 	 o No matter how hard you try, some people just do not like you. 
Kahit ana pa mang pagsusumikap and gawin mo, may mga tao 
taJagang ayaw sa iyo 0 hindi ka gusto. 
o 	 People who cannot get others to like them do not understand how 
to get along with other people. 
Ang mga taong hindi makahikayat ng iba upang magustuhan sila ay 
hindi marunong makisama 
8. 	 o Heredity plays the major role in determining your personality. 
Ang iyong pinagmulan ang nagtatakda ng iyong pagkatao. 
o It is your experiences in life that determine your personality. 
Ang iyong mga karanasan sa buhay ang humuhubog ng iyong 
pagkatao. 
9. 	 o I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
Mangyayari kung ano ang nakatakdang mangyari. 
o 	 Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a 
decision to take a definite course of action. 
Ang pagdedesisyon base sa mga plano ay higit na maayos kaysa 
kung ipapaubaya lang sa kapalaran 
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10. 	 D If a student is well prepared, there is rarely, if ever, such a thing as 
an unfair test or examination. 
Kung ang mag-aaral ay handa sa pagsusulit, bibihira kung sakaling 
man na may maituturing siyang hindi makatarungang pagsusu/it. 
D 	 Exam questions are often so unrelated to course work that studying 
is really useless. 
Ang mga katanungan sa pagsusulit ay kada/asang walang 
kaugnayan sa kurso kung kaya naman hindi na kailangang mag 
balik-aral. 
11. 	 o Becoming a success is a matter of hard work; luck has little or 
nothing to do with it. 
Upang maging matagumpay kailangang magtrabaho ng maigi at 
magsumikap, konti lamang 0 maaring walang kinalaman ang 
swerte dito. 
D Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the 
right time. 
May ma/aking kaugnayan sa pagkakaroon ng mabuting trabaho 
ang pagiging nasa tamang lugar sa tamang oras. 
12. o 	 The average citizen can have an influence in government 
decisions. 
Ang mga ordinaryong mamamayan ay maaring makaimpluwensya 
sa desisyon ng pamahalaan. 
D 	 The few people in power run this world, and there is not much the 
little a guy can do about it. 
Ang mundo ay pinapatakbo ng ii/an lamang na makapangyarihang 
tao sa mundo, ang masa 0 ordinaryong mamamayan ay halos 
wa/ang magagawa upang baguhin ang kondisyong ito. 
13. 	 o When I make plans, I am usually almost certain that I can make 
them work. 
Sa aking mga pagpaplano, kada/asang nakasisiguro ako na kaya 
kong gawin at ipatupad ito. 
o 	 It is not usually wise to plan too far ahead because many things 
turn out to be a matter of luck anyway. 
Kada/asan, hindi na kinakailangan mag-aksaya ng panahon sa 
pagpaplano dahil maraming bagay 0 pangyayari ay bunga naman 
ng swerte. 
14 o 	 There are certain people who are just no good. 
May mga taong wa/ang kwenta 0 silbi. 
o 	 There is some good in everybody. 
Lahat ng tao ay mayroong maituturing na kabutihan 0 kagalingan. 
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15. 	 o In my case, getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. 
Sa aking sitwasyon, walang kinalaman ang swerte upang makamit 
ko ang aking ninanais. 
o 	 Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a 
coin. 
Maraming pagkakataon na mabuting pang gamitin ang sapalaran 
sa barya (paghagis ng barya: nakaharap 0 nakatalikod?) para 
mabuo ang desisyon. 
16. 	 o Who gets promotion often depends on who was lucky enough to be 
in the right place first. 
Ang pagtaas/pag-angat ng posisyon sa trabaho ay nakabatay sa 
swerte kung sino ang unang nasa tamang fugar. 
o 	 Getting promotion depends upon ability; luck has little or nothing to 
do with it. 
Ang pagtaaslpag-angat ng posisyon sa trabaho ay nakabatay sa 
abi/idad at kahusayan ng tao, maaaring kaunti lamang 0 waJang 
kinafaman dito ang swerte 0 kapa/aran. 
17. o 	 As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of 
forces we can neither understand nor control. 
Kung pag-uusapan ang mga pangyayari sa mundo halos lahat tayo 
ay biktima ng mga pwersang hindi natin maintindihan at hindi 
makontrol. 
o 	 By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can 
control world events. 
Maaaring makontrof ng mga mamamayan ang mga kaganapan sa 
mundo kung sila ay aktibong makikilahok sa mga gawaing 
pampulitika at pang-mamamayan. 
18. 	 o Most people do not realise the extent to which their lives are 
controlled by accidental happenings. 
Maraming tao ang hindi nakakaunawa sa kapangyarihan ng mga 
di-sinasadyang pangyayari sa kanilang buhay. 
o 	 There really is no such thing as luck. 
Wala naman taiagang maituturing na swerte. 
19. o 	 You should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
Kailangan /agi kang nakahandang umamin sa iyong mga kama/ian. 
o 	 It is usually best to cover up your mistakes. 
Pinakamabuti ang pagtakpan ang iyong mga kamafian. 
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20. o It is hard to know whether or not other people on board ship really 
like you. 
Mahirap malaman kung ta/agang gusto ka ng ibang mga tao na 
kasama mo sa barko. 
o 	 How many friends you have on board ship depends upon how you 
treat your shipmates. 
Ang dami ng kaibigan mo sa barko ay depende 0 nakabase sa 
kung paano mo itinuturing / Unatrato ang iyong mga kasama. 
21. 	 o In the long run, the bad things that happen to us are balanced by 
the good ones. 
Sa huling banda, ang masasamang pangyayari sa atin ay 
nababalanse ng mga mabubuting pangyayari. 
o 	 Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness 
or all three 
Karamihan ng mga kasawian ay bunga ng kakulangan ng abiJidad, 
kamangmangan, katamaran 0 lahat ng nabanggit. 
22. o 	 With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
Kung may sapat na pagsusumikap, maaaring maalis 0 mawaJa na 
ang pangungurakot at korapsyon sa pulitika. 
o 	 It is difficult for people to have much control over the things 
politicians do in office. 
Napakahirap para sa mga mamamayan ang magkaroon ng kontrol 
sa mga gawain ng pulitiko sa opisina. 
23. o 	 Sometimes I cannot understand how my supervisor arrives at the 
conclusions he puts in my company appraisal report. 
Minsan, hindi ko maunawaan kung saan nanggagaling ang opinion 
at pananaw na isinusulat sa pagsusuring pagganap (appraisal 
report) ng aking tagamahafa at tagasiyasat. 
o 	 There is a direct connection between how well I do my job and the 
company appraisal report I get. 
Mayroon direktang kaugnayan kung gaano kahusay ang aking 
pagtatrabaho sa ulat na natatanggap ko galing sa kompanya. 
24. o 	 A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they 
should do. 
Inaasahan ng mahusay na pinuno na kayang magdesisyon ng mga 
mamamayan kung ana ang dapat nilang gawin. 
o 	 A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are. 
Ipinaliliwanag sa fahat ng mahusay na pin uno kung ana ang 
trabaho ng bawat isa. 
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25. o I often feel that I have little or no influence over the things that 
happen to me. 

Kadalasan ay wala akong kina/aman sa mga nangyayari sa aking 

buhay. 

o 	 I cannot believe that fate or chance play an important role in my life. 
Hindi aka naniniwa/a na ang pagkakataon at kapa/aran ay 
gumaganap ng maha/agang bahagi ng aking buhay. 
26. o 	 People are lonely because they do not try to be friendly. 
Maraming tao ang ma/ungkot dahi/ ayaw nilang subukang 
makipagkaibigan. 
o 	 There is not much use in trying too hard to please people; if they 
like you they like you. 
Hindi mo na kailangang pilitin at gawin ang buong makakaya upang 
magustuhan ka ng mga tao; kung gusto ka nila ... gusto ka nila. 
27. 	 o There is too much emphasis on safety on board ships nowadays. 
Masyadong pinahaha/agahan ang Kaligtasan sa mga 
barko/sasakyang pandagat sa panahon ito. 
o 	 Emphasising safety on board ship helps to develop a team spirit. 
Ang pagpapaha/aga sa Kaligtasan sa barko/sasakyang pandagat 
ay nakakatulong sa pagbuo ng mahusay na pagsasamahan bilang 
isang buong pangkat. 
28. 	 o What happens to me is my own doin"g. 
Kung ana man ang nangyari sa akin ay dahi/ na rin sa aking sariling 
gawain. 
o 	 Sometimes I feel that I do not have enough control over the 
direction my life is taking. 
Minsan, nararamdaman ko na walang akong kina/aman 0 kontro/ sa 
direksyong tinatahak ng aking buhay. 
29. o 	 Usually I cannot understand why companies send out so much 
Safety literature to their ships: accidents will still happen. 
Kadalasan hindi ko maintindihan kung bakit napakaraming 
babasahin tungko/ sa Ka/igtasan ang pinapada/a ng mga kumpanya 
sa kanilang mga barko, gayun pa man patu/oy pa ring magaganap 
ang mga aksidente. 
D 	 In the long run seafarers are responsible for accidents on board 
ships and consequently for poor company accident records. 
Sa huling banda, ang mga mandaragat ang mananagot at 
responsab/e sa mga aksidenteng nangyari sa kanilang barko at sa 
paghina at masahol na mga talalrekord pangkaligtasan ng kanilang 
kumpanya. 
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Annex F 
QUESTIONNAIRE EVALUATION SCALE 

Part 1 
Rank 	 Experience (Age + Service) 
0.1 	 Superintendent 5 Add together the following: 
Master or CtE 4 0.2 40+ 3 
Other Officer 3 25 -40 2 
Senior rating 2 18 - 25 1 
Junior Rating 1 0.4 30+ 3 
15 - 30 2 
0-15 1 
Academic & Professional Attainment 
Academic Qualifications Professional Qualifications 
University Degree 5 Master I Chief Engineer unlimited 5 
College Diploma or Certificate 4 Master I Chief Engineer restricted 4 
Higher School Certificate 3 Deck / Engineer Officer Class 2 3 
Lower School Certificate 2 Deck I Engineer Officer Class 3 2 
Other (Score above equivalent) Mechanic t Electrician I Cook t AS 1 
Other (score above equivalent) 
Safety Qualifications (Add to above) 

STCW Certificates 1 

Lead Auditor 2 

Other 1 or 2 (depending on qualification) 

0.5 Membership of a Professional Body 
No Score to be awarded. This question is not for evaluation purposes. The 
results are to be used in the final discussion part of the paper. 
Score one point for each of the following: 
2.a, 3.b, 4.b, 5.b. 6.a, 7.a, 9.a, 10.b, ii.b, 12.b, 13.b, i5.b, 16.a, 17.a, 18.a, 
20.a, 21.a, 22.b, 23.a, 25.a, 26.b, 28.b,29.a. 
A high score = External Locus of Control 
A low score =Internal Locus of Control 
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